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INTRODUCTION
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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
Fairbanks North Star Borough v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
In Fairbanks North Star Borough v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 1 the Ninth Circuit held that
the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers’ (“Corps”) issuance of an approved jurisdictional determination did not
constitute final agency action under the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) for purposes of judicial
review. 2 Fairbanks sought permission from the Corps to develop property for recreational use. 3 The Corps
found that the Clean Water Act required that Fairbanks obtain a permit prior to conducting the work. 4
Fairbanks brought suit to set aside the Corps’s determination. 5 The district court granted the Corps’s
motion for judgment on the pleadings, and concluded that the approved jurisdictional determination did not
constitute final agency action under the APA. 6 The court of appeals provided two conditions for agency
action to be final: (1) the action must mark the consummation of the agency’s decision-making process, and
(2) the action must be one by which rights or obligations have been determined, or from which legal
consequences will flow. 7 The court concluded that the first condition was met, but the second was not. 8
According to the court, the second condition was not met because Fairbanks’s rights and obligations
remained unchanged by the approved jurisdictional determination, since the determination did not require
Fairbanks to do or forbear from anything. 9 The court distinguished Fairbanks’s obligation under the Clean
Water Act (“CWA”) from the Corps’s issuance of an approved jurisdictional determination. 10 Ultimately,
the court held, Fairbanks was only obligated to act pursuant to the CWA. 11 Because the Corps’ view did
not impose an obligation, deny a right, or fix some legal relationship, the court found that it did not have
jurisdiction to review the Corps’s approved jurisdictional determination. 12 Affirming the district court, the
the Ninth Circuit held that the Corps’s issuance of an approved jurisdictional determination did not
constitute final agency action under the APA for purposes of judicial review. 13
Sam v. Astrue
In Sam v. Astrue, 14 the Ninth Circuit held that when an administrative law judge (“ALJ”) finds that
a person has never been disabled, the ALJ need not follow regulations pertaining to the determination of
the onset date of the disability. 15 Sam filed an application for disability insurance in 2003 in which he
claimed that he had been unable to work since 1993 due to pain in his neck, back and legs. 16 In 2006, the
ALJ handling the case found that Sam was not disabled, as defined by the Social Security Act, at any time
prior to the decision. 17 Sam appealed to the district court, arguing that the ALJ erred by not conferring a
medical expert to determine a disability onset date. 18 The district court affirmed the ALJ, and Sam
appealed. 19 The Ninth Circuit reasoned that if a person had never been disabled, there could be no issue
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pertaining to the onset of the disability. 20 Thus, the regulations used to determine the onset date of a
disability were inapplicable to Sam’s case. 21 Affirming the district court, the Ninth Circuit held that when
an ALJ finds a person to not be disabled at any time before the decision, the ALJ need not follow
regulations pertaining to the determination of the onset date. 22
State v. Federal Subsistence Board
In State v. Federal Subsistence Board, 23 the Ninth Circuit held that the Administrative Procedure
Act (“APA”) does not bar the Federal Subsistence Board (“FSB”) from granting Customary and Traditional
use determination (“C & T determination”) to subsistence communities that grant broader access to land. 24
The FSB granted a C & T determination to Chistochina, a rural subsistence community, which allowed the
community to hunt moose in all three pre-delineated sections of a 10,000 square mile game management
unit (“GMU”). 25 The State challenged the determination, arguing: (1) that Chistochina only used particular
areas within each section, (2) that the FSB did not consider the effect its determination would have on
specific moose populations, and (3) that the broad determination was arbitrary and capricious. 26 The Ninth
Circuit affirmed the district court in rejecting all of these arguments, finding first that Chistochina had
adequately shown that it used land in all three sections of the GMU. 27 Second, the court held that the FSB
had sufficiently evaluated the effects that the determination would have on twelve specific moose
populations. 28 Third, the court found that forcing the FSB to constantly define new areas in each GMU—
even though Alaska argued that the FSB did not reflect the use patters of the Christochina residents—
would make the system almost impossible to manage. 29 Thus, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the decision of the
district court, holding that the APA does not bar the FSB from granting C & T determinations to
subsistence communities that grant broader access to land. 30

Alaska Supreme Court
Alford v. State, Department of Administration
In Alford v. State, Department of Administration, 31 the supreme court held that: (1) the Division of
Retirement and Benefits’ (the “Division”) methodology did not violate the Alaska Constitution, (2) the
Division’s recalculation of pensions were reasonable, and (3) the recapture requirement was not a
downward adjustment prohibited by the Public Employees’ Retirement System (“PERS”) statutes. 32 In
1977, the statute governing calculation of pensions under PERS was amended to alter the calculation of
pensions after a subsequent retirement. 33 The Attorney General’s office advised the Division that the use of
either the old or the new calculation method depended on the employee’s retirement date. 34 However, the
Attorney General’s office later advised the Division that according to the supreme court, the method used
should be determined based on the date the employee enrolled in PERS, not the date of retirement. 35 The
Division agreed to pay interest on back payments to affected beneficiaries. 36 However, as required by
statute, the Division also began to recapture retirement benefits disbursed to those who had originally taken
20
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early retirement. 37 The Commissioner rejected the early retirees’ request to be exempted from the recapture
requirement. 38 Both the PERS Board (“Board”) and the trial court upheld this decision, and the retirees
appealed, arguing that the recapture provision was unconstitutional and that the Division’s calculations
resulted in a reduced pension, thus violating the statute’s prohibition on downward adjustments. 39 The
court reasoned that based on its precedent, while PERS members were entitled to choose the best benefits
available, they were not entitled to sever statutory provisions from one another and mix and match
provisions from one era with that of another. 40 The court also determined that the Division’s calculations
were supported by quantifiable mathematical basis, 41 and that application of the recapture requirement was
a natural extension of applying the former subsection in order to correct the previous error in calculations. 42
The supreme court affirmed the Board’s denial of the early retiree’s claims, holding that: (1) the Division’s
methodology did not violate the Alaska Constitution, (2) the Division’s recalculations of pensions were
reasonable, and (3) the recapture requirement was not a downward adjustment prohibited by PERS
statutes. 43
Amerada Hess Pipeline Corp. v. Regulatory Commission of Alaska
In Amerada Hess Pipeline Corp. v. Regulatory Commission of Alaska, 44 the supreme court held
that: (1) an administrative agency’s use of a settlement contract in calculating rates did not violate the rules
of evidence; (2) an administrative agency did not violate the rule against retroactive ratemaking when the
rates were suspended when the litigation began; (3) an administrative agency’s failure to recuse a staff
expert did not necessarily violate procedural due process when that expert has analyzed, in an academic
work, an issue currently in contention before the agency. 45 After the Regulatory Commission of Alaska
(“RCA”) was sued by certain companies that shipped oil (“shippers”) in 1997 on the Trans Alaska Pipeline
System (“TAPS”), the RCA promulgated Order No. 151 which changed the methodology for calculating
shipping rates and ordered the owners of TAPS to refund the shippers’ overpayments. 46 TAPS’ owners
appealed Order No. 151. 47 The supreme court adopted the superior court’s opinion as its own. 48 First, the
supreme court reasoned that the RCA did not violate the rules of evidence when it considered the
settlement contract while determining the total amount of depreciation of the pipeline because it was not
used to prove a disputed claim. 49 Thus, the policy rationale against allowing evidence of settlement
negotiation in subsequent litigation was not invoked. 50 Second, the superior court reasoned that the RCA
did not retroactively set rates because the RCA had properly suspended the rates when litigation
commenced in 1997. 51 Third, the superior court reasoned that the RCA did not err when it failed to recuse
its economics expert. 52 Although the expert had analyzed the issue under contention (namely, the best
methodology for calculating shipping rates on TAPS) in his master’s thesis some years before, the court
was not apprised of any facts indicating that the economist’s testimony or reports dominated the RCA
commissioner’s decision, nor that any RCA commissioner had prejudged the case. 53 Affirming the superior
court, the supreme court held that: (1) an administrative agency’s use of a settlement contract in calculating
rates did not violate the rules of evidence; (2) an administrative agency did not violate the rule against
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retroactive ratemaking when the rates were suspended when the litigation began; (3) an administrative
agency’s failure to recuse a staff expert did not necessarily violate procedural due process when that expert
has analyzed, in an academic work, an issue currently in contention before the agency. 54
Baker v. State, Department of Health and Social Services
In Baker v. State, Department of Health and Social Services, 55 the supreme court held that notices
sent to individuals in the Personal Care Attendant Program (“PCA”) informing those individuals of reduced
services were not sufficient for due process purposes since the notices lacked enough explanation about the
reasons for the State’s decision to reduce services. 56 The Department of Health and Social Services
(“Department”) created an objective test to determine the appropriate level of services individuals in the
PCA should receive. 57 The test required that a nurse interview and observe an individual and then provide a
numerical code to score the level of service the individual required, and form letters informing individuals
of the change in PCA services they would receive were then sent out. 58 Baker and Burtness, two
individuals in the PCA, filed a class action suit against the Department on the grounds that the notices
violated their procedural due process rights because the notices did not include information that would have
permitted an appeal. 59 The superior court held that the notices complied with due process. 60 According to
the supreme court, a notice must be written in accordance with the standards of federal regulations and
must be “complete,” which entails the inclusion of specific information on how the agency made its
determination to reduce benefits. 61 The court also agreed with Baker that due process required individuals
in the PCA to be given an opportunity to understand, review, and, if appropriate, challenge the
department’s action. 62 Finally, because of the importance of the objective test used in determining the
appropriate level of benefits, the supreme court held that the analysis conducted by the nurse during the test
must be included in the notice. 63 Reversing the superior court, the supreme court held that notices sent to
individuals in the PCA informing those individuals of reduced services were not sufficient for due process
purposes since the notices lacked enough explanation about the reasons for the State’s decision to reduce
services. 64
Barrington v. Alaska Communications Systems Group, Inc.
In Barrington v. Alaska Communications Systems Group, Inc., 65 the supreme court held that: (1)
the Alaska Workers’ Compensation Appeals Commission (“Commission”) could not be a party in appeals
from its decisions to the supreme court, and (2) a doctor’s claim for payment was not barred after his
patient settles her related workers’ compensation claim without joining him as a party or giving him notice
of the settlement. 66 Barrington, a physician, performed an evaluation on Williams after she experienced
job-related pain; Williams’s attorney assured Barrington that his claim for payment would be included with
Williams’s workers’ compensation claim. 67 However, Williams entered into a written settlement agreement
with her employer before the Alaska Workers’ Compensation Board (“Board”) without giving notice to
Barrington or attempting to join him as a party in the proceedings. 68 Two months later, Barrington filed his
own payment claim against Williams’s employer. 69 The Board ruled that Barrington’s claim was barred by
the settlement, but that he retained a civil claim against Williams; Commission affirmed the Board’s ruling,
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holding that Barrington’s interests were represented by Williams and that he had no right of notice to the
settlement. 70 Barrington appealed to the supreme court, and the Commission asserted that it should be a
party in the appeal proceedings. 71 The supreme court ruled that the legislature had authorized the director
of the Division of Workers’ Compensation, not the Commission, to represent the executive branch in
workers’ compensation appeals; also, the court found that the Commission, unlike a party, had no interest
in defending its decisions and therefore could not be a party to appeals from its own decisions. 72 Turning to
Barrington’s claim, the court held that due process required the board to join him as a party to Williams’s
claim or give him notice prior to approving the settlement. 73 The court ruled that Barrington was a
necessary party to the Board’s proceedings because he had a potential claim for relief, Williams was not an
adequate representative for him, and his absence materially limited his ability to safeguard his interests. 74
Thus, the board’s failure to join Barrington or give him notice was a due process violation. 75 The supreme
court reversed the decision of the Commission, holding that: (1) the Commission could not be a party in
appeals from its decisions to the supreme court, and (2) a doctor’s claim for payment was not barred after
his patient settles her related workers’ compensation claim without joining him as a party or giving him
notice of the settlement. 76
Bauer v. State, Department of Corrections
In Bauer v. State, Department of Corrections, 77 the supreme court held that an inmate is entitled to
an administrative appeal when the relief obtained through such an appeal would be greater than what the
Department of Corrections (“DOC”) had already provided. 78 Bauer, an inmate at Spring Creek Correctional
Center, refused to clean up a blood spill without the assistance of another crew member due to a new safety
protocol requiring that two trained crew members clean such a spill. 79 Bauer was found guilty of
disobeying a direct order by the DOC and given fifteen days’ segregation. 80 Bauer appealed to the superior
court, but the superior court dismissed the case after the DOC said it would provide Bauer with a new
administrative hearing. 81 Instead, the DOC reduced the incident to an “informational” item in Bauer’s
record and claimed the need for another hearing was unnecessary. 82 Bauer argued that this reduction was
inadequate relief because if he was successful in the new hearing, the record of the underlying incident
would be removed from his file. 83 The supreme court agreed with Bauer, reasoning that the case might not
be moot if Bauer could be entitled to greater relief through an appeal than DOC had given through the
downgrade to an informational item in his report. 84 The court found further that it was unclear whether
prison policy would require removal of all record of the incident from his file if Bauer had been found not
guilty. 85 Reversing the superior court, the supreme court held that an inmate is entitled to an administrative
appeal when the relief obtained through such an appeal would be greater than what the Department of
Corrections (“DOC”) had already provided. 86
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Bragg v. Matanuska-Susitna Borough
In Bragg v. Matanuska-Susitna Borough, 87 the supreme court held that: (1) plaintiffs have
standing when they allege that a government entity encroached upon their procedural rights, (2) Alaska law
permits municipalities to levy excise taxes, and (3) locally-enacted excise taxes do not require voter
ratification to take effect. 88 By ordinance, the Matanuska-Susitna Borough (“Borough”) imposed a tax on
the initial acquisition, manufacture, or transport of tobacco, but the ordinance was not submitted for voter
ratification. 89 Bragg brought suit, arguing that the ordinance, as an excise tax, could not be adopted by the
Borough; alternatively, he argued that if the ordinance is lawful, it required voter ratification. 90 The
superior court, assuming that Bragg possessed standing to bring suit, held that excise taxes fall within
municipalities’ general taxation powers, and also held that such taxes could be enforced without voter
ratification. 91 The supreme court addressed Bragg’s standing, since lower courts may not avoid such
inquiries. 92 The court ruled that Alaska law gives the Borough’s taxpayers certain procedural rights prior to
the imposition of taxes; it held that to the extent Bragg claimed that the Borough encroached upon these
rights, he had standing to bring suit. 93 In addressing the Borough’s taxing authority, the court noted that the
Alaska Constitution requires a liberal reading of municipal powers and that the Alaska Statutes grant
municipalities general powers, including the power to levy taxes. 94 The court then held that Bragg had
failed to show any excise tax exception to these municipal powers. 95 Finally, the court ruled that several
features of the tax—its one-time application on manufacturers and distributors, goal of discouraging
tobacco use, and label as an “excise tax”—suggested that the ordinance imposed an excise tax. 96 The court
held that as an excise tax, rather than a sales or use tax, the ordinance did not require voter ratification.97
The supreme court affirmed the superior court, holding that: (1) plaintiffs have standing when they allege
that a government entity encroached upon their procedural rights, (2) Alaska law permits municipalities to
levy excise taxes, and (3) locally-enacted excise taxes do not require voter ratification to take effect.98
Bridges v. Banner Health
In Bridges v. Banner Health, 99 the supreme court held that: (1) where a court has ruled that a
motion for intervention as a matter of right is untimely, it is not an abuse of discretion to deny permissive
intervention on the same grounds; and (2) legislation is an unconstitutional special act if it creates a
permanently closed class. 100 Under §§ 18.07.031 and 18.07.111 of the Alaska Statutes, health care
providers must obtain a certificate of need (“CON”) from the Department of Health and Social Services
(“DHSS”) prior to constructing an “independent diagnostic testing facility” (IDTF). 101 Banner Health
(“Banner”) asked DHSS to investigate whether Alaska Open Imaging Center (“AOIC”) was legally
building an MRI center without obtaining a CON; DHSS ruled that AOIC was exempt from the CON
requirement as a “private physician’s office.” 102 Banner sought to enjoin both the enforcement of DHSS’s
ruling and the construction of AOIC’s center without a CON. 103 The superior court reversed DHSS’s
determination since it had relied upon regulations that contradicted the legislature’s intent; the judge also
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enjoined AOIC from building its MRI facility without a CON. 104 Six weeks after entry of the injunctions,
AOIC’s medical director, Dr. Bridges, sought to intervene because he was also an equity holder and
guarantor of debt; the judge denied Bridges’s motion as untimely. 105 The superior court later entered a final
judgment for Banner. 106 On appeal, the supreme court ruled that since Bridges presented no grounds for his
delay, his request for intervention as of right was untimely. 107 Regarding Bridges’s permissive intervention
motion, the court stated that because such applications are less likely to be granted than motions for
intervention as of right, the superior court did not abuse its discretion in holding that Bridges’s motion for
permissive intervention was likewise untimely. 108 In evaluating AOIC’s argument that the statutory CON
requirement was unconstitutional, the supreme court held that a statute is unconstitutional special
legislation if it creates a permanently closed class. 109 The court ruled that a closed class is one that limits
application to current members; since the CON requirement covered IDTFs, whose numbers would grow if
other health care providers were to build them, the court held that the legislation created neither a closed
class nor a special act. 110 Affirming in part and vacating in part, the supreme court held that: (1) where a
court has ruled that a motion for intervention as a matter of right is untimely, it is not an abuse of discretion
to deny permissive intervention on the same grounds; and (2) that legislation is an unconstitutional special
act if it creates a permanently-closed class. 111
Carter v. B&B Construction, Inc.
In Carter v. B&B Construction, Inc., 112 the supreme court held that: (1) a doctor’s testimony
supporting both a work-related injury and a non-work-related injury as contributing “substantial factors” to
an employee’s permanent total disability (“PTD”) claim does not meet the rebuttal standard required of an
employer, and (2) the relevant starting period for reemployment benefits is the date on which an employee
begins to seek benefits. 113 Carter was injured on the job. 114 Believing he could return to work, he began
rehabilitation—entitling him to reemployment benefits—before he became completely unable to work. 115
Seeking compensation for his injuries, Carter filed a claim with the Alaska Workers’ Compensation Board
(“Board”), which granted him reemployment benefits but denied him PTD benefits. 116 He appealed to the
superior court, which affirmed the Board’s conclusions. 117 Regarding Carter’s PTD claim, the supreme
court noted that such claims are subject to a three-stage analysis: (1) the claimant must show a link between
the injury and the employment, (2) the employer may then rebut this link with “substantial evidence” that
shows the injury was unrelated to the work, and (3) the employee can overcome this presumption with a
preponderance of evidence establishing the link. 118 The court reasoned that because the doctor’s testimony
used by the employer to rebut the presumption suggested two “substantial factors,” one work related, and
one not, the employer had failed to rebut Carter’s link. 119 Regarding the reemployment benefits, the court
reasoned that while the statute was ambiguous, the legislature could not have intended for a gap between
the expiration of Carter’s earlier benefits for which Carter was entitled and his reemployment benefits, the
relevant starting period for reemployment benefits is the date on which the employee starts to seek such
benefits. 120 Reversing the superior court, the supreme court held that: (1) the doctor’s testimony supporting
both a work-related injury and a non-work-related injury as contributing “substantial factors” to an
104
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employee’s PTD claim does not meet the rebuttal standard required of an employer, and (2) the relevant
starting period for reemployment benefits is the date on which an employee begins to seek such benefits. 121
Fuhs v. Gilbertson
In Fuhs v. Gilbertson 122 the supreme court held that: (1) because a citizen was not substantially
affected by a proposed new medical facility, he did not have standing to challenge a certificate of need
issued by the Alaska Department of Health and Social Services (“ADHSS”); and (2) because the public
interest litigant exception to Alaska Civil Rule 82 no longer applies to non-constitutional causes of action,
he could not claim an exemption from an award of attorney’s fees. 123 Fuhs challenged the granting of a
certificate of need (“CON”) to Providence Alaska Medical Center for the construction of an open-bore MRI
facility. 124 Gilbertson, the ADHSS Commissioner, denied Fuhs’s request for a hearing on the CON on the
grounds that Fuhs lacked standing under Alaska’s CON statute. 125 Fuhs appealed and also sought an
injunction against the construction of the facility; the superior court dismissed the case on the grounds that
Fuhs lacked standing and awarded attorney’s fees to Gilbertson and the Medical Center. 126 Fuhs claimed
that § 07.080 of the Alaska Administrative Code granted standing to anyone who could demonstrate good
cause; this regulation, however, conflicted with § 18.07.081(a) of the Alaska Statutes, requiring a person be
substantially affected in order to have standing. 127 Because Fuhs did not address the question of standing in
the supplemental brief requested by the supreme court, the court looked only to the statute and, even under
a liberal construction, found that Fuhs was not substantially affected by the construction of the MRI
facility. 128 Regarding the award of fees, the supreme court reasoned that even if Fuhs was a public interest
litigant, the public interest exception to Rule 82 does not apply to nonconstitutional causes of action.129
Affirming the superior court, the supreme court held that: (1) because a citizen was not substantially
affected by a proposed new medical facility he did not have standing to challenge a CON issued by
ADHSS; and (2) because the public interest litigant exception to Alaska Civil Rule 82 no longer applies to
non-constitutional causes of action, he could not claim an exemption from an award of attorney’s fees. 130
Haggblom v. City of Dillingham
In Haggblom v. City of Dillingham, 131 the supreme court held that: (1) a dog owner’s procedural
due process rights are not violated when she is not told she has a right to counsel at, or to bring witnesses
to, an administrative appeal of a euthanasia order;132 (2) a city ordinance which mandates euthanasia for an
animal that bites a person without provocation is not void for vagueness; 133 and (3) a city’s offer to allow a
dog owner to remove the animal from the city limits in lieu of euthanasia does not support a claim of
arbitrary enforcement. 134 When Haggblom took her dog, Muneca, with her to work, Muneca bit one of
Haggblom’s coworkers without growling or giving any other warning that she was about to bite. 135 The
police were informed of the incident and conducted an investigation. 136 Muneca was deemed “vicious”
under the city dog bite ordinance, and she was ordered euthanized or banished from the city. 137 Haggblom
administratively appealed the decision and lost. 138 She appealed to the superior court and lost there too. 139
121
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Haggblom appealed to the supreme court, claiming that the dog bite ordinance violated her due process
rights, was void for vagueness, and was arbitrarily enforced. 140 The supreme court first determined that
because the city ordinance listed the standards for determining whether an animal was vicious and also
required notice to the owner of the planned time for euthanasia and the right to appeal, there was no due
process violation. 141 The court refused to require municipalities to advise litigants of their procedural rights
in city administrative hearings. 142 Next, the court determined that the ordinance’s use of the term “without
provocation” was not void for vagueness in this case because both parties agreed that Muneca attacked for
no reason. 143 Thus, the case fell squarely within the phrase’s plain meaning. 144 Finally, the court
determined that the city was being lenient by allowing Muneca to be banished instead of euthanized. 145
Thus, its actions did not prove arbitrary. 146 The supreme court affirmed the order for euthanasia or
banishment, holding that: (1) a dog owner’s procedural due process rights are not violated when she is not
told she has a right to counsel at, or to bring witnesses to, an administrative appeal of a euthanasia order; 147
(2) a city ordinance which mandates euthanasia for an animal that bites a person without provocation is not
void for vagueness; 148 and (3) a city’s offer to allow a dog owner to remove the animal from the city limits
in lieu of euthanasia does not support a claim of arbitrary enforcement. 149
Matanuska Electric Ass’n v. Municipality of Anchorage
In Matanuska Electric Ass’n v. Municipality of Anchorage, 150 the supreme court held that: (1) an
administrative agency’s order regarding the operation of an electrical line will be upheld if it is supported
by substantial evidence, and (2) the erroneous denial of a request for cross-examination does not create
reversible error if the refusal was harmless. 151 Matanuska Electric Association (“MEA”) and the Alaska
Energy Authority agreed that the latter would operate a transmission line owned by the former. 152 The line
was designed to operate at 115 kV, but was energized to 138 kV for several years. 153 Eventually, MEA
attempted to renegotiate the contract in order to operate at 115 kV. 154 The distributors using MEA’s line
applied to the Regulatory Commission of Alaska (“Commission”) for continued use of the line. 155 During a
trial focusing primarily on the line’s safety, MEA declined to cross-examine Haagenson, one of the
appellees’ witnesses. 156 When Haagenson was recalled to testify on the following day, MEA was denied
the opportunity to cross-examine him because it had not done so on the first day. 157 The Commission later
found 138 kV operation to be safe and ordered it to continue. 158 On appeal, MEA argued that the
Commission could not order continued operation at 138 kV, because doing so violated safety codes
incorporated into state law; MEA also argued that the Commission erred by refusing to permit crossexamination of Haagenson. 159 The supreme court found that MEA had presented no evidence that
operation at 138 kV violated state law. MEA had only shown that 138 kV operation was not as safe as 115
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kV operation, 160 but court affirmed the Commission’s ruling because there was substantial evidence
showing that it was still safe to operate the line at the higher kV level. 161 The supreme court also reasoned
that the failure of MEA’s attorney to explain why she wished to cross-examine Haagenson constituted a
waiver of any claim of error regarding the exclusion of evidence. 162 The court held that since the
Commission would have reached the same decision even if it had heard Haagenson’s additional testimony,
the denial was not reversible error. 163 The supreme court affirmed the Commission, holding that: (1) an
administrative agency’s order regarding the operation of an electrical line will be upheld if it is supported
by substantial evidence and (2) the erroneous denial of a request for cross-examination does not create
reversible error if the refusal was harmless. 164
Regulatory Commission of Alaska v. Tesoro Alaska Company
In Regulatory Commission of Alaska v. Tesoro Alaska Company, 165 the supreme court held that a
denial to investigate the rates charged by the owners of the Trans-Alaska Pipeline is legitimate when the
request is untimely. 166 In 2003, the Regulatory Commission of Alaska (“Commission”) received a
complaint from Tesoro Alaska Company and William Alaska Petroleum, Inc., about the rates charged for
use of the Trans-Alaska Pipeline between 1986 and 1996. 167 Because of the history of investigations that
had already been concluded, the Commission found the complaint untimely; on appeal, the superior court
remanded the case with orders to conduct a review of the years challenged. 168 The supreme court
independently reviewed the Commission’s final decision, applying the three-part test found in the
Administrative Procedures Act, and applied a reasonable-and-not-arbitrary standard to the Commission’s
decision to not conduct a further review of the rates in question. 169 The court noted that the Commission
had discretion under the Alaska Statutes, and was supported in its decision by case law as well as its own
regulations. 170 Using these statutes and cases, the supreme court noted the problems with each of the
arguments submitted by Tesoro and William, finding that the Commission had a reasonable basis for its
decision. 171 Reversing the superior court, the supreme court held that a denial to investigate the rates
charged by the owners of the Trans-Alaska Pipeline is legitimate when the request is untimely. 172
State, Commercial Fisheries Entry Commission v. Carlson
In State, Commercial Fisheries Entry Commission v. Carlson, 173 the supreme court held that under
the Constitution’s Privileges and Immunities Clause, Alaska was permitted to charge nonresidents more
than residents for fishermen license and permit fees, but the differential must be substantially equal to the
contribution of each Alaska resident to fisheries management. 174 Between 1984 and 2002, nonresident
commercial fishermen paid three times more than resident fishermen for licenses and permits. 175 Carlson
filed a class action on behalf of all nonresident Alaska fishermen and demanded a refund for the amount
that nonresidents paid in excess of the amount that residents paid.176 The superior court ruled for Carlson’s
class and required the state to pay refunds to nonresidents who paid more than their fair contribution to
Alaska’s fisheries budget, 177 reasoning that Alaska’s existing three-to-one fee schedule was not rationally
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related to the goal of equalizing the fisheries management burden. 178 The supreme court held that because
Alaska has a legitimate interest in equalizing the economic burdens between residents and nonresidents,
Alaska need only demonstrate that its fee schedules have a “substantial enough relationship” to the goal of
equalizing economic burdens between residents and nonresidents. 179 The supreme court vacated and
remanded the superior court’s judgment because it required strict equality in calculating the refund owed to
nonresident fishermen, holding that under the constitution’s Privileges and Immunities Clause, Alaska may
charge nonresidents more than residents for fishermen license and permit fees, but the differential must be
substantially equal to the contribution of each Alaska resident to fisheries management. 180
Swetzof v. Philemonoff
In Swetzof v. Philemonoff, 181 the supreme court held that it was proper for a city clerk to refuse to
certify a proposed initiative that would require the city to refrain from engaging in the sale or delivery of
electric power. 182 Swetzof, Clerk of the City of St. Paul, refused to certify two proposed initiatives that
would have required the city to stop the sale and delivery of electric power to retail customers and
encourage the use of renewable energy. 183 The sponsors of both proposals then filed suit in the superior
court challenging the refusals. 184 The superior court ordered certification of both proposals, and Swetzof
appealed. 185 The supreme court reversed the superior court’s findings, reasoning that the first proposal was
not enforceable as a matter of law because the City of St. Paul could not simply discontinue electric service
to retail customers but, instead, would have to seek permission from the Regulatory Commission of
Alaska. 186 The court said it would rule on the second initiative at a later date.187 Reversing the superior
court, the supreme court held that it was proper for a city clerk to refuse to certify a proposed initiative that
would require the city to refrain from engaging in the sale or delivery of electric power. 188
VECO Alaska, Inc. v. State
In VECO Alaska, Inc. v. State, 189 the supreme court held that the Alaska Workers’ Compensation
Board’s (“Board”) written record requirement for reimbursement from the Second Injury Fund (“SIF”)
requires only that the employer have knowledge of a preexisting impairment rather than a specific medical
condition. 190 Huizenga began work for VECO after seriously injuring his back at a previous job. 191
Huizenga disclosed his back injuries in a questionnaire to VECO prior to beginning work but did not
disclose that he had arthritis resulting from a congenital condition. 192 Almost two years after he began
working for VECO, he reinjured his back while on the job, and the injury was exacerbated by his
arthritis. 193 VECO initially paid his compensation benefits and then filed a claim for reimbursement out of
the SIF. 194 The Board denied VECO’s claim, stating that it could not be reasonably inferred from VECO’s
written records that it had knowledge of Huizenga’s arthritis as a prior condition. 195 The superior court
upheld the Board’s finding, and VECO appealed. 196 Reversing the superior court, the supreme court
reasoned that the Board’s standard was one that most employers would not be able to meet based on
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information received from employees who may not fully understand their medical conditions, and
therefore, the standard used was contrary to the purpose of the SIF. 197 Reversing the superior court, the
supreme court held that the Board’s written record requirement for reimbursement from the SIF requires
only that the employer have knowledge of a preexisting impairment rather than a specific medical
condition. 198
Washington’s Army v. City of Seward
In Washington’s Army v. City of Seward, 199 the supreme court held that even when individuals
have taxpayer standing to challenge acts of city council, those individuals may only use a referendum to
challenge official action by the city council. 200 The Seward City Charter permits referenda to challenge any
act of the city council. 201 However, the charter defines official action to require the votes of at least four
council members. 202 Intent on challenging a controversial plan, Washington’s Army filed an application for
a referendum petition. 203 The City of Seward clerk denied the group’s application because no official action
was taken—only three council members voted for the plan. 204 Washington’s Army appealed the superior
court’s decision denying their right to challenge the controversial plan via referendum. 205 The supreme
court held that: (1) the citizen members of Washington’s Army, but not the collective entity, had standing
to make this appeal because individual citizens—rather than unincorporated entities—may be held
accountable for the results of the legal proceedings; 206 but that (2) because the subject of the citizens’
proposed referendum was voted on by only three members of the council, it did not constitute official
action and thus could not be challenged via referendum. 207 The supreme court affirmed the superior court’s
dismissal of the citizens’ complaint, holding that even when individuals have taxpayer standing to
challenge acts of city council, those individuals may only use a referendum to challenge official action by
the city council. 208
Wilber v. State, Commercial Fisheries Entry Commission
In Wilber v. State, Commercial Fisheries Entry Commission, 209 the supreme court held that the
Commercial Fisheries Entry Commission (“CFEC”) may combine two seasons into one “year” for the
purposes of assessing hardship. 210 The Alaska Legislature passed a bill placing a moratorium on entry into
the geoduck fishery and requiring the Commercial Fisheries Entry Commission (“CFEC”) to study whether
it was necessary to limit entry into the geoduck fishery. 211 Finding that restrictions were appropriate, the
CFEC developed a priority classification system for distributing permits to harvest geoducks through the
awarding of points. 212 Because the system combined the short January 1996 season (before the moratorium
took effect) into the previous year, Wilber was only able to claim ten points in the CFEC system, one point
away from being awarded a transferable permit. 213 The supreme court reviewed the decision of the CFEC
with a deferential standard, looking only for a reasonable basis in the law. 214 The court agreed with the
superior court that CFEC’s argument about the flexible meaning of the word “year” was reasonable. 215
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Moreover, the court held that the legislature’s amendment of a statute to give the CFEC broad discretion
reinforced the reasonableness of the CFEC’s decision. 216 This discretion includes the ability to disregard
one or more particular hardships when ranking applicants. 217 Affirming the superior court, the supreme
court held that the CFEC may combine two seasons into one “year” for the purposes of assessing
hardship. 218

Alaska Court of Appeals
Holden v. State
In Holden v. State, 219 the court of appeals held that it had no jurisdiction to review a final superior
court judgment on an administrative appeal and transferred the case to the supreme court. 220 After the
Department of Public Safety determined that Holden was required to register as a sex offender, Holden
appealed that determination in the superior court. 221 The superior court ruled that a recent change in the
registration law had mooted Holden’s appeal; Holden then sought review by the supreme court. 222 The
supreme court granted the State’s motion to transfer the case to the court of appeals on the basis that the
court of appeals generally has jurisdiction over cases involving the Sex Offender Registration Act. 223 The
court of appeals stated that although the Alaska Statutes give litigants the option to appeal a final decision
from the superior court, litigants may not choose the forum in which they will bring their appeals. 224 The
court reasoned that the jurisdiction of the state’s two appellate courts is not determined by the type of legal
issue raised but rather the type of proceeding that gives rise to the appeal. 225 An appeal must be brought in
the court of appeals if it regards a type of proceeding specifically within the jurisdiction of the court of
appeals; otherwise, it must be brought in the supreme court. 226 The court of appeals lacks jurisdiction over
administrative appeals. 227 The court of appeals held that it had no jurisdiction to review a final superior
court judgment on an administrative appeal and transferred the case to the supreme court. 228

BUSINESS LAW
Alaska Supreme Court
Harris v. Ahtna, Inc.
In Harris v. Ahtna, Inc., 229 the supreme court held that: (1) a court may utilize counsels’
conclusions of law and findings of fact where they reflect a court’s independent evaluation of the evidence;
and (2) the admission of evidence was not unfairly surprising where the exploration of an issue was
foreseeable, the objecting party already possessed the evidence in question, and the omission of evidence
would be misleading. 230 Ahtna, Inc. formed a subsidiary called Ahtna Government Services, Inc.
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(“AGS”). 231 While president of AGS, Harris engineered several contracts with companies he owned,
benefitting himself at the expense of AGS. 232 Harris was fired and AGS sued him for breach of fiduciary
duty. 233 The trial judge admitted time sheets from one of Harris’s companies, which AGS had obtained the
previous night, and Harris’s objection on grounds of unfair surprise was overruled. 234 The superior court
found against Harris on all counts and then ordered AGS to draft findings of fact and conclusions of law,
which the court utilized after making certain modifications. 235 On appeal, Harris argued that: (1) the
superior court inappropriately used AGS’s conclusions and findings, and (2) the admission of the time
sheets was unfair surprise. 236 The supreme court held that Alaska Civil Rule 78 permits a court to adopt
conclusions and findings drafted by counsel as long as they reflect the court’s independent evaluation of the
evidence. 237 Since the trial court had clearly deleted significant material regarding a party, the supreme
court ruled that this standard had been met. 238 The court further ruled that admission of the time sheets was
not unfair surprise, given the allegations of self-dealing in favor of Harris’s companies and that the work
actually performed by those companies would be an issue at trial. 239 The court noted that since the time
sheets had been approved by Harris and came from one of his companies, he was already aware of their
contents, 240 and also that excluding the time sheets would have created an inaccurate picture of events. 241
The supreme court affirmed the superior court, holding that: (1) a court may utilize counsels’ conclusions
of law and findings of fact where they reflect a court’s independent evaluation of the evidence; and (2) the
admission of evidence was not unfairly surprising where the exploration of an issue was foreseeable, the
objecting party already possessed the evidence in question, and the omission of evidence would be
misleading. 242

Alaska Court of Appeals
State v. Greenpeace, Inc.
In State v. Greenpeace, Inc., 243 the court of appeals held that: (1) a person or organization does not
qualify as the authorized agent of a principal unless the principal controls or has the legal right to control
the purported agent, 244 and (2) adoption or ratification of an agent’s actions by a principal requires at a
minimum both an awareness of the misconduct and some action to ratify or adopt the misconduct. 245 The
vessel Arctic Sunrise docked in Ketchikan en route to an anti-logging campaign for Greenpeace, Inc
(“Greenpeace”). 246 After obtaining permission from Greenpeace International, Greenpeace, chartered the
vessel from Stichting Marine Services (“SMS”). 247 When the Arctic Sunrise arrived in Ketchikan it did not
have an approved oil spill contingency plan or certificate of financial responsibility as required by Alaska
law, and did not obtain one in Ketchikan. 248 As a result, the State charged Greenpeace and Sorensen, the
Arctic Sunrise’s master, with operating the vessel with criminal negligence. 249 A jury convicted
Greenpeace and Sorensen, but the trial court set aside the convictions after ruling that they were not
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supported by sufficient evidence. 250 On appeal, the court of appeals first determined that the double
jeopardy clause does not bar an appeal from a court’s decision to set aside a jury verdict. 251 The court then
determined that considerable evidence was presented at trial to show that Greenpeace did not own or
control the Arctic Sunrise. 252 The evidence showed that SMS, not Greenpeace, had the obligation to ensure
that the vessel complied with all regulatory requirements. 253 The evidence also showed that SMS was a
separate entity from Greenpeace, and as such Greenpeace had no right to control actions taken by SMS. 254
Thus, Greenpeace could not be held liable as a principal for the actions of SMS. 255 Furthermore, even if the
State could prove that SMS was Greenpeace’s agent, the State could not prove that Greenpeace ratified the
actions taken by SMS. 256 Therefore, there was insufficient evidence for a jury to find that SMS was an
agent for Greenpeace. 257 The court of appeals affirmed the district court, holding that: (1) a person or
organization does not qualify as the authorized agent of a principal unless the principal controls or has the
legal right to control the purported agent, 258 and (2) adoption or ratification of an agent’s actions by a
principal requires at a minimum both an awareness of the misconduct and some action to ratify or adopt the
misconduct. 259

CIVIL PROCEDURE
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
Cysewski v. Astrue
In Cysewski v. Astrue, 260 the Ninth Circuit held that a finding of an individual’s residual functional
capacity (“RFC”) must be supported by specific, substantial evidence.261 Cysewski applied for and was
denied disability benefits; the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) discounted her testimony regarding the
severity of her symptoms because she had been paid to babysit her two grandchildren for fifty hours per
week. 262 The ALJ also found that Cysewski’s RFC allowed her to work, basing this finding on an
incomplete State Agency’s Physical Residual Functioning Capacity Assessment form. 263 The Ninth Circuit
held that in order to reject an individual’s testimony, the ALJ must have had a clear and convincing reason
for doing so. 264 Rather than relying almost exclusively on the incomplete assessment form, the ALJ should
have conducted a function-by-function assessment of Cysewski’s capacities in determining her RFC. 265
The Ninth Circuit reversed the decision of the district court, holding that a finding of RFC by an ALJ must
be supported by specific, substantial evidence. 266
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Oscar v. State, Department of Education and Early Development
In Oscar v. State, Department of Education and Early Development, 267 the Ninth Circuit held that
dismissal of a party’s claim without prejudice is not a judgment on the merits, and, therefore, attorneys’
fees may not be awarded. 268 Oscar requested an investigation into violations of his daughter’s Individuals
with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”) individualized education plan. 269 The Alaska Department of
Education and Early Development (“DEED”) refused to recognize his request as a formal complaint
because Oscar sent it via an unsigned email. 270 Oscar sued DEED under IDEA. 271 The district court
dismissed the case and awarded DEED attorneys’ fees. 272 Oscar appealed the award of attorneys’ fees. 273
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit noted that the Supreme Court of the United States has held that attorneys’ fees
may only be awarded to a prevailing party, defined as one who received a judgment on the merits or a
court-ordered consent decree. 274 The court reasoned that, consistent with its precedent, a dismissal without
prejudice is not a judgment on the merits because it does not change the parties’ legal relationship and
another complaint could still be filed. 275 Reversing the order of the district court, the Ninth Circuit held that
dismissal of a party’s claim without prejudice is not a judgment on the merits, and, therefore, attorneys’
fees may not be awarded. 276

Alaska Supreme Court
Beegan v. State, Department of Transportation & Public Facilities
In Beegan v. State, Department of Transportation & Public Facilities, 277 the supreme court held
that an employee’s claim for back pay was not barred under collateral estoppel when the employee did not
have the opportunity to argue the back pay claim in front of the Alaska State Commission for Human
Rights (the “Commission”). 278 Beegan brought a complaint before the Commission against the Department
of Transportation and Public Facilities (“DOTPF”) for age discrimination and improper retaliation for
human rights complaints. 279 The Commission found that the DOTPF’s actions against Beegan were
retaliation for his human rights complaints but failed to address Beegan’s request for back pay damages. 280
The superior court ruled that he was collaterally estopped from seeking back pay damages, and Beegan
appealed. 281 The supreme court reasoned that claims can only be precluded by collateral estoppel if the
court decided the question or if the party failed to raise the question in the initial forum. 282 Since the
remedy of back pay damages was unavailable at the Commission level, the Commission could not have
decided the question. 283 The supreme court held that Beegan’s claim was not barred under collateral
estoppel when he did not have the opportunity to argue the back pay claim in front of the Commission. 284
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Byers Alaska Wilderness Adventures v. City of Kodiak
In Byers Alaska Wilderness Adventures v. City of Kodiak, 285 the supreme court held that a superior
court judge is not required by the law of the case doctrine to follow another judge’s ruling on a motion in
limine. 286 Byers ran a boat chartering business that specialized in extended hunting, fishing, and site seeing
trips, but it failed only after a few weeks. 287 Byers sued Kodiak for defamation. 288 The superior court judge
originally assigned to the case granted a motion in limine to prevent the jury from hearing prejudicial
statements about Byers’s past. 289 Because of scheduling, a different superior court judge actually presided
over the trial. 290 The second judge ignored the original motion in limine though he did give curative
statements when the defendant’s counsel made prejudicial comments. 291 In deciding the case, the supreme
court first established that the law of the case doctrine in Alaska does not require superior court judges to
follow orders from previous superior court judges. 292 Not only was the superior court allowed to ignore the
previous order, it did not err in its own evidentiary rulings because it struck prejudicial references from the
record and used curative statements to ensure an unbiased jury. 293 The supreme court affirmed the decision
of superior court, holding that a superior court judge is not required by the law of the case doctrine to
follow another judge’s ruling on a motion in limine. 294
Hertz v. Carothers
In Hertz v. Carothers, 295 the supreme court held that an exception in § 09.38.030(f) of the Alaska
Statutes that excludes prisoners from claiming a low income exemption in a statute regarding debt
collection was valid. 296 After Hertz, a state prisoner, unsuccessfully litigated a civil rights claim against the
prison, he was ordered to pay the state’s attorney’s fees or have them garnished from his prisoner trust
account. 297 Hertz argued that his income fell below the statutory minimum necessary for the debt collection
statute to apply or in the alternative, that the statute was unconstitutional.298 The statute, however, included
an exception to the minimum income requirement for prisoners. 299 The supreme court reasoned that Hertz
clearly fell under the exception for prisoners articulated in the debt collection statutes and that the
exemption from collection for people with low incomes was superseded by Hertz’s status as a prisoner. 300
The legislature intended to make it easier for the state to collect against prisoners, so the exception to the
exemption provision should be honored. 301 In regards to Hertz’s constitutional claims, the court reasoned
that it did not violate prisoners’ rights to attempt to curtail frivolous litigation by providing penalties for
unsuccessful suits, and that the statute did not impede access to courts. 302 Additionally, there was no equal
protection violation because indigent prisoners and indigent non-prisoners are not similarly situated, so the
law may treat them differently. 303 The supreme court affirmed the decision of the superior court, holding
that an exception in § 09.38.030(f) that excludes prisoners from claiming a low income exemption in a
statute regarding debt collection was valid. 304
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In re Guardianship of McGregory
In In re Guardianship of McGregory, 305 the supreme court held that Alaska Civil Rule 82 (“Rule
82”) should not apply to guardianship proceedings if Rule 82 would interfere with the “unique character
and purpose” of the proceedings, but if its application would not interfere, then Rule 82’s fee-shifting
provisions apply. 306 After Decker-Brown removed her mother, McGregory, from a state-run assisted-living
facility, the State filed a petition for guardianship of McGregory. 307 McGregory and Decker-Brown filed a
motion to dismiss; the State did not oppose this motion after it determined that McGregory was being
appropriately cared for. 308 Following dismissal of the motion, McGregory’s and Decker-Brown’s lawyers
sought fees and costs from the State. 309 McGregory’s lawyer based her claim on Rule 82, alleging that the
State’s petition was in bad faith; Decker-Brown’s lawyer based her claim on § 13.26.131(d) of the Alaska
Statutes, claiming the State’s petition was “malicious, frivolous, or without just cause.” 310 The supreme
court reasoned that guardianship proceedings are protective in nature and, because analogous “protective”
proceedings were exempt from Rule 82, it would be inconsistent to not also exempt guardianship
proceedings. 311 Moreover, allowing fee shifting might chill an important State function. 312 However, the
court held that the exception in §13.26.131(d), which allows for fee shifting if a proceeding is “malicious,
frivolous, or without just cause,” should also apply to individuals who do not receive appointed counsel. 313
Therefore, affirming the lower court, the supreme court held that Rule 82 should not apply to guardianship
proceedings if Rule 82 would interfere with the “unique character and purpose” of the proceedings, but if
its application would not interfere, then Rule 82’s fee-shifting provisions apply. 314
In re Protective Proceedings of W.A.
In In re Protective Proceedings of W.A., 315 the supreme court held that: (1) an individual is totally
incapacitated if clear and convincing evidence shows that he is unable to ensure his own health and safety,
and (2) alternatives to guardianship are not feasible if clear and convincing evidence shows that the
individual is incapable of making important life decisions. 316 W.A. was a 45-year-old man living with his
81-year-old mother, and his adult siblings brought an action to obtain a permanent guardian for W.A. 317
The siblings alleged that W.A. had not held a steady job for over 20 years and had been treating his mother
abusively. 318 After extensive testimony, the superior court appointed a permanent guardian, reasoning that
W.A. met the standard for incapacity and that there were no reasonable alternatives; W.A. appealed. 319
First, the supreme court held that the superior court’s finding of incapacity was based on significant
testimony of experts and family members, providing more than enough information to find clear and
convincing evidence of incapacity. 320 Second, while the superior court did not state that its finding that
alternatives to guardianship were not feasible was based on clear and convincing evidence, this finding was
rendered irrelevant by the fact that the magistrate’s recommendation upon which the court relied stated that
the finding was based on clear and convincing evidence. 321 The supreme court affirmed the decision of the
superior court, holding that: (1) an individual is totally incapacitated if clear and convincing evidence
shows that he is unable to ensure his own health and safety, and (2) alternatives to guardianship are not
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feasible if clear and convincing evidence shows that the individual is incapable of making important life
decisions. 322
Maness v. Daily
In Maness v. Daily, 323 the supreme court held that, unless it is clearly fair and efficient to do so,
judicial findings made at criminal sentencing hearings do not estop the defendant from challenging the
same issues in a civil suit. 324 In 2001, Alaska State Troopers attempted to take Maness into custody in order
to transport him to a hospital for psychiatric evaluation. 325 In an attempt to escape, Maness took a rifle and
fled by foot into the woods. 326 State Troopers eventually captured Maness after shooting him in the back. 327
Maness was convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm. 328 At the sentencing hearing, the federal
judge found that Maness assaulted the State Troopers. 329 Maness filed a civil action against the police
claiming use of excessive force. 330 The superior court held that Maness was precluded from relitigating the
issue of his assault of the State Troopers and dismissed the claim. 331 The supreme court found that Maness
was not afforded a fair opportunity to present evidence regarding the assault allegations during the
sentencing hearing. 332 Further, the supreme court found that there were still unresolved factual questions as
to whether the officers’ force was “reasonably necessary.” 333 Reversing the superior court on the excessive
force claim, the supreme court held that judicial findings made at criminal sentencing hearings do not estop
the defendant from challenging the same issues in a civil suit unless it is clearly fair and efficient to do
so. 334
Mitchell v. Teck Cominco Alaska Inc.
In Mitchell v. Teck Cominco Alaska Inc., 335 the supreme court held that: (1) summary judgment on
a race-based discrimination claim is improper when the nonmoving party properly requests additional time
to respond to the motion; (2) summary judgment is improper on a good faith and fair dealing claim when
material facts are still in dispute; (3) summary judgment is improper on a breach of contract claim, even
when unopposed by the nonmoving party, if material facts are in dispute; and (4) a Judge may have a
conflict of interest when the Judge’s spouse might directly benefit from the outcome of a case, even if the
spouse’s interest is de minimis. 336 Mitchell, an African-American, worked as a warehouse manager for
Teck Cominco. 337 Mitchell wanted to start a relationship with an employee of a Cominco contractor and
asked a mutual friend to contact the employee about a possible relationship. 338 Teck Cominco discovered
the solicitation, which contained overtones of an employment-for-sex trade, and confronted Mitchell, who
then lied about having anything do with the note. 339 Mitchell was fired for sexual harassment after the
investigation was complete. 340 The supreme court held that Mitchell’s Civil Rule 56(f) request for
additional time in response to Teck Cominco’s summary judgment motion to dismiss the race-based
discrimination claim should have been granted because: (1) Mitchell satisfied the three requirements, and
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(2) 56(f) requests should be freely granted. 341 Mitchell also overcame Teck Cominco’s summary judgment
motion to dismiss the employment contracts claim because there was a triable issue of fact: several Teck
Cominco employees violated the company’s sexual harassment but were punished less severely. 342
Furthermore, the court held that Mitchell’s summary judgment motion for his claim that Teck Cominco
breached its covenant of good faith and fair dealing was properly denied even though Teck Cominco did
not oppose summary judgment or dispute all of the evidence presented by Mitchell, since significant facts
were still in dispute. 343 Finally, because the trial judge’s wife was receiving approximately $300 in
dividends annually from stock that she owned in Teck Cominco, and even though that amount might be de
minimis, there still might be a reasonable question concerning the judge’s impartiality that should be
considered further. 344 Reversing in part and affirming in part, the supreme court held that: (1) summary
judgment on a race-based discrimination claim is improper when the nonmoving party properly requests
additional time to respond to the motion; (2) summary judgment is improper on a good faith and fair
dealing claim when material facts are still in dispute; (3) summary judgment is improper on a breach of
contract claim, even when unopposed by the nonmoving party, if material facts are in dispute; and (4) a
Judge may have a conflict of interest when the Judge’s spouse might directly benefit from the outcome of a
case, even if the spouse’s interest is de minimis. 345
Mullins v. Oates
In Mullins v. Oates, 346 the supreme court held a settlement agreement legally binding where no
evidence showed coercion or duress during negotiations and the disputing party stated in court that she
voluntarily entered into it. 347 Mullins contracted with Oates to purchase three lots of real property and a
wooden structure. 348 When Mullins defaulted on the contract, Oates moved to terminate the contract and
retain title and whatever payments had been made. 349 The superior court ordered a settlement conference,
where an agreement was reached after the mediator informed Mullins that she would likely lose and be
forced to pay Oates’s attorney’s fees. 350 Mullins later moved to set aside the agreement because it was
made under duress, Oates had later sent documents constituting a counteroffer, and the agreement violated
her constitutional rights. 351 The supreme court reasoned that, based on the length of the settlement
conference and the available record, the agreement was not reached under duress. 352 Furthermore, the
mediator had correctly stated the law and Mullins had freely entered the agreement in open court. 353
Additionally, while the written terms of settlement mailed by Oates to Mullins contained at least one nonnegotiated term, the court found that this term was void but was not material enough to invalidate the entire
agreement. 354 Affirming the superior court, the supreme court held a settlement agreement legally binding
where no evidence showed coercion or duress during negotiations and the disputing party stated in court
that she voluntarily entered into it. 355
Parson v. State, Alaska Housing Finance Corp.
In Parson v. State, Alaska Housing Finance Corp., 356 the supreme court held that when an
administrative agency closes a claim without an adversarial hearing or an adjudication on the merits, the
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decision is not a final decision on the merits. 357 After his employment was terminated in October 2002,
Parson filed a complaint against the Alaska Housing Finance Corporation (“AHFC”) with the Alaska State
Commission for Human Rights, claiming that his termination was racially motivated. 358 After an informal
investigation, as per the Commission’s policy, the Commission determined that the claim was not
supported by substantial evidence and closed the case. 359 Parson subsequently sued AHFC in superior court
under the Alaska Human Rights Act. 360 AHFC moved for summary judgment on the basis that by closing
the complaint, it had entered a final judgment on the merits which could not be relitigated in state court,
and the superior court granted its motion. 361 The supreme court overturned the superior court, that the
Commission’s decision was not an final judgment on the merits because there was neither an adversarial
hearing nor an adjudication on the merits. 362 The supreme court further found that because there was no
final judgment on the merits, the decision had no preclusive effect. 363 The supreme court reversed the
superior court, holding that when an administrative agency closes a claim without an adversarial hearing or
an adjudication on the merits, the decision is not a final decision on the merits. 364
Petitioners for the Dissolution of Skagway v. Local Boundary Commission
In Petitioners for the Dissolution of Skagway v. Local Boundary Commission, 365 the supreme court
held that litigants acting on behalf of a public entity are not entitled to the public interest litigant exception
of Alaska Civil Rule 82. 366 After winning an appeal relating to their petition to form the city of Skagway
into a borough, Petitioners filed a motion for attorneys’ fees as the prevailing party.367 The court laid out a
four-part test for determining whether Petitioners were public interest litigants: (1) the case must be
designed to effectuate strong policy; (2) if the suit is successful, numerous people must be benefited; (3)
only a private party can bring the suit; and (4) the litigants must not have a personal economic incentive. 368
The court reasoned that the exception to the general rule is based on public policy, so that litigants acting
privately but in the public’s best interests would not be deterred from acting for the public good by the cost
of litigation; and that factor was lacking here since the litigation could have been initiated by a public
entity. 369 Since the city would be precluded from claiming public interest status, petitioners acting on its
behalf were similarly precluded. 370 Affirming the decision of the superior court, the supreme court held that
litigants acting on behalf of a public entity are not entitled to the public interest litigant exception of Alaska
Civil Rule 82. 371
Pomeroy v. Rizzo ex rel. C.R.
In Pomeroy v. Rizzo ex rel. C.R., 372 the supreme court held that a “no contest” plea to sexual
assault precluded the perpetrator from later claiming in a civil suit that an action for damages relating to the
assault was frivolous. 373 Pomeroy was charged with four counts of sexual assault of a minor and pled no
contest to assault in the third degree. 374 Shortly after Pomeroy’s arrest, Rizzo, the minor’s mother, filed a
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civil suit seeking damages for the sexual assault. 375 Pomeroy counterclaimed that the suit was frivolous. 376
The superior court held that Pomeroy’s assault conviction precluded him from maintaining his
counterclaim. 377 He appealed, arguing that his no contest plea could not be used against him in a civil
proceeding. 378 The supreme court reasoned that because Pomeroy was convicted of assault, he could not
contest the elements of the assault charge, and thus Rizzo had probable cause to believe that Pomeroy
committed the acts alleged in her complaint. 379 The supreme court affirmed the superior court, holding that
a no contest plea to sexual assault precluded the perpetrator from later claiming in a civil suit that an action
for damages relating to the assault was frivolous. 380
Wagner v. Wagner
In Wagner v. Wagner, 381 the supreme court held that specific performance is an equitable remedy
that falls under the guidelines of Alaska Rule of Civil Procedure 82(b)(2). 382 Gregory, the plaintiff, cosigned with his father, Richard, the defendant, for a loan to repay Richard’s creditors in return for monthly
payments from Richard’s oil and gas royalties. 383 When Richard failed to pay, Gregory was awarded a final
judgment for back payments along with a partial final judgment for specific performance requiring Richard
to fulfill the agreement. 384 Under Rule 82(b)(2), the superior court awarded attorneys’ fees, but on appeal,
Gregory argued that Rule 82(b)(1) governed the award of attorneys’ fees involving monetary specific
performance judgments. 385 The supreme court rejected this argument, stating that specific performance is
an equitable remedy, not a money judgment, and therefore it falls under Rule 82(b)(2). 386 The supreme
court affirmed the superior court’s award for attorney’s fees in a partial judgment for specific performance,
holding that specific performance is an equitable remedy that falls under the guidelines of Rule 82(b)(2). 387
Wayne B. v. Alaska Psychiatric Institute
In Wayne B. v. Alaska Psychiatric Institute, 388 the supreme court held that an individual cannot be
involuntarily committed when the State fails to comply with the filing requirements under Alaska Civil
Rule 53(d)(1). 389 Wayne was ordered to be involuntarily committed by the superior court based on the
recommendations of a superior court standing master. 390 Wayne appealed, claiming that the standing
master had failed to file a transcript of the hearing as required by Rule 53(d)(1). 391 The supreme court held
that because of the significant curtailment of liberty inherent in the process of involuntary commitment, the
superior court must have full knowledge of the evidence that justifies committing Wayne to a mental
institution. 392 Here, the superior court lacked full knowledge because the standing master had failed to file
the transcript with the court. 393 The supreme court vacated the superior court’s order to involuntarily
commit Wayne, holding that an individual cannot be involuntarily committed when the State fails to
comply with the filing requirements under Rule 53(d)(1). 394
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
Porter v. Osborn
In Porter v. Osborn, 395 the Ninth Circuit held that, in certain situations, the “purpose to harm”
standard applies to the level of culpability necessary to shock the conscience when facing a Fourteenth
Amendment due process question. 396 Osborn, an Alaska state trooper, responded to a call about an
abandoned car and found Porter’s son asleep in the driver’s seat. 397 A confrontation ensued, resulting in
Osborn killing Porter’s son. 398 Alleging that his Fourteenth Amendment rights of familial association with
his son were violated, Porter filed suit. 399 The district court denied Osborn’s motion for summary judgment
due to qualified immunity, and Osborn appealed. 400 The court reasoned that to determine whether qualified
immunity precluded the lawsuit against Osborn, the court must decide: (1) the proper standard of
culpability, and (2) whether Osborn’s conduct met that standard. 401 The court determined that the proper
standard is whether the conduct occurred with a “purpose to harm” without regard to legitimate goals of
law enforcement. 402 The “deliberate indifference” standard applied by the district court was inappropriate
because Osborn lacked the time for the deliberation required for the “deliberate indifference” standard to
apply. 403 Reversing the district court, the Ninth Circuit held that, in certain situations, the “purpose to
harm” standard applies to the level of culpability necessary to shock the conscience when facing a
Fourteenth Amendment due process question. 404

Alaska Supreme Court
City of Valdez v. Polar Tankers, Inc.
In City of Valdez v. Polar Tankers, Inc., 405 the supreme court held that an ad valorem property tax
using an apportionment formula based on a vessel’s time in port does not violate the Due Process,
Commerce, or Tonnage Clauses of the Federal Constitution. 406 Valdez adopted an ad valorem property tax
on certain large vessels; the tax was apportioned based on a vessel’s annual ratio of days spent in Valdez to
days spent in all ports, including Valdez. 407 Polar Tankers (“Polar”), which paid the tax for several years,
sued in superior court, claiming that the assessment violated the Due Process, Commerce, and Tonnage
Clauses of the Federal Constitution; the superior court held that the tax’s apportionment formula violated
the Due Process and Commerce Clauses, but not the Tonnage Clause. 408 The judge concluded that the
apportionment was unconstitutional because it created a risk of duplicative taxation. 409 On appeal, the
supreme court stated that a tax on mobile property used in interstate commerce satisfies the Due Process
and Commerce Clauses if: (1) the property taxed has a substantial nexus with the taxing jurisdiction, (2) the
tax is fairly apportioned, (3) the tax does not discriminate against interstate commerce, and (4) the tax is
fairly related to the services provided by the taxing jurisdiction. 410 The supreme court ruled that the first
395
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element was satisfied because of the extensive connections between Valdez and Polar Tankers, which
included the funding of a private shipping terminal with municipal bonds, the provision of municipal health
and safety services to vessel crews, and the city’s involvement in oil spill contingency plans. 411 Regarding
the second element, the supreme court ruled that the home port doctrine, which gives dominant taxing
rights to a vessel’s domicile, had been superseded by a rule of fair apportionment among states with a tax
situs. 412 The court had previously determined that Polar’s connections with Valdez made the city a tax
situs; based on previously-sustained apportionment schemes, the court ruled that Valdez’s system was fair,
valid, and without risk of duplicative taxation. 413 Additionally, the court found Polar’s arguments on the
third and fourth elements had been waived; since all four elements were thus met, the supreme court held
that the tax did not violate either the Due Process or Commerce Clauses. 414 Finally, the court ruled that
although the Tonnage Clause forbids duties on entering, trading in, or lying in a port, a fairly apportioned
property tax is not a tonnage duty; since the court had already held that Valdez’s tax was a fairly
apportioned property tax, it further held that the tax did not violate the Tonnage Clause. 415 Reversing the
superior court in part, the supreme court held that an ad valorem property tax using an apportionment
formula based on a vessel’s time in port does not violate the Due Process, Commerce, or Tonnage Clauses
of the Federal Constitution. 416
Glover v. State, Department of Transportation
In Glover v. State, Department of Transportation, 417 the supreme court held that: (1) the statute
revoking the State’s waiver of sovereign immunity for suits by state-employed seamen (a) does not violate
the waiver of sovereign immunity in the Alaska Constitution, (b) was not preempted by the Jones Act, and
(c) did not violate a seaman’s constitutional rights; 418 and (2) a reduction of attorneys’ fees for the State is
proper when the losing plaintiff undertakes a disproportionate financial burden in litigating the case. 419 In
2003, the Alaska Legislature passed an amendment to § 09.50.250 of the Alaska Statutes, revoking the
State’s waiver of sovereign immunity for suits by state-employed seamen. 420 The result of the amendment
was that seamen who were previously entitled to seek compensation under the federal Jones Act were now
required to seek compensation under the State’s worker compensation system. 421 A year later, Glover was
injured while working for the Alaska Marine Highway System (“AMHS”), and challenged the
constitutionality of the statute. 422 The superior court upheld the statute but limited the State’s ability to
recover attorneys’ fees. 423 The supreme court, looking to legislative history and the language of the Alaska
Constitution, found that Article II, § 21 of the Alaska Constitution does not contain an absolute waiver of
sovereign immunity. 424 Also, the court found that the statute did not discriminate against a federal cause of
action, indicating that the Jones Act did not supersede the statute. 425 Furthermore, since common law does
not provide a right to a jury trial when there is no right to sue the sovereign, the statute did not infringe
upon Glover’s constitutional right to a jury trial, and since Glover still maintained a substantial and
effective remedy under the new statute, his due process right to access the courts was not violated. 426
Additionally, the statute did not violate equal protection because the State’s action bore a fair and
substantial relationship to the government’s legitimate purpose of creating a uniform system for
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compensating state employees. 427 Finally, even though Glover was motivated by economic purposes, the
superior court properly allowed the reduction of attorneys’ fees, given Glover’s disproportionate financial
burden as the first seaman to challenge the statute. 428 The supreme court affirmed the decision of the
superior court, holding that: (1) the statute revoking the State’s waiver of sovereign immunity for suits by
state-employed seamen (a) does not violate the waiver of sovereign immunity in the Alaska Constitution,
(b) was not preempted by the Jones Act, and (c) did not violate a seaman’s constitutional rights; 429 and (2)
a reduction of attorneys’ fees for the State is proper when the losing plaintiff undertakes a disproportionate
financial burden in litigating the case. 430
Varilek v. McRoberts
In Varilek v. McRoberts, 431 the supreme court held that there is no due process right to counsel in
a civil action for wrongful death. 432 After the court appointed the Professional Guardianship Services
Corporation (“PGSC”) to serve as Dunnigan’s conservator, and soon after, the PGSC moved Dunnigan to
an assisted living home. 433 Due to the negligent care provided at the assisted living home, its assisted living
license was revoked the day after Dunnigan’s death. 434 As the personal representative of Dunnigan’s estate,
Varilek brought a pro se suit for wrongful death and sought court-appointed counsel. 435 The court applied
the Matthews v. Eldridge balancing test, which consists of three factors: (1) the private interest involved,
(2) the benefit of additional procedural safeguards, and (3) the cost and administrative burden to the
government. 436 Focusing on the first factor, the supreme court reasoned that mere personal pecuniary
benefit was not a protected private interest. 437 Therefore, the court held that no due process right to counsel
exists in a wrongful death action between private parties. 438 Thus, the trial court’s refusal to grant Varilek’s
requested continuance was not reversible error. 439 The supreme court affirmed the superior court in all
regards, holding that there is no due process right to counsel in a civil action for wrongful death. 440

CONTRACT LAW
Alaska Supreme Court
Carr-Gottstein Foods Co. v. Wasilla, LLC
In Carr Gottstein Foods Co. v. Wasilla, LLC, 441 the supreme court held that where a landlord
prejudices a tenant by acquiescing to a known breach of the lease over a period of six years, the landlord
waives his right to strictly enforce the lease. 442 Carr-Gottstein Properties (“CG”) leased shopping center
spaces for a liquor store and a supermarket to Carr-Gottstein Foods Co. (“CG Foods”); the separate liquor
store was later closed and relocated inside the supermarket. 443 Although CG Foods did not ask CG for
427
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permission to relocate the liquor store, CG knew of the move; CG failed to object that the relocation would
violate either the use or sublease clauses of the contract. 444 When Safeway bought CG Foods, it asked CG
for certificates indicating that there were no defaults under CG Foods’ lease; CG neither signed the
certificates nor stated that CG Foods was in default. 445 Later, approximately six years after the relocation,
CG informed Safeway that the liquor store’s move was a breach of the lease. 446 CG then brought a suit
against Safeway, who argued that CG’s delay in objecting to the move constituted an implied waiver of its
claim for breach; the superior court, after concluding that the lease barred waiver as an affirmative defense,
found for CG. 447 On appeal, the supreme court reasoned that where failure to enforce a legal right would
reasonably indicate that the right will not be pursued in the future, it constitutes an implied waiver or
estoppel. 448 The court noted that CG had chosen to delay its protests against the relocation until the
optimum time, maintaining this noncommittal stance despite a duty to respond to Safeway’s inquiries about
defaults on the lease. 449 The court reasoned that CG’s actions prejudiced Safeway and CG Foods by
denying them the opportunity to seek alternative leasing arrangements or protection against liability; and
held that CG’s actions and the resulting prejudice clearly indicated that CG had waived its claim for breach
of the lease. 450 The court also held that the non-waiver clause did not bar the defense of waiver in this case;
the clause meant that where a lease term had been breached, the landlord’s failure to object did not waive
the tenant’s duty to comply in the future. 451 The supreme court reversed the decision of the superior court,
holding that where a landlord prejudices a tenant by acquiescing to a known breach of the lease over a
period of six years, the landlord waives his right to strictly enforce the lease. 452
State v. Alaska State Employees Ass’n.
In State v. Alaska State Employees Ass’n., 453 the supreme court held that the state was not
protected by sovereign immunity from payment of a prejudgment interest award made by the superior court
according to the terms of a collective bargaining agreement. 454 A union representative was suspended
without pay for thirty days for using profanity during an employment dispute. 455 When he lied during
investigative proceedings, he was dismissed by the state. 456 Pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement,
the Alaska State Employees Association (“ASEA”) appealed the state’s decision to an arbitrator. 457 The
arbitrator upheld the suspension but ordered the state to reinstate the employee and pay backpay. 458 The
state refused to comply, and ASEA filed suit in superior court. 459 The superior court sustained the
arbitrator’s award of backpay and added pre-judgment and post-judgment interest. 460 The state appealed to
the Supreme Court, arguing that ASEA’s claim was merely an extension of the arbitration proceeding and
since the pertinent statute, the Public Employment Relations Act, said nothing about prejudgment interest,
it could not be required to pay the award. 461 The supreme court disagreed, reasoning that the suit arose
under the collective bargaining agreement and was therefore properly characterized as a contract claim. 462
Contract claims claim are encompassed by § 09.50.250 of the Alaska Statutes, which authorizes the
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payment of prejudgment interest. 463 Therefore, the state’s sovereign immunity argument failed. 464
Affirming the superior court, the supreme court held that the state was not protected by sovereign immunity
from payment of a prejudgment interest award made by the superior court according to the terms of a
collective bargaining agreement. 465
Wasser & Winters Co. v. Ritchie Bros. Auctioneers, Inc.
In Wasser & Winters Co. v. Ritchie Bros. Auctioneers, Inc., 466 the supreme court held that
reformation of a contract based on mutual mistake was proper when neither party was aware of certain liens
on the property underlying the contract. 467 Wasser, a creditor, authorized Ritchie, an auctioneer, to sell off
pieces of equipment in which Wasser held an interest. 468 Wasser agreed to release its interest upon
payment, not to exceed the entire amount owed to Wasser, of the net proceeds from the auction. 469 After
the auction, Ritchie discovered several other tax liens on the equipment to which Wasser’s interest was
subordinate. 470 At the time of the agreement, neither party knew there were other tax liens on the
equipment. 471 The superior court found mutual mistake of fact and reformed the contract to reflect payoff
to the senior creditors before Wasser. 472 On appeal, Wasser argued that rewriting the contract was not
appropriate because the mistake did not have a material effect on the transaction and that the risk of
mistake rested with Ritchie. 473 Affirming the superior court, the supreme court reasoned that: (1) the
mistake was material because it significantly reduced the net proceeds from the auction, (2) Ritchie’s
interest in accurate lien information was much lower than Wasser’s, and (3) Wasser had the ability to
obtain the information. 474 Affirming the superior court, the supreme court held that reformation of a
contract based on mutual mistake was proper when neither party was aware of certain liens on the property
underlying the contract. 475
Wolff v. Cunningham
In Wolff v. Cunningham, 476 the supreme court held that because a third party’s contractual promise
to pay another person’s child support obligations did not modify those obligations, that contract was
enforceable against the third party when supported by consideration. 477 Cunningham co-owned a business
with Clanton. 478 When Clanton decided to sell his share of the business to Cunningham, they, along with
Wolff, executed a promissory note making Clanton’s share of the business, in the amount of $25,000,
payable to Wolff. 479 The promissory note also provided that the $25,000 would satisfy Clanton’s child
support obligations to Wolff. 480 The supreme court reasoned that the contract between Clanton and Wolff
did not violate Alaska Civil Rule 90.3 because it did not modify the child support agreement. 481 Thus, the
contract between Clanton and Cunningham was enforceable, and supported by consideration: (1)
Cunningham received Clanton’s share of the business and a promise to not compete there against, (2) Wolff
received a promise of $25,000 from Cunningham, and (3) Clanton received satisfaction of his outstanding
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child support debts. 482 Reversing the superior court, the supreme court held that because a third party’s
contractual promise to pay another person’s child support obligations does not modify those obligations,
that contract is enforceable against the third party when supported by consideration. 483

CRIMINAL LAW
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
Osborne v. District Attorney’s Office
In Osborne v. District Attorney’s Office, 484 the Ninth Circuit held that a convicted defendant’s due
process rights prohibit a State from denying him reasonable access to biological evidence for the purpose of
additional DNA testing, where: (1) the biological evidence was used to secure his conviction; (2) the testing
will be conducted with new, more accurate methods; (3) such methods are capable of conclusively
determining whether the defendant is the source of the genetic material; (4) the testing can be conducted
without cost or prejudice to the State; and (5) the evidence is material to available forms of post-conviction
relief. 485 Osborne was convicted of kidnapping and sexual assault. 486 Subsequently, he applied for postconviction relief arguing that he had a right to retest the DNA using methods unavailable at the time of
trial; when this application was rejected, Osborne filed a claim in federal district court under § 1983
alleging that the District Attorney’s Office violated his federal constitutional rights to access DNA for postconviction testing. 487 The district court determined that under the specific facts presented in the case, the
defendant had a very limited right to the desired testing. 488 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that a
defendant’s right to access evidence extends to post-conviction proceedings and that Osborne could assert
these rights in a § 1983 claim. 489 Analyzing the materiality of Osborne’s proposed DNA tests, the court
reasoned that the results would be material if a habeas proceeding on an actual innocence claim by Osborne
would be unworthy of confidence without the DNA evidence. 490 The court also concluded that the results
could have extraordinary exculpatory potential, because they could both disprove Osborne’s guilt and
specifically implicate the actual perpetrator. 491 Finally, the court concluded that the evidence Osborne
sought could be produced easily and without prejudice to the State because Osborne had offered to pay for
the testing himself. 492 The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court, holding that a convicted defendant’s
due process rights prohibit a State from denying him reasonable access to biological evidence for the
purpose of additional DNA testing, where: (1) the biological evidence was used to secure his conviction;
(2) the testing will be conducted with new, more accurate methods; (3) such methods are capable of
conclusively determining whether the defendant is the source of the genetic material; (4) the testing can be
conducted without cost or prejudice to the State; and (5) the evidence is material to available forms of postconviction relief. 493
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United States v. Weyhrauch
In United States v. Weyhrauch, 494 the Ninth Circuit held that the United States Code creates a
uniform standard of “honest services” that is independent of state law. 495 The government filed an
interlocutory appeal of a district court ruling excluding evidence that Weyhrauch, a state legislator, failed to
disclose a conflict of interest—Weyhrauch promised to vote favorable on oil tax legislation for future legal
word—regarding pending legislation because Alaska law did not require him to disclose the conflict. 496
The government argued that the evidence was admissible to support an “honest services” fraud conviction,
which criminalizes the use of the postal service in carrying out fraud, and which does not rely on a
violation of state law. 497 Reasoning that the purpose of the public “honest services” law is to ensure
transparency that enables the public to determine whether public officials are complying with their duty of
honesty, the Ninth Circuit held that the “honest services” law does not depend on a state law violation. 498
Reversing the district court, the Ninth Circuit held that the United States Code creates a uniform standard
of “honest services” that is independent of state law. 499

Alaska Supreme Court
Lewis v. State
In Lewis v. State, 500 the supreme court held that when a criminal defendant waives his Fifth
Amendment rights, the trial court may: (1) order psychiatric evaluations of the defendant, (2) allow the
parties to introduce the results of those evaluations into evidence, and (3) instruct the jurors on a possible
“guilty but mentally ill” verdict. 501 Lewis was convicted of several counts of assault. 502 During trial, his
attorney announced that despite Lewis’s chronic mental illness, Lewis did not wish to claim insanity or use
his mental disease to negate a culpable mental state. 503 Despite this, the trial court ordered a psychiatric
evaluation on the grounds that Lewis had already raised the issue by bringing it up at trial, and his sanity
could later become an issue in the case through the testimony of the witnesses. 504 After Lewis was
convicted, he appealed, arguing that the psychiatric evaluations violated his Fifth Amendment right against
self-incrimination, and since he had not raised the issue, the State was barred from introducing evidence of
mental disease or defect. 505 The supreme court reasoned that a defendant waives his Fifth Amendment
rights by raising the issue in court. 506 Although Lewis did not give advance warning of his intention to
claim “no culpable mental state by reason of mental defect,” it was the strategy his attorney took during
trial. 507 Affirming the superior court, the supreme court held that when a criminal defendant waives his
Fifth Amendment rights, the trial court may: (1) order psychiatric evaluations of the defendant, (2) allow
the parties to introduce the results of those evaluations into evidence, and (3) instruct the jurors on a
possible “guilty but mentally ill” verdict. 508
Morris v. State, Department of Administration
In Morris v. State, Department of Administration, 509 the supreme court held that even when the
disparity between a breath test and a blood test for alcohol is greater than would be explained by the
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average rate of alcohol processing by the body, the breath test is not necessarily unreliable. 510 After making
an illegal turn, Morris was pulled over by a police officer. 511 The officer administered a preliminary breath
test, a second breath test, and then a blood test, and determined that Morris was intoxicated. At a hearing
regarding revocation of his license, Morris argued that the results of the first breath test were inconsistent
with the normal rate of alcohol elimination and could not be relied upon, but his license was revoked and
the revocation was upheld by the superior court. 512 On appeal, the supreme court found that it is not
impossible for a person to have a higher rate of alcohol elimination than the normal rate, and that state law
defines a violation in terms of a breath test, not a blood test. 513 Moreover, the court noted that the results
between the second breath test and the blood test fell within the normal range of alcohol elimination,
supporting the conclusion that Morris was over the legal limit at the time of his first test. 514 Affirming the
superior court, the supreme court held that even when the disparity between a breath test and a blood test
for alcohol is greater than would be explained by the average rate of alcohol processing by the body, the
breath test is not necessarily unreliable. 515
Pastos v. State
In Pastos v. State, 516 the supreme court held that an individual does not violate a no-contact order
by cashing a check written three years earlier by the subject of the no-contact order. 517 After having
unlawful contact with K.Y. in violation of the terms of a protective order, the court prohibited Pastos from
contacting K.Y. until Pastos reported to state custody the following morning. 518 However, later that
afternoon Pastos cashed a check that K.Y. had written him three years earlier. 519 The trial court and the
court of appeals held that cashing the check violated the no-contact order because Pastos should have
known that cashing the check would have an impact on K.Y. 520 The supreme court disagreed, holding that
cashing a check does not constitute a “communication” between the parties and thus did not violate the nocontact order. 521 Reversing the lower court, the supreme court held that an individual does not violate a nocontact order by cashing a check written three years earlier by the subject of the no-contact order. 522
Whiting v. State
In Whiting v. State, 523 the supreme court held that the mitigating factor contained in §
12.55.155(d)(15) of the Alaska Statutes, applicable when a controlled substance is a small amount for
personal use in one’s home, does not hinge on where the controlled substance is found, but rather on where
and for what purpose the defendant intended to use the controlled substance. 524 Whiting pleaded no contest
to possession of oxycodone after two pills were discovered in Whiting’s car as he was driving away from
his residence. 525 The superior court ruled that the mitigating factor did not apply because the substances
were not found in the defendant’s home. 526 On appeal, Whiting argued that where and how he had intended
to use the substance, rather than the physical location of the pills, should have been the controlling fact in
deciding the issue of the mitigating factor. 527 Because the supreme court was not provided with any case
law or statutory history as to how the statute should be interpreted, the court used a canon of statutory
510
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interpretation called the “last antecedent rule.” 528 Application of this canon resulted in requiring the
mitigating factor to apply when the defendant possesses a small amount of a controlled substance for the
purpose of using it personally in his or her home. 529 Thus, the supreme court vacated the superior court’s
ruling, holding that the mitigating factor contained in § 12.55.155(d)(15) does not hinge on where the
controlled substance is found, but rather on where and for what purpose the defendant intended to use the
controlled substance. 530

Alaska Court of Appeals
Abel v. State
In Abel v. State, 531 the court of appeals held that an officer may enter a private residence without a
warrant to prevent the likely destruction of evidence. 532 Upon arriving at a residence in response to a report
of neglected animals, an officer observed a woman walk into the house and say, “[p]ut it away, guys. The
cops.” 533 The officer walked onto the porch, and observed through an open door that Abel was holding a
bag containing a green substance and money in his hand. 534 Believing that he was witnessing a drug sale
and that if he left, the evidence would be destroyed while he went to obtain a warrant, the officer entered
the residence and arrested Abel. 535 Abel filed a motion to suppress all evidence that the officer obtained via
the warrantless search and seizure. 536 The court of appeals held that, because of the possibility that
evidence would be destroyed in the time it took to obtain a warrant, the officer was justified in entering the
house and seizing the evidence without a warrant. 537 The court further noted that probable cause does not
require conclusive proof that a crime had occurred, only a fair probability or substantial chance of criminal
activity. 538 The court of appeals affirmed the superior court, holding that an officer may enter a private
residence without a warrant to prevent the likely destruction of evidence. 539
Baker v. State
In Baker v. State, 540 the court of appeals held that a criminal defendant is not entitled to a jury trial
on the issue of whether he is a “worst offender,” because such a finding does not depend on the kinds of
facts that juries must hear. 541 Baker was convicted for felony driving while intoxicated, felony refusal to
submit to a breath test and driving with a revoked license. 542 The trial court sentenced Baker to 11.5 years
in prison based on his conviction of three or more felonies and his substantial history of criminal
conduct. 543 Baker appealed the sentence asserting that he was entitled to a jury trial on the issues of his
prior felonies and “worst offender” status, and that the sentence was excessive. 544 In determining whether a
“worst offender” finding must be made by a jury, the court of appeals concluded that such a finding is
based on traditional sentencing criteria which look to the characteristics of the offense and the offender to
justify the imposition of a maximum sentence. 545 According to the court, the “worst offender” finding does
not involve the types of factual issues which must be submitted to a jury pursuant to Blakely v.
528
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Washington. 546 Because of this, the court of appeals rejected Baker’s claim that the trial court erred in
finding that he was a worst offender. 547 Thus, the court of appeals affirmed the superior court, holding that
a criminal defendant is not entitled to a jury trial on the issue of whether he is a “worst offender,” because
such a finding does not depend on the kinds of facts that juries must hear. 548
Berumen v. State
In Berumen v. State, 549 the court of appeals held that suppression of evidence was the proper
remedy for a serious violation of the “knock and announce” law. 550 While trying to serve a warrant for
Berumen’s arrest, 551 police officers entered Berumen’s hotel room without announcing their authority—in
violation of the “knock and announce” law—and collected evidence leading to an indictment for thirddegree controlled-substance misconduct and two counts of second-degree contributing to the delinquency
of a minor. 552 The superior court denied Berumen’s motion to suppress the evidence found in the hotel
room. 553 On appeal Berumen argued suppression was warranted because the police violated the “knock and
announce” statute. 554 The court of appeals concluded the “knock and announce” violation was not excused
under the substantial compliance doctrine. 555 The court of appeals then reasoned that the exclusionary rule
applied because: (1) the “knock and announce” law was clear and widely known, (2) the statute was
designed to protect individual rights, (3) admission of evidence obtained in contravention of the statute
would condone “dirty business,” and (4) it appeared that police engaged in repeated of violations of the
statute. 556 The court of appeals reversed the superior court’s dismissal of Berumen’s suppression motion, 557
holding that suppression of evidence was the proper remedy for a serious violation of the “knock and
announce” law. 558
Gates v. State
In Gates v. State, 559 the court of appeals held that when a defendant prematurely terminates a
court-ordered treatment program, the actual time spent in the program counts as credit against his or her
sentence. 560 Under court order, Gates was supposed to complete two residential treatment programs prior to
sentencing. 561 When she failed to complete the ordered treatment programs, the superior court held that,
under Nygren v. State 562 and § 12.55.027 of the Alaska Statutes, when defendants fail to complete court
ordered treatment programs, they are not entitled to any credit against their sentences. 563 The court of
appeals examined the legislative history of § 12.55.027. 564 Reasoning that the statute’s legislative history
implied a legislative intent not to require completion of court-ordered treatment programs, the court of
appeals held that Gates could receive credit against her sentence when she attended, but failed to complete,
a treatment program. 565 The court of appeals reversed the superior court, holding that when a defendant
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prematurely terminates a court-ordered treatment program, the actual time spent in the program should
count as credit against his or her sentence. 566
Gottlieb v. State
In Gottlieb v. State, 567 the court of appeals held that: (1) an indictment for perjury must be
obtained within one year of discovering a fair probability or substantial chance of the existence of perjury;
(2) an instrument or document is forged only if it is altered, completed, or otherwise created so as to falsely
appear or purport to be an authentic creation of someone other than its true maker; and (3) the proper forum
to attack the validity of a medical license in the first instance is the State Medical Board. 568 When Gottlieb
applied to the State Medical Board for a license to practice medicine in Alaska, he falsely declared that he
had completed his required post-graduate internship. 569 The State Medical Board issued Gottlieb a license
based on his false answer. 570 The State eventually discovered Gottlieb’s deception and convicted him of a
variety of crimes, including perjury, forgery, and first-degree theft (on the basis that Gottlieb was paid for
medical services which he rendered under the authority of an invalid license). 571 On appeal, the court of
appeals first determined that Gottlieb’s perjury conviction was barred because the State likely knew of the
perjury for more than one year before the prosecution commenced, thus exceeding the statute of
limitations. 572 Regarding the forgery conviction, the court because Gottlieb only lied on his medical license
application and did not falsely alter, complete, or make the document as defined by § 11.46.580(a) of the
Alaska Statutes, his conviction could not stand. 573 Next, the court of appeals determined that Gottlieb’s
convictions for first-degree theft were invalid because the State premised the convictions on the assertion
that Gottlieb’s medical license was invalid despite the fact that the State Medical Board had the exclusive
authority to regulate a physician’s license and had not made a ruling in this case.574 Because the State failed
to first challenge Gottlieb’s license before the Medical Board, it could not argue at trial that Gottlieb’s
license was invalid, nor could it support the charge of first-degree theft. 575 Thus, vacating the superior
court’s conviction on the perjury charge and reversing the conviction for first-degree theft, the court of
appeals held that: (1) an indictment for perjury must be obtained within one year of discovering a fair
probability or substantial chance of the existence of perjury, (2) an instrument or document is forged only if
it is altered, completed, or otherwise created so as to falsely appear or purport to be an authentic creation of
someone other than its true maker, and (3) the proper forum to attack the validity of a medical license in the
first instance is the State Medical Board. 576
Harmon v. State
In Harmon v. State, 577 the court of appeals held that: (1) a criminal trial for murder and sexual
assault is not prejudiced by media reports when the jurors in the trial have little knowledge of the media
reports; (2) evidence concerning a prior sexual assault on the victim may be admitted when its more
probative than prejudicial: and (3) a 72-year sentence may not be excessive, even for a first-time felony
offender. 578 Harmon was convicted of second-degree murder and first-degree sexual assault for his attack
on M.W. in 2003. 579 The trial was held in Juneau, where the attack garnered significant media attention. 580
After his conviction, Harmon appealed on three grounds: (1) media reports had prejudiced his trial, (2)
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evidence of a previous incident where he sexually assaulted M.W. was overly prejudicial, and (3) his
sentence of 72 years in prison was excessive. 581 The court of appeals applied the Mallet test to Harmon’s
complaints of pretrial publicity prejudice, holding that a motion for change of venue shall be granted when
potentially prejudicial material is disseminated, if there is a substantial likelihood that in the absence of a
change, a fair trial by an impartial jury is impossible. 582 Finding that the trial judge had appropriately
dismissed all potential jurors with more than a cursory knowledge of the case or who knew of Harmon’s
incriminating statements, 583 the court held that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion by denying
Harmon’s request for a change of venue. 584 Similarly, the court did not abuse its discretion by admitting
evidence of Harmon’s alleged earlier sexual assault on M.W. 585 because the evidence helped establish
Harmon’s identity as the person who attacked M.W., and the probative value of the evidence outweighed
its prejudicial value. 586 Lastly, the court held that Harmon’s sentence was not excessive even though it
exceeded the Page benchmark range. 587 Harmon’s actions after the murder—living in M.W.’s cabin, eating
her food, and playing poker with her money—outweighed the fact that this was his first felony offense. 588
Affirming Harmon’s conviction, the court of appeals held that: (1) a criminal trial for murder and sexual
assault is not prejudiced by media reports when the jurors in the trial have little knowledge of the media
reports; (2) evidence concerning a prior sexual assault on the victim may be admitted when its more
probative than prejudicial; and (3) a 72-year sentence may not be excessive, even for a first-time felony
offender. 589
Haywood v. State
In Haywood v. State, 590 the court of appeals held that under former § 28.33.140 of the Alaska
Statutes, a person who held a commercial driver’s license and was convicted under § 28.35.030 for driving
under the influence while in a private vehicle would not lose his or her commercial driver’s license. 591
While driving a private vehicle, Haywood was stopped by an Anchorage police officer for exceeding the
posted speed limit. 592 The officer found evidence of intoxication. 593 Prior to trial, Haywood argued that §
28.33.140 only granted trial judges the authority to revoke commercial driver’s licenses when the crime of
driving under the influence was committed in conjunction with operating a commercial vehicle. 594 He
subsequently entered a plea and was convicted; at sentencing, the trial judge revoked Haywood’s
commercial driver’s license. 595 The court of appeals looked to the legislative history of former § 28.33.140
and found that it was drafted to parallel corresponding federal regulations. 596 These federal regulations
disqualified individuals from having a commercial driver’s license if they had committed certain crimes,
but each of these crimes required that a commercial vehicle be involved. 597 Although § 28.33.140(a) did
not mention the commercial vehicle requirement, § 28.33.140(b) did. 598 The court of appeals resolved this
ambiguity to provide the most lenient penalty. 599 Reversing the superior court, the court of appeals held
that under former § 28.33.140 of the Alaska Statutes, a person who held a commercial driver’s license and
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was convicted of § 28.35.030 for driving under the influence while in a private vehicle would not lose his
or her commercial driver’s license. 600
Hinson v. State
In Hinson v. State, 601 the court of appeals held that: (1) a jury may use circumstantial evidence to
convict a criminal defendant; (2) larger sentences may be justified if the defendant, inter alia, has an
extensive criminal record; and (3) when trial courts impose unusually strict parole restrictions, they must
lay out their reasons with particularity. 602 Hinson was convicted of murder based on forensic evidence, the
inconsistency of the defendant’s story, and other relevant evidence. 603 On appeal, the court of appeals held
that a jury could reasonably infer the defendant’s guilt—even though the evidence was purely
circumstantial—since Alaska law makes no distinction between direct and circumstantial evidence. 604 The
court further held that a seventy-year sentence was not excessive, reasoning that it had previously upheld a
sixty-year sentence for the same crime by a younger offender and Hinton had an extensive criminal record,
substance abuse problems, and had proved resistant to rehabilitation. 605 However, the court held that the
trial court insufficiently laid out its reasons for its unusually strict parole restrictions. 606 Also, a parole
restriction requiring the defendant to arrange visitation with his children through his ex-girlfriend did not
rationally relate to his reformation and was based on unsubstantiated and unrelated allegations of sexual
abuse. 607 In part affirming and in part vacating the superior court, the court of appeals held that: (1) a jury
may use circumstantial evidence to convict a criminal defendant; (2) larger sentences may be justified if the
defendant, inter alia, has an extensive criminal record; and (3) when trial courts impose unusually strict
parole restrictions, they must lay out their reasons with particularity. 608
Hunter v. State
In Hunter v. State, 609 the court of appeals held that the superior court did not violate the double
jeopardy clause when it imposed the same 95-year composite sentence on remand because the sentence still
reflected the criminal conduct. 610 Hunter was convicted of offenses relating to attacks on five different
women over the course of six years. 611 At the time of his sentencing he had three prior felony
convictions. 612 Hunter argued that the superior court had violated the double jeopardy clause by changing
the terms of his prior sentences in order to keep the composite sentence at 95 years. 613 The court found that
because Hunter was convicted of nine counts based on the five attacks—for which the composite sentence
could have reached 200 years—the superior court had not violated double jeopardy by adjusting the terms
and re-imposing the 95-year composite sentence. 614 Additionally, the court held that the 95-year composite
sentence was not excessive. 615 The court found that the sentence was appropriate because of the nature of
Hunter’s crimes and his long criminal history which render him one “of the rare class of offenders who
must be incarcerated for the remainder of their life for the protection of the public.” 616 Affirming the
superior court, the court of appeals held that the superior court did not violate the double jeopardy clause
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when it imposed the same 95-year composite sentence on remand because the sentence still reflected the
criminal conduct. 617
Itta v. State
In Itta v. State, 618 the court of appeals held that: (1) the trial judge acted properly by refusing to
give a definitive answer to the admissibility of other-crimes evidence before Itta chose whether to take the
stand, and (2) there was sufficient corroboration of Itta’s accomplices’ testimony because corroboration on
every element of the crime was not necessary. 619 Itta was convicted of assault. 620 During trial, the judge
refused to give a definitive answer on whether other-crimes evidence was admissible before Itta made a
decision on whether to take the stand. 621 Itta appealed his conviction, arguing that: (1) the judge infringed
Itta’s right to testify by refusing to give a final answer on the admissibility of other-crimes evidence until
the content of the defense case was known, and (2) there was insufficient corroboration of the testimony
offered by Itta’s accomplices to support a conviction.622 The court of appeals reasoned that the judge
needed to preserve his right to change his ruling because the content of Itta’s testimony could have altered
the balance between the probative value of the evidence and its potential for unfair prejudice.623 The court
further reasoned that Alaska law only requires independent corroboration of a defendant’s connection to the
crime, not every element of the crime. 624 The court held that: (1) the trial judge acted properly by refusing
to give a definitive answer as to the admissibility of other-crimes evidence, and (2) there was sufficient
corroboration of Itta’s accomplices’ testimony because corroboration on every element of the crime was
not necessary. 625
Ivie v. State
In Ivie v. State, 626 the court of appeals held that a person released to a halfway house was not
under “official detention” and could not be charged with escape. 627 Ivie was convicted for escape in the
second degree for walking away from a halfway house. 628 Ivie appealed, arguing that he was not under
official detention at the halfway house because he was confined on an order of conditional bail release. 629
Relying on the superior court judge’s comments at trial, the court of appeals concluded that the judge
intended to release Ivie to the halfway house, and did not intend to order the Department of Corrections to
confine him. 630 The court vacated Ivie’s conviction for escape, and held that a person released to a halfway
house was not under official detention and could not be charged with escape. 631
Johnson v. State
In Johnson v. State, 632 the court of appeals held that a jury could reasonably convict a father of
manslaughter because his knowledge that his child was being starved by the mother made her subsequent
deadly assault upon the child foreseeable. 633 Johnson and Heather had a small daughter, Christina, whom
Heather subjected to extreme starvation. 634 Eventually, Heather killed Christina by intentionally dropping
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the child on her head. 635 Afterwards, the State prosecuted Johnson on the theory that he had breached his
parental duty to protect Christina, and the jury convicted Johnson of manslaughter. 636 When a special
verdict form was presented to the jurors, they unanimously indicated that Christina’s death was caused
solely by head trauma. 637 On appeal, Johnson argued that he should acquitted because even when the
evidence was viewed most favorably for the verdict, it was clear that Christina’s death resulted from
Heather’s unforeseeable assault. 638 The court of appeals reasoned that Johnson’s duty to care for his
daughter could have been breached only if he had been aware of a risk but refrained from taking action. 639
The court also reasoned that harm to a victim would be foreseeable if it was of the same general type the
defendant could foresee, even if the precise nature of the harm was unforeseeable. 640 The court further
reasoned that Johnson could foresee Christina’s death through some type of parental abuse, because he
knew she was being starved and that Heather might utilize other forms of abuse, including physical
assaults. 641 The court concluded that even if Christina had died solely from head trauma, Johnson would
still have breached his parental duty to protect her. 642 The court of appeals affirmed the superior court,
holding that a jury could reasonably convict a father of manslaughter because his knowledge that his child
was being starved by the mother made her subsequent deadly assault upon the child foreseeable. 643
Johnson v. State
In Johnson v. State, 644 the court of appeals held that a judge was under no duty to explain
Johnson’s right of self-representation because Johnson did not clearly and unequivocally invoke his right to
self-representation. 645 During the sentencing phase of Johnson’s trial for driving under the influence,
Johnson indicated that he was dissatisfied with his current attorney and desired a new one. 646 When the
court refused to grant this request, Johnson made comments about representing himself in the matter. 647
The judge replied that Johnson would be allowed to give his opinion on sentencing, and Johnson did not
renew his representation request. 648 On appeal, Johnson argued that he had been entitled to a more detailed
explanation of his right to self-representation. 649 The court reasoned that only clear and unequivocal
requests to proceed pro se oblige a trial judge to explain that right. 650 Since Johnson brought up selfrepresentation only once, the court held it was reasonable to conclude that Johnson had solely been
interested in commenting on sentencing.651 The court of appeals affirmed the superior court’s judgment,
holding that a judge was under no duty to explain Johnson’s right of self-representation because there was
no clear and unequivocal request for self-representation.652
Lyons v. State
In Lyons v. State, 653 the court of appeals held that police could legally search an unlocked glove
box where the vehicle’s owner had been arrested immediately after exiting his vehicle. 654 Lyons
unsuccessfully sought suppression of a handgun found during a search of his vehicle that was conducted
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immediately after he was arrested 655 He argued that because he had closed and locked his vehicle prior to
being arrested, the search exceeded the lawful scope of a search incident to arrest. 656 The court reasoned
that when arresting a person, police may normally make a warrantless search of the arrestee’s person and
the area within the arrestee’s immediate control. 657 The court pointed out that in Crawford v. State, 658 the
Alaska Supreme Court had upheld the search of a vehicle’s unlocked center console incident to the arrest of
the driver. 659 The Crawford court had held that because a center console was functionally similar to a
clothing pocket, it should be subject to search limitations similar to those for an arrestee’s pocket.660 The
court of appeals reasoned that a glove box was functionally similar to a center console.661 The court held
that a search of an unlocked glove box is permissible incident to arrest if the driver is arrested in the vehicle
or immediately upon exiting it. 662 Affirming the superior court, the court of appeals held that the search of
Lyons’s unlocked glove box was legal because he had been arrested immediately after exiting his
vehicle. 663
Mattox v. State
In Mattox v. State, 664 the court of appeals held that § 28.35.032(f) of the Alaska Statutes makes it a
crime for a person to refuse to take a breath test if he is arrested for driving while intoxicated.665 Mattox
was arrested for driving while intoxicated. 666 He was read an implied consent warning informing him that
he would be charged with a crime if he did not submit to a breath test. 667 Mattox refused to submit to the
breath test, but instead offered to take a blood test. 668 Mattox was eventually convicted of felony refusal to
submit to a chemical test. 669 He appealed, claiming that § 28.35.032(f) permits a blood test to be offered in
lieu of a breath test when a motorist is arrested for driving while under the influence. 670 In determining
whether the refusal statute allows a blood test in lieu of a breath test, the court of appeals concluded that §
28.35.032(f) makes it a crime to refuse “to submit to a chemical test authorized by . . . [§] 28.35.031 (a) or
(g).” 671 Because § 28.35.031(a) only authorizes a breath test of any person arrested for driving while under
the influence, Mattox did not have a right to request a blood test in lieu of a breath test. 672 Thus, the court
of appeals affirmed Mattox’s conviction, holding that § 28.35.032(f) makes it a crime for a person to refuse
to take a breath test if he is arrested for driving while intoxicated. 673
Molina v. State
In Molina v. State, 674 the court of appeals held that Arizona’s statutory definition of driving under
the influence is sufficiently similar to Alaska’s definition to permit an Arizona conviction to constitute a
predicate offense for a conviction in Alaska. 675 Molina was convicted of felony driving under the influence
(“DUI”), an offense which requires that the defendant (1) drove under the influence and (2) had at least two
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previous DUI convictions. 676 One of Molina’s prior convictions was a DUI conviction from Arizona. 677
Molina appealed, arguing that Arizona’s statutory definition of DUI is not sufficiently similar to Alaska’s
definition to permit consideration of the Arizona DUI conviction as a predicate conviction for the present
felony DUI conviction. 678 In Gundersen v. Anchorage, 679 the court of appeals interpreted Alaska’s DUI
statute to require proof of a certain level of impairment, and the wording of Arizona’s DUI statute appeared
to require proof of a lesser level of impairment than the Gundersen test. 680 However, Arizona case law has
consistently suggested that Arizona’s DUI statute is in fact very similar to Alaska’s. 681 The court of appeals
affirmed Molina’s conviction for felony driving under the influence, holding that Arizona’s statutory
definition of driving under the influence is sufficiently similar to Alaska’s definition to permit an Arizona
conviction to constitute a predicate offense for a conviction in Alaska. 682
Muller v. State
In Muller v. State, 683 the court of appeals held that a person accused of criminal trespass must
show “some evidence” to raise a necessity defense. 684 Muller was convicted of criminal trespass after
entering United States Senator Ted Stevens’s office with a group of people to protest the war in Iraq,
spending the afternoon there, and refusing to leave when the office closed for the day. 685 At trial, Muller
raised a defense of necessity. 686 Though the trial judge used her own jury instruction instead of Muller’s
proffered instruction, he did not raise an objection, and was convicted of trespass. 687 The court of appeals
reasoned that a defendant attempting to establish a necessity defense must prove that: (1) the charged act
was committed to stop a serious evil, (2) the defendant had no adequate alternative course of action, and (3)
the resulting harm was not disproportionate to the avoided harm. 688 Though Muller was correct that the
jury was improperly instructed, as the trial judge did not properly characterize the mental state required for
the first two elements of the necessity defense, Muller was not entitled to raise this defense based on the
facts of his case. 689 Affirming a jury’s conviction, the court of appeals held that a person accused of
criminal trespass must show “some evidence” to raise a necessity defense. 690
Osborne v. State
In Osborne v. State, 691 the court of appeals held that § 12.55.120(e) of the Alaska Statutes only
bars the appeal of a composite sentence that is less than or equal to the minimum consecutive sentence
mandated by § 12.55.127. 692 Osborne was convicted of three counts of second-degree assault and one count
of driving under the influence. 693 He was sentenced to three years in prison for each of the assault charges
and one year in prison for driving under the influence. 694 The assault sentences were to be served
consecutively, and the sentence for driving under the influence was to be served concurrently with the
assault sentences. 695 All but ten months of each assault sentence was suspended; Osborne was thus required
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to serve thirty months in prison with seventy-eight months suspended. 696 Osborne appealed his sentence,
claiming that it was excessive. 697 The court of appeals first determined that § 12.55.120(e) did not prevent
Osborne from appealing his sentence because his sentence exceeded the upper limit of the presumptive
range for a single count of second-degree assault. 698 After making a determination that Osborne had a right
to appeal his sentence, the court of appeals determined that his sentence was not excessive given the
severity of his crimes. 699 The court of appeals held that § 12.55.120(e) only bars the appeal of a composite
sentence that is less than or equal to the minimum consecutive sentence mandated by § 12.55.127. 700
Oyoumick v. State
In Oyoumick v. State, 701 the court of appeals held that a judge may impose a probation revocation
sentence that exceeds the maximum original sentence if exceptional circumstances show that the
defendant’s prospects for rehabilitation are poor. 702 Oyoumick was convicted of a felony, and the judge
gave him a three-year sentence—three years in prison, with two of those years suspended. 703 In order to
sentence him to more than one year in prison, the prosecution would have had to show evidence of an
aggravating circumstance, an option that was not explored at the original trial. 704 After two violations of his
probation, including persistent refusal to attend his court-mandated sex offender treatment, the judge
imposed the remainder of the three-year sentence, resulting in a prison sentence that exceeded the two-year
maximum allowed in the original trial. 705 The court of appeals found that the superior court had carefully
evaluated Oyoumick’s situation and determined that exceptional circumstances warranted the imposition of
the entire three-year sentence. 706 Oyoumick had a criminal record, had violated his probation several times
by becoming intoxicated, and had refused sex offender treatment. 707 Because he had been given multiple
opportunities to become rehabilitated, the court of appeals agreed that his poor prospects for rehabilitation
constituted an exceptional circumstance. 708 The court of appeals affirmed the superior court, holding that a
judge may impose a probation revocation sentence that exceeds the maximum original sentence if
exceptional circumstances show that the defendant’s prospects for rehabilitation are poor. 709
State v. Bourdon
In State v. Bourdon, 710 the court of appeals held that inmates are entitled to “good time” for
obeying the rules of the halfway house to which they are assigned by the Department of Corrections
(“DOC”). 711 After being arrested for violating his parole, Bourdon was placed at the Glacier Manor
halfway house for 248 days. 712 Alaska law entitles inmates to “good time”—a deduction of one-third of a
term of imprisonment—provided that they obey the rules of the institutions to which they are assigned. 713
Bourdon contended that he was entitled to 83 days of “good time” from Glacier Manor; DOC disagreed,
arguing that “good time” could not be earned there because Glacier Manor was not a state-run
institution. 714 Bourdon filed an application for post-conviction relief, and the superior court ruled in his
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favor. 715 The court of appeals focused on the definitions used in the Alaska Statutes and found that “good
time” may only be earned in a “correctional facility.” The court ruled that the DOC Commissioner’s broad
authority to assign prisoners meant that “correctional facility” included any placement the Commissioner
designated to house prisoners. 716 The court held that because DOC had placed Bourdon at Glacier House
following his arrest, he was entitled to earn “good time” for following the halfway house’s rules. 717 The
court also indicated that a contrary holding would subject prisoners at non-state-run institutions to longer
sentences than prisoners in state-run institutions. 718 The court of appeals affirmed the superior court,
holding that inmates are entitled to “good time” for obeying the rules of the halfway house to which they
are assigned by the DOC. 719
State v. Smith
In State v. Smith, 720 the court of appeals held that an affidavit linking an officer’s ability to smell
marijuana to the probability of a commercial growing operation provided probable cause for issuing a
search warrant. 721 After smelling a moderate odor of marijuana outside Smith’s mobile home, Officer
Young applied for a warrant to search Smith’s mobile home for a possible marijuana growing operation. 722
The search produced nearly ten pounds of marijuana; after being indicted, Smith filed a motion to suppress
the evidence and dismiss the charges on the basis that the search warrant was issued without probable
cause. 723 Based on State v. Crocker, 724 the superior court granted Smith’s motion because Young had
observed no specific facts suggesting that Smith possessed a non-constitutionally protected amount of
marijuana. 725 The court of appeals reasoned that Young’s affidavit—which included information about his
ability to smell marijuana, his past experiences locating commercial operations, and statistical analyses of
previous cases with his unit—linked the marijuana odor to the quantity of marijuana, thereby overcoming
the deficiency in Crocker and establishing probable cause. 726 The court of appeals reversed the superior
court’s, holding that an affidavit linking an officer’s ability to smell marijuana to the probability of a
growing operation provided probable cause for issuing a search warrant. 727
State v. Waterman
In State v. Waterman, 728 the court of appeals held that: (1) the State maintains its right to an
interlocutory appeal of dismissed indictments when double jeopardy has not attached, 729 and (2) if a
statement by law enforcement officials informs a suspect that non-cooperation will be reported to the trial
judge or jury, then the statement is coercive. 730 Two of Waterman’s friends confessed to murdering
Waterman’s mother, and they told law enforcement officials that Waterman was involved. 731 When law
enforcement officials initially interviewed Waterman, she denied involvement; 732 during a subsequent
interview, she confessed. 733 The superior court found sua sponte that Waterman’s confession was nonvoluntary and consequently dismissed the indictment. 734 The court of appeals reasoned that the State was
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permitted to bring an interlocutory appeal under § 22.07.020(d)(2) of the Alaska Statutes because the
legislative history of the statute showed a clear legislative intent to expand the State’s right to appeal. 735
Since curtailing the State’s pre-existent right to interlocutory appeal was inconsistent with this legislative
intent, the court of appeals held that the State had properly brought an interlocutory appeal. 736 Second, the
court of appeals reasoned that a defendant generally has a right against self-incrimination and that coercive
interrogation techniques violate that right. 737 Since the defendant’s confession followed the interrogator’s
statement that non-cooperation would be reported to the trial judge and jury, Waterman was coerced. 738
Affirming in part and reversing in part, the court of appeals held that: (1) the State maintains its right to an
interlocutory appeal of dismissed indictments when double jeopardy has not attached, 739 and (2) if a
statement by law enforcement officials informs a suspect that non-cooperation will be reported to the trial
judge or jury, then the statement is coercive. 740
Tice v. State
In Tice v. State, 741 the court of appeals held that a twenty-five year composite sentence on two
class A felony convictions is not clearly mistaken for a defendant with poor character and rehabilitation
prospects. 742 Tice was convicted of manslaughter and assault in the first degree following a car accident
that killed one girl and injured her sister; he faced a presumptive minimum sentence of fifteen years’
imprisonment for each of these class A felonies. 743 The superior court found that an aggravating factor
existed because Tice knew or should have known that the victims were vulnerable given their youth; based
on this aggravator, the judge imposed twenty years per charge, with a twenty-five year composite sentence.
744
Tice appealed, arguing that the “vulnerable victim” aggravator did not apply because his conduct was
neither targeted at the girls nor exploitative of their vulnerability. 745 The court held that the history of the
federal sentencing guidelines created an ambiguity that it may have to resolve in Tice’s favor; however,
rather than rule on whether the aggravator applied only if the victim was targeted, the court chose to
evaluate the trial judge’s alternative sentence under the “clearly mistaken” standard. 746 Because superior
court judge believed that a twenty-five year sentence was necessary given Tice’s history, which included
theft, drug dealing, sexual abuse, and convincing the accident victims’ mother to claim that she had been
driving, the court of appeals held that the superior court was not clearly mistaken in believing that this
history reflected so poorly on Tice’s character and rehabilitation prospects that a twenty-five year
composite sentence was appropriate. 747 The court of appeals affirmed the superior court’s sentence, holding
that a twenty-five year composite sentence on two class A felony convictions is not clearly mistaken for a
defendant with poor character and rehabilitation prospects. 748
Twogood v. State
In Twogood v. State, 749 the court of appeals held that where a prisoner’s parole eligibility is
unclear because of an ambiguity in the structure of partially or fully consecutive sentences, the ambiguity
must be resolved in favor of the prisoner. 750 Following convictions for attempted murder and sexual
assault, Twogood received sentences of fifteen and ten years of imprisonment, respectively; the judge
sentenced him to a combined, partially-consecutive sentence of twenty years, but failed to specify how the
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two sentences were structured to reach the composite twenty-year term. 751 After he was imprisoned,
Twogood filed a motion to have his sentence clarified because the ambiguous structure affected his parole
eligibility. 752 The district court dismissed the motion, finding that discretionary parole calculations were
entrusted only to the Alaska Parole Board and the Department of Corrections. 753 On appeal, the court of
appeals ruled that Alaska courts may correct any sentence that is legally incomplete. 754 In judging whether
Twogood’s sentence was legally incomplete, the court considered whether the structure of Twogood’s
sentence would affect his eligibility for parole. 755 It noted that a prisoner who receives consecutive
sentences is not eligible for discretionary parole until he has served a certain portion of his “primary”
sentence and a different portion of all other sentences. 756 The statutes under which Twogood was sentenced
contained no criteria for determining which sentence was his “primary” one; if the Twogood’s attempted
murder sentence were primary, he would have to wait ninety months before he would become eligible for
discretionary parole, but if the rape charge were primary, Twogood would become eligible after seventy
months. 757 Since any after-the-fact sentence increase would violate state law, the court held that the
sentencing ambiguity must be resolved in Twogood’s favor by choosing the shorter eligibility period.758
The court of appeals reversed the superior court, holding that where a prisoner’s parole eligibility is unclear
because of an ambiguity in the structure of partially or fully consecutive sentences, the ambiguity must be
resolved in favor of the prisoner. 759
Vickers v. State
In Vickers v. State, 760 the court of appeals held that an individual’s express consent to contact with
a defendant who has been judicially ordered not to contact the individual is insufficient to permit the
defendant to invoke the mistake defense if the defendant is aware of the judicial order. 761 Vickers was
indicted for assaulting and attempting to murder Jamestown. 762 Vickers was only orally forbidden to have
contact with Jamestown as a condition of his parole because an inadvertent oversight caused the “no
contact” box to remain unchecked. 763 Shortly thereafter, Vickers was arrested for having contact with
Jamestown and sentenced to five years’ probation. 764 Jamestown then wrote a letter to the district attorney
that stated she consented to contact with Vickers. 765 A detective spotted the two together and again Vickers
was arrested for violating his probation. 766 On appeal, the court of appeals reasoned that a defense of
mistake is allowed if the defendant was unaware of the judicial order’s existence and contents.767 Because
Vickers knew his actions could violate his probation, an honest belief that Jamestown’s consent overrode
that condition was not sufficient. 768 Further, the court reasoned that though the correct box was not checked
on the release, on at least two occasions, the judge, in Vickers’s presence, forbade him from having contact
with Jamestown, and that it was irrelevant whether the order was communicated orally or in writing. 769 The
court of appeals affirmed the superior court, holding that an individual’s express consent to contact with a
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defendant who has been judicially ordered not to contact the individual is insufficient to permit the
defendant to invoke the mistake defense if the defendant is aware of the judicial order. 770
W.S. v. State
In W.S. v. State, 771 the court of appeals held that: (1) the superior court had authority to order
restitution to both a victim’s aunt and mental health counselor, and (2) a minor’s obligation to pay
restitution was not extinguished when the minor’s term of probation ended. 772 W.S. was adjudicated a
delinquent minor for assaulting a twelve-year old boy. 773 The superior court ordered W.S. and his parents
to pay restitution to the victim’s aunt and to the victim’s mental health counselor. 774 W.S. appealed,
arguing that the superior court only had the authority to grant restitution to the direct victim of the offense
and that his restitution obligations should terminate when his term of probation ended.775 The court
concluded that, as the victim’s guardian and physical custodian, the victim’s aunt qualified as a “victim”
for restitution purposes. 776 The court then concluded that “suitable restitution” in § 47.12.010(b)(12) of the
Alaska Statutes encompasses mental health counseling for victims. 777 The court also concluded that
because the Delinquency Rules did not specify whether a minor’s restitution obligation extended past the
end of the minor’s probation, § 47.12.170(a) was not inconsistent with the Delinquency Rules and W.S.’s
restitution obligations did not end when the superior court lost its juvenile jurisdiction over him. 778
Affirming the lower court, the court of appeals held that: (1) the superior court had authority to order
restitution to both a victim’s aunt and mental health counselor, and (2) a minor’s obligation to pay
restitution was not extinguished when the minor’s term of probation ended. 779

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
United States v. Turvin
In United States v. Turvin, 780 the Ninth Circuit held that a vehicle search was lawful when an
officer’s prior questions and request for consent to search the vehicle did not unreasonably prolong the
traffic stop. 781 Officer Christenson stopped Turvin for minor traffic violations; when Trooper Powell
arrived on scene, he informed Christensen that a drug lab had previously been found in Turvin’s truck. 782
Christensen ceased writing citations and went to speak with Turvin. 783 Turvin consented to Christensen’s
request to search of his truck; the search yielded methamphetamine and an illegal weapon. 784 At trial, the
district court granted Turvin’s motion to suppress, holding that Christensen’s questions about suspected
drug activity had converted a lawful traffic stop into a lengthy, unlawful detention that made Turvin’s
consent to search involuntary. 785 The Ninth Circuit reasoned that since no reasonable suspicion is needed to
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justify police questioning that does not prolong an initially lawful stop, the key issue was whether
Christensen’s questioning had extended the stop into an unlawful detention. 786 The court reasoned that
because only fourteen minutes elapsed from the initial stop until consent was given to search the vehicle,
the decision to ask questions about drug activity was reasonable. 787 The Ninth Circuit also observed that it
had previously upheld asking questions while slowly writing citations, and reasoned that there was no
reason why briefly pausing from writing a ticket in order to ask questions should not also be permissible. 788
The court held that officers do not need reasonable suspicion to ask questions unrelated to a lawful stop if
the questioning does not unreasonably extend the duration of the stop. 789 The Ninth Circuit reversed the
district court, holding that a vehicle search is lawful when the Trooper’s prior questions and request for
consent to search the vehicle did not unreasonably prolong the traffic stop. 790
United States v. Weyhrauch
In United States v. Weyhrauch, 791 the Ninth Circuit held that where anyone other than a U.S.
Attorney certifies an interlocutory appeal under 18 U.S.C. § 3731, he must demonstrate that he is
authorized to do so. 792 Weyhrauch was indicted in a prosecution conducted by the Department of Justice
(“DOJ”) after the U.S. Attorney’s Office recused itself from the case. 793 The day before trial, the trial court
excluded evidence proffered by the government. 794 The attorney for the DOJ orally stated his intent to file
an interlocutory appeal of the exclusion under § 3731. 795 Under § 3731, the U.S. Attorney must certify an
interlocutory appeal. 796 The DOJ argued that its certification was appropriate, because it was made in
consultation with a DOJ director who was overseeing this prosecution or because the director submitted a
subsequent written certification. 797 The Ninth Circuit held that the DOJ did not show cause why the appeal
should be granted despite the improper certification here. 798 First, the court held that where someone other
than a U.S. Attorney certifies the appeal, he must document that he received proper delegation to certify the
appeal. 799 Here, the DOJ did not submit any documentation that the attorney himself was so delegated. 800
Second, the court held that special appointment under 28 U.S.C § 515(a) to conduct a legal proceeding that
the U.S. Attorney’s Office is authorized to conduct is not sufficient to prove authority to certify an
appeal. 801 The court ordered the government to submit evidence that someone in the DOJ was properly
delegated authority to certify the appeal, holding that where anyone other than a U.S. Attorney certifies an
interlocutory appeal under 18 U.S.C. § 3731, he must demonstrate that he is authorized to do so. 802

Alaska Supreme Court
Manrique v. State
In Manrique v. State, 803 the supreme court held that: (1) a hearing is needed to determine whether
a juror is biased when there is insufficient evidence in the record to make such a determination, and (2)
employing a three-judge panel to review a sentence is only necessary if the defendant can show evidence of
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an extraordinary potential for rehabilitation. 804 A jury found Manrique guilty of sexual assault and
burglary, but Manrique contended that two jurors were biased. 805 The supreme court used a two-part test to
evaluate juror misconduct, which asked whether the juror violated his or her duty, and if so, whether the
violation resulted in an unfair trial. 806 Here, there was not enough evidence to make this determination, so
the case had to be remanded and a special hearing held to determine whether juror bias affected the
verdict. 807 The court also held that Manrique was not entitled to have his sentence reviewed by a threejudge panel because he failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence his exceptional potential for
rehabilitation. 808 Despite Manrique’s prior good citizenship, he failed to prove that he was significantly
different from a typical offender or that his conduct was significantly different from a typical offense. 809
Affirming the superior court, the supreme court held that: (1) a hearing is needed to determine whether a
juror is biased when there is insufficient evidence in the record to make such a determination, and (2)
employing a three-judge panel to review a sentence is only necessary if the defendant can show evidence of
an extraordinary potential for rehabilitation. 810

Alaska Court of Appeals
Ackerman v. State
In Ackerman v. State, 811 the court of appeals held that a convicted criminal was not entitled to a
credit against his sentence for time spent on electronic monitoring. 812 Ackerman was arrested and released
on electronic monitoring until his trial. 813 After he was convicted, Ackerman requested that the superior
court credit the time he spent on electronic monitoring against his sentence, but the court denied his
request. 814 On appeal, Ackerman argued that the Alaska Legislature intended to give credit to defendants
who are released on bail under electronic monitoring and that his release under electronic monitoring was
significantly different from release without the monitoring and thus gave rise to a credit. 815 Reasoning that:
(1) the Alaska legislature specifically intended to limit the scope to prisoners serving their sentence, not to
those on bail, and (2) the electronic monitoring did not add to the restrictions placed on his bail, the
supreme court denied Ackerman’s request. 816 Affirming the superior court, the court of appeals held that
Ackerman was not entitled to credit against his sentence for time spent on electronic monitoring. 817
Bradley v. State
In Bradley v. State, 818 the court of appeals held that: (1) a lost recording of an arrest does not
require the trial court to suppress evidence, (2) a trial judge may decline to grant co-counsel status to a
defendant with his public defender, (3) inadvertent statements to prospective jurors do not constitute plain
error unless the defendant shows that the statements were prejudicial, (4) an individual may be convicted of
driving under the influence (“DUI”) without the results of a breath test, and (5) the sentencing dates of prior
offenses are the relevant dates for determining whether those offenses elevate the current charge. 819 Police
arrested Bradley for DUI, but they lost the audio recording of the arrest. 820 Bradley chose to represent
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himself, declining the judge’s offer to appoint a public defender in an advisory position, and he was
subsequently convicted. 821 On appeal, he argued: (1) that the trial court should have suppressed the breath
test results, (2) that the public defender should have been appointed as co-counsel, (3) that the prospective
jury should not have been told about the felony DUI charge, and (4) that the trial judge should not have
used the sentencing dates to determine whether his prior convictions elevated the current charge. 822 The
court of appeals rejected these arguments, finding first that the sanction imposed by the trial judge for the
lost evidence—instructing the jury to presume that the lost recording would have been favorable to
Bradley—was not plainly insufficient. 823 Second, the trial judge did not dismiss Bradley’s request for cocounsel status out-of-hand, but rather gave him an opportunity to have a public defender appointed as an
advisor. 824 Third, although the trial judge improperly instructed the prospective jury, he quickly corrected
himself and told the jury that none of the charges were to be taken as evidence. 825 Fourth, based on the
officers’ testimony about Bradley’s impaired condition, a jury could have convicted him of DUI even
without the results of the breath test. 826 Fifth, in determining whether prior convictions are relevant for the
purposes of elevating the current charge, the relevant date is the sentencing date. 827 Thus, the court of
appeals affirmed the superior court, holding that: (1) a lost recording of an arrest does not require the trial
court to suppress evidence, (2) a trial judge may decline to grant co-counsel status to a defendant with his
public defender, (3) inadvertent statements to prospective jurors do not constitute plain error unless the
defendant shows that the statements were prejudicial, (4) an individual may be convicted of DUI without
the results of a breath test, and (5) the sentencing dates of prior offenses are the relevant dates for
determining whether those offenses elevate the current charge. 828
Brown v. State
In Brown v. State, 829 the court of appeals held that because the Alaska Constitution imposes
greater restrictions than the Federal Constitution on a police officer’s authority to request a motorist’s
permission to conduct a search during a routine traffic stop, a police officer was prohibited from requesting
permission to conduct a search that was unrelated to the basis for the stop and otherwise unsupported by a
reasonable suspicion of criminality. 830 Brown was pulled over because her license plate was not properly
illuminated. 831 Officer Salinas never told Brown why she was stopped and was ready to let her go with a
warning before he asked for Brown’s permission to search her person and her vehicle for drugs and
weapons. 832 Brown consented to the search and drugs were found. 833 The superior court upheld the validity
of the search, 834 and Brown appealed, claiming that because the circumstances surrounding her encounter
with Officer Salinas implicitly coerced her to consent, the search of her vehicle was not valid. 835 The court
of appeals recognized that motorists who are stopped for traffic infractions do not act from a position of
psychological independence when they decide how to respond to a police officer’s request for a search.836
The psychological pressures inherent in a stop, combined with individuals’ ignorance of their rights, lead
the vast majority of motorists who are asked for permission to search their vehicles to give it. 837 Because
traffic violations are so frequent and because motorists often accede to police searches of their vehicles, the
court found that the Fourth Amendment rules governing traffic stops were not sufficient to protect
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Alaskans’ privacy. 838 Here, the search was invalid because Brown was never told why she was stopped,
and therefore did not know the basis for the officer’s assertion of authority over her. 839 As a result, she
could not have known whether she had the right to refuse the search. 840 Thus, the court of appeals reversed
of the superior court, holding that that because the Alaska Constitution imposes greater restrictions than the
Federal Constitution on a police officer’s authority to request a motorist’s permission to conduct a search
during a routine traffic stop, a police officer was prohibited from requesting permission to conduct a search
that was unrelated to the basis for the stop and otherwise unsupported by a reasonable suspicion of
criminality. 841
Burton v. State
In Burton v. State, 842 the court of appeals held that a convicted criminal is not entitled to postconviction relief for ineffective assistance of counsel when the individual does not present a prima facie
case of attorney incompetence or of prejudice resulting from such incompetence. 843 Over ten years after he
was convicted of first-degree murder, Burton submitted a petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that
his trial attorney’s failure to pursue certain legal tactics constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. 844 The
superior court dismissed the petition, holding that the man had failed to present a prima facie case of his
attorney’s incompetence and that he had failed to demonstrate that any incompetence would have had a
negative effect on the outcome of the original trial. 845 The court of appeals affirmed, finding that the
superior court was justified in partially relying on Burton’s direct appeal, in which the court of appeals had
found that the attorney’s alleged incompetence did not constitute plain error. 846 Because the finding of no
plain error was based on the fact that any alleged incompetence did not prejudice the defendant, the
superior court could deny post-conviction relief for ineffective assistance of counsel as long as the
pleadings did not indicate any reason why the plain error finding in the direct appeal was incorrect. 847
Furthermore, the court of appeals affirmed that any failure of the man’s attorney to object to potential
hearsay evidence did not have a prejudicial effect on his defense. 848 The court also found that there was no
error in failing to instruct the jury on criminally negligent homicide and manslaughter, because (1) there
was insufficient evidence to support either verdict, and (2) the jury was instructed on second-degree murder
and still found the defendant guilty of first-degree murder, a more serious charge. 849 Finally, the court
found that the man did not present a prima facie case of his trial attorney’s incompetence in her preparation
of the defense’s firearms expert or her cross-examination of the prosecution’s firearms expert. 850 Although
the appellant argued that his attorney should have pursued different lines of questioning, he did not offer
any evidence that the attorney’s legal strategy demonstrated incompetence. 851 The court of appeals
affirmed the superior court, holding that a convicted criminal is not entitled to post-conviction relief for
ineffective assistance of counsel when the individual does not present a prima facie case of attorney
incompetence or of prejudice resulting from such incompetence. 852
Collins v. State
In Collins v. State, 853 the court of appeals held that even though a defendant has a right to be
present at all stages of the trial, a defendant’s absence during the trial judge’s decision to release an ill juror
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or during the trial judge’s questioning of a different juror about media exposure does not amount to
reversible error. 854 During Collins’s murder trial, the trial judge, without Collins present, released a juror
because of illness and questioned another juror about media exposure. 855 Appealing his conviction, Collins
argued that his right to be present was violated. 856 The court of appeals reasoned that medical emergency
situations sometimes arise which require the protection of a juror’s rights, and the defendant was not
prejudiced by the juror’s release. 857 Furthermore, it reasoned that the trial judge sufficiently established that
the other juror had not been exposed to the media. 858 The court of appeals went on to hold that both
releasing a juror in medical emergencies without the defendant present and questioning a juror about media
exposure without the defendant present are harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt. 859 Affirming the
superior court, the court of appeals held that even though a defendant has a right to be present at all stages
of the trial, a defendant’s absence during the trial judge’s decision to release an ill juror or during the trial
judge’s questioning of a different juror about media exposure does not amount to reversible error. 860
Cooper v. State
In Cooper v. State, 861 the court of appeals held that failing to correct an improper analogy used by
the prosecutor in her closing argument to describe reasonable doubt only constitutes plain error if the
statement was so prejudicial that failing to correct it would create a miscarriage of justice. 862 Cooper was
tried for several sex crimes. 863 During the prosecutor’s closing argument, she compared the concept of
proof beyond a reasonable doubt to the idea of deciding whether to purchase a house. 864 The defense
attorney did not object to this statement, and Cooper was subsequently convicted.865 The court of appeals
affirmed the conviction, holding that the judge’s failure to correct the prosecutor’s statement did not
constitute plain error. 866 Although the law in many States precludes prosecutors from making analogies to
reasonable doubt, Alaska did not have any cases criticizing such analogies. 867 Furthermore, because the
judge gave the jury proper instruction on the legal definition of reasonable doubt, the prosecutor’s
statement was not so prejudicial to Cooper that failing to correct it would have resulted in a miscarriage of
justice. 868 The court of appeals affirmed the superior court, holding that failing to correct an improper
analogy used by the prosecutor in her closing argument to describe reasonable doubt only constitutes plain
error if the statement was so prejudicial that failing to correct it would create a miscarriage of justice. 869
Dominguez v. State
In Dominguez v. State, 870 the court of appeals held that a judge should not preside over an
omnibus hearing after being disqualified from a case by a peremptory challenge. 871 During the state’s
prosecution of Dominguez in Kenai superior court, his attorney peremptorily challenged Judge Moran. 872
Alaska Criminal Rule 25(d)(3) states that when a party peremptorily challenges a judge, the judge may not
participate further in the action unless the challenged judge is the presiding judge, who may only perform
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the ministerial functions of a presiding judge. 873 After the challenge, the superior court re-assigned
Dominguez’s case to another judge, but the order also set an omnibus hearing before Judge Moran. 874
During the omnibus hearing, the attorney for Dominguez questioned Judge Moran’s authority to hear the
case, but Judge Moran proceeded with the hearing. 875 Dominguez then asked the appellate court to review
Judge Moran’s action. 876 The appellate court stated common law standards for disqualified judges did not
apply in this case because a specific State statute prohibited a disqualified judge from further participation
in litigation and it was irrelevant that Judge Morgan was merely performing administrative matters. 877 The
appellate court reversed the superior court, holding that a judge should not preside over an omnibus hearing
after being disqualified from a case by a peremptory challenge. 878
Duncan v. State
In Duncan v. State, 879 the court of appeals held that police have probable cause for arrest when a
citizen informant reports the activity of a suspect with a reputation for dealing drugs who is found in an
area known for drug activity. 880 Two police officers, responding to a citizen’s complaint of drug dealing
outside his business, stopped and searched Duncan and arrested him for misconduct involving a controlled
substance after finding crack cocaine and a crack pipe on his person. 881 Duncan moved to suppress the
cocaine from evidence at trial, arguing that the searches were unlawful and were not incident to arrest. 882
The superior court denied his motion. 883 On appeal, the court of appeals reasoned that police may search a
suspect without a warrant if: (1) the police have probable cause for the arrest, (2) the search is at roughly
the same time as the arrest, (3) the arrest is not a pretext for the search, and (4) the suspect may have
evidence on his person of the offense for which the arrest is taking place. 884 Probable cause for arrest exists
if the facts known to the police support a belief that the suspect has committed the offense in question, and
information provided by a citizen informant may be presumed to be trustworthy as long as the police verify
some details before making an arrest. 885 Here, the police knew Duncan and knew of his reputation for drug
dealing, and they knew that the area where they found Duncan had the reputation for drug activity; these
were sufficient to constitute probable cause for Duncan’s arrest. 886 The court of appeals affirmed the
superior court, holding that police have probable cause for arrest when a citizen informant reports the
activity of a suspect with a reputation for dealing drugs who is found in an area known for drug activity. 887
Erickson v. State
In Erickson v. State, 888 the court of appeals held that the state may not search and seize an
abandoned object when an illegal search or seizure may have prompted that act of abandonment. 889 A
police officer found marijuana on Erickson during an illegal search. 890 After making this illegal discovery,
the officer noticed a black bag outside of Erickson’s car. 891 After Erickson denied ownership of the bag, the
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officer found that it contained methamphetamines. 892 The superior court admitted the evidence found in the
black bag, and Erickson appealed. 893 Because Erickson’s decision to disclaim ownership of the bag may
have been influenced by the officer’s earlier illegal search of Erickson, the court of appeals held that the
evidence in the bag should be suppressed as the tainted fruit of the illegal search. 894 The court of appeals
reversed the superior court, holding that the state may not search and seize an abandoned object when an
illegal search or seizure may have prompted that act of abandonment. 895
Fungchenpen v. State
In Fungchenpen v. State, 896 the court of appeals held that a convicted criminal defendant was not
entitled to a credit against a criminal sentence for time spent on bail release prior to sentencing.897 A man
convicted of assault was granted a conditional release during the 200-day period between his conviction
and sentencing. 898 He requested that this 200-day period be credited against his sentence, and the superior
court denied his request. 899 The court of appeals ruled that the conditions of the man’s bail release were not
materially different from conditions considered in prior cases where credit was also denied. 900 The court
also rejected the appellant’s argument that this prior decision was wrongly decided and should be
overruled, noting that the Alaska Legislature codified the reasoning of this earlier decision in §
12.55.027(d) of the Alaska Statutes. 901 The court of appeals affirmed the decision of the superior court,
holding that a convicted criminal defendant was not entitled to a credit against a criminal sentence for time
spent on bail release prior to sentencing. 902
Harris v. State
In Harris v. State, 903 the court of appeals held that the superior court had the authority to preclude
expert testimony from a criminal trial when the judge found that the defense attorney willfully violated his
obligation to disclose the evidence before trial. 904 In a case about the alleged assault of a baby by his
parents, the public defender for one of the parents failed to meet the requirements of Alaska Criminal Rule
16(c)(4) (“Rule 16(c)(4)”) when he failed to provide a written description of the expected testimony of a
doctor he planned to call as an expert witness. 905 In response to the lack of a report, the trial judge granted
the prosecutor’s motion to preclude the defense from calling the doctor. 906 On the first day of the trial, the
public defender finally produced the doctor’s report. 907 The public defender appealed the trial judge’s
decision to preclude the testimony, arguing that: (1) the trial judge erred when he required disclosure of
witnesses’ reports by a certain date before trial, (2) the trial judge violated Alaska law by imposing the
sanction of preclusion of evidence without proof of a willful violation of the pre-trial disclosure
obligations, (3) lesser sanctions would have been sufficient, and (4) a law allowing preclusion of evidence
is unconstitutional. 908 First, the court of appeals held that because the pubic defender did not raise the claim
of error during the trial, he failed to preserve the issue for appeal; moreover, although the claim could be
raised on the grounds of plain error, the court held no plain error existed because Rule 16(c)(4) clearly
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requires disclosure and disclosure was not made until the morning the trial began. 909 Second, the court
upheld the trial judge’s decision to preclude the evidence because there was no evidence proving that the
trial judge’s conclusion—that the public defender’s violation of the disclosure obligation was “willful”—
was clearly erroneous. 910 Third, the court explained why prior cases on point should not control this case,
noting that Rule 16 has been changed and now explicitly authorizes the sanctions imposed by the trial
judge. 911 Finally, the court rejected the fourth argument because Rule 16 is entitled to a presumption of
constitutionality, the public defender did not explain why the Alaska Constitution should offer greater
protection than the corresponding provision of the Federal Constitution, and the Alaska Constitution does
not absolutely bar judges from precluding evidence. 912 Affirming the superior court, the court of appeals
held that the superior court had the authority to preclude expert testimony from a criminal trial when the
judge found that the defense attorney willfully violated his obligation to disclose the evidence before
trial. 913
Hewitt v. State
In Hewitt v. State, 914 the court of appeals held that: (1) a police officer’s observations of a vehicle
provided sufficient evidence for the jury to find that the defendant was driving the car, and (2) a judge need
not necessarily dismiss a jury after accidentally reading a part of the indictment, which both parties agreed
should not be disclosed. 915 A police officer observed Hewitt parking his car at an auto garage late at
night. 916 After asking for his identification, the officer discovered that Hewitt was driving with a revoked
license. 917 Hewitt admitted to the officer that he, and not his friend, had been driving the car. 918 At trial, the
judge began to read a part of the indictment that the parties had agreed would be kept from the jury; the
judge then stopped and gave the jury a corrective instruction. 919 On appeal, Hewitt argued that the police
testimony was insufficient to prove that he had been driving and that the judge’s mistake had tainted the
jury, requiring a new venire. 920 The court of appeals held that the evidence presented was sufficient to
support the jury’s guilty verdict, since a reasonable person could have concluded that Hewitt was
driving. 921 The court of appeals also rejected Hewitt’s argument that a new venire was required, since the
judge had stopped before reading an entire sentence of exempted material, immediately corrected himself,
and emphasized to the jury that the indictment should not be taken as evidence against the defendant. 922
The court held that given these circumstances, the judge did not abuse his discretion in refusing to dismiss
the jury. 923 The court of appeals affirmed the superior court, holding that: (1) a police officer’s observations
of a vehicle provided sufficient evidence for the jury to find that the defendant was driving the car, and (2)
a judge need not necessarily dismiss a jury after accidentally reading a part of the indictment, which both
parties agreed should not be disclosed. 924
Hoekzema v. State
In Hoekzema v. State, 925 the court of appeals held that: (1) multiple felony charges arising from
the same case constitute a single felony conviction for the purposes of presumptive sentencing, and (2) a
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trial court should undertake a law- and fact-based analysis to determine whether the defendant had a “small
amount” of drugs that would mitigate his sentence. 926 Hoekzema was arrested after being caught with
thirty-one grams of marijuana equally divided into twelve plastic baggies and a separate bottle containing
4.4 grams that he called his “personal stash.” 927 He was subsequently convicted of possession of more than
one ounce (28.35 grams) of marijuana with intent to deliver. 928 Hoekzema appealed, arguing that: (1) the
jury did not have sufficient evidence to convict him; (2) he should have been sentenced as a second-felony,
rather than a third-felony, offender; and (3) the judge should have found mitigating factors in determining
his sentence. 929 First, the court of appeals found that the jury had sufficient evidence to convict Hoekzema,
given the facts that he was acting suspiciously after being detained during a traffic stop, the marijuana was
found on the ground near him after he made a furtive movement, he had equally divided the marijuana into
small baggies, and he called the separate bottle his “personal stash.” 930 Second, the court held that the judge
should reconsider whether Hoekzema should have been classified as a second-felony offender rather than a
third-felony offender, because both of his prior felony convictions arose from “a single, continuous
criminal episode.” 931 Third, the court held that the sentencing judge should have found that the fact that
Hoekzema possessed such a small amount of marijuana was a mitigating factor because: 932 (1) “more than
one ounce” could apply to a warehouse full of marijuana, placing thirty-one grams on the low end of the
statute’s possible range, 933 and (2) if Hoekzema had been carrying ten baggies instead of twelve, the case
would have been a misdemeanor instead of a felony, suggesting that the amount was very small as a factual
matter. 934 Affirming in part and reversing in part, the court of appeals held that: (1) multiple felony charges
arising from the same case constitute a single felony conviction for the purposes of presumptive sentencing,
and (2) a trial court should undertake a law- and fact-based analysis to determine whether the defendant had
a “small amount” of drugs that would mitigate his sentence. 935
Horner v. State
In Horner v. State, 936 the court of appeals held that a police officer’s questioning of an individual
did not constitute an investigative stop because the officer did not cause the individual to reasonably
believe that he was being detained, and therefore the evidence obtained during such a stop was
admissible. 937 A police officer was suspicious of three individuals at an airport. 938 He began asking them
questions, and one of them admitted that they were in the process of illegally importing alcohol.939 Horner
entered a Cooksey plea and was convicted. 940 The court of appeals rejected Horner’s argument that the
officer’s language or physical position created a reasonable belief that the officer was detaining him. 941 The
court emphasized the importance of context, stating that all of the circumstances surrounding the incident
must be examined to determine whether a reasonable innocent person would have believed he was free to
leave. 942 In this situation, the officer was friendly and did not do anything to suggest that he planned to
prevent the citizens from leaving. 943 Thus, Horner could not have reasonably believed that he was being
detained. 944 The court of appeals upheld Horner’s conviction, holding that a police officer’s questioning of
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an individual did not constitute an investigative stop because the officer did not cause the individual to
reasonably believe that he was being detained, and therefore the evidence obtained during such a stop was
admissible. 945
I.J. v. State
In I.J. v. State, 946 the court of appeals held that: (1) a minor had the right to a jury trial in a
delinquency proceeding, and (2) that a late request for a jury trial should be granted under certain
circumstances. 947 The State filed a juvenile delinquency petition against I.J. for fourth-degree controlled
substance misconduct. 948 Since I.J. did not request a jury trial, the case was scheduled for a bench trial. 949
I.J. received a new attorney just before trial due to a conflict of interest with his original attorney, and the
attorney was advised by the court that she could file a motion requesting a jury trial, which she did seven
days later. 950 Her motion was denied by the superior court for being untimely under Delinquency Rule
21(a). 951 The court of appeals reasoned that the Alaska Constitution guarantees the right to a jury trial in
juvenile delinquency cases if the charged conduct would carry a possible sentence of incarceration when
pertaining to an adult. 952 Further, the supreme court has determined that minors have the right to jury trials
in delinquency proceedings based on Alaska Civil Rules 38 and 39, which preserve the right to a jury trial
for all parties. 953 The supreme court referred to its framework for determining when a trial court abuses its
discretion in denying a late request for a jury trial: (1) whether the request was prompt in light of the entire
history of the case, (2) whether the granting of the request would cause administrative problems for the
court, (3) whether there was reason to not hold the party to his earlier agreement to a bench trial, and (4)
whether the opposing party would suffer any prejudice from the court’s granting the request. 954 Based on
these factors, the appellant’s request should have been granted by the superior court. 955 The court of
appeals reversed the superior court, holding that: (1) a minor had the right to a jury trial in a delinquency
proceeding, and (2) that a late request for a jury trial should be granted under certain circumstances. 956
Juarez v. State
In Juarez v. State, 957 the court of appeals held that the timeliness of a peremptory challenge of a
judge is determined in relation to when express assignment to a judge occurs. 958 Juarez made a peremptory
challenge of the trial judge in his misdemeanor case. 959 The judge denied his challenge, stating that because
Kodiak was a single-judge district, it was obvious that he would be the judge in Juarez’s case. 960 The court
of appeals stated that a criminal defendant is entitled to one peremptory challenge of a judge as long as the
challenge is made within five days after the defendant is made aware of the judge in his case. 961 The critical
factor of whether the peremptory challenge is timely is not the party’s knowledge that the district is a
single-judge district, but rather when the court gives express notice of assignment to a judge. 962 Juarez filed
his peremptory challenge within five days of the judge being assigned, so the trial court wrongly denied
Juarez’s peremptory challenge right. 963 The court of appeals reversed the lower court’s order, 964 holding
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that the timeliness of a peremptory challenge of a judge is determined in relation to when express
assignment to a judge occurs. 965
Leavitt v. State
In Leavitt v. State, 966 the court of appeals held that a trial judge may limit the cross-examination of an
alleged rape victim to exclude evidence of prior assaults and mental health problems. 967 Leavitt was
convicted of first-degree sexual assault after he forced the victim to have sex with him by threatening her
with a pair of scissors. 968 The victim had a prior history of assaults that the defense attorney sought to
introduce as evidence to show that she would not be intimidated by the scissors, but the trial judge held that
the same evidential result could be achieved through her general testimony and it was not necessary to
introduce the victim’s prior convictions. 969 On appeal, the court of appeals reasoned that it was within the
judge’s discretion to decide that allowing evidence of prior assaults was irrelevant and would unnecessarily
prejudice the jury. 970 But because of the victim’s own admission, the defense was still able to introduce
evidence of the victim’s violent behavior. 971 The court further reasoned that it was within the judge’s
discretion to decide that allowing evidence of prior mental health problems was unnecessary because the
defense had not shown that there was any connection to her testimony in this case. 972 The court of appeals
affirmed the superior court, holding that that a trial judge may limit the cross-examination of an alleged
rape victim to exclude evidence of prior assaults and mental health problems. 973
Marshall v. State
In Marshall v. State, 974 the court of appeals held that: (1) it is not necessarily entrapment for the
police to use a third party to set up a drug sale between a suspect and the police, and (2) any accusations of
entrapment must be supported by at least a modicum of evidence. 975 Marshall was convicted of misconduct
involving a controlled substance after he sold Oxycontin to an undercover officer in exchange for six
hundred dollars. 976 The sale was set up by police informants, who acted with the hope of receiving reduced
sentences after they were convicted of selling drugs to undercover officers themselves. 977 Marshall
appealed, arguing, inter alia, that the superior court improperly failed to consider his claim of entrapment
and that certain evidence should have been suppressed. 978 The court reasoned that the admission of the
evidence of additional pills that officers found when they searched his car was harmless, and therefore it
was irrelevant that it was not excluded. 979 On the entrapment claim, the court reasoned that although the
supreme court has announced that the Bueno theory of entrapment is compatible with general Alaska
entrapment doctrine, the supreme court has not yet explicitly adopted it. 980 The Bueno theory of entrapment
states that an individual accused of selling drugs has been entrapped when the police supply drugs to an
informant, arrange the sale, and then establish the informant as the middleman. 981 The court of appeals
avoided the issue in this case by stating that even if the doctrine did exist, Marshall does not meet the
burden of proof to claim it. 982 The court reasoned that although Marshall claimed that the pills belonged to
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the police informant and not to him, he did not provide any factual basis for this assertion. 983 Since
Marshall did not provide even a modicum of evidence, such as an affidavit, the superior court was not
obligated to hold a factual hearing. 984 Affirming the superior court, the court of appeals held that: (1) it is
not necessarily entrapment for the police to use a third party to set up a drug sale between a suspect and the
police, and (2) any accusations of entrapment must be supported by at least a modicum of evidence. 985
Moore v. State
In Moore v. State, 986 the court of appeals held that vacated juvenile adjudications could be used to
establish a history of repeated instances of assaultive behavior in an adult criminal case. 987 At his
resentencing for attempted first-degree sexual assault, attempted second-degree sexual assault, and firstdegree burglary, Moore conceded he had two juvenile adjudications for assault. 988 The superior court found
that § 12.55.155(c)(8) of the Alaska Statutes (“aggravator (c)(8)”) applied. 989 On appeal, Moore argued that
a vacated adjudication should not be used to support aggravator (c)(8). 990 The court of appeals reasoned
that a defendant’s conduct as a juvenile was relevant for sentencing purposes and that Moore’s adjudication
established beyond a reasonable doubt that he engaged in repeated instances of assaultive behavior. 991 The
court of appeals affirmed the judgment of the superior court, holding that vacated juvenile adjudications
could be used to establish a history of repeated instances of assaultive behavior in an adult criminal case. 992
Oviuk v. State
In Oviuk v. State, 993 the court of appeals held that a criminal defendant has a right to selfrepresentation even if the defendant will be confined in shackles during the trial. 994 Oviuk was charged
with first and second degree murder and attempted to represent himself pro se. 995 Based on a history of
dramatic violence, recommendations of corrections officers, and Oviuk’s history of disobeying court
orders, the trial judge decided that the defendant should be shackled during the trial. 996 Because the
shackling would not allow the defendant to represent himself effectively, the judge ruled that he could not
proceed pro se. 997 The court of appeals rejected the reasoning of the superior court, stating that shackling
alone is not a sufficient basis for denying the right to self-representation. 998 The judge must inform the
defendant of potential problems arising from trying a case in shackles, but ultimately the judge must accept
the defendant’s final decision. 999 Thus, the defendant in this case was wrongly denied the right to selfrepresentation. 1000 The court of appeals reversed the decision of the superior court, holding that a criminal
defendant has a right to self-representation even if the defendant will be confined in shackles during the
trial. 1001
Phillips v. State
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In Phillips v. State, 1002 the court of appeals held that Appellate Rule 216 allows for expedited
appeals on a peremptory challenge. 1003 Phillips, using Rule 216, appealed the denial of his request to
exercise a peremptory challenge of a superior court judge. 1004 Appellate Rule 216(a) was amended in 1982
to allow for expedited appeals on a peremptory challenge, but Rule 216(c) continued to require a final
judgment by a lower court before an appeal could be filed. 1005 The court reasoned that when the literal
import of the text is inconsistent with the legislative meaning or intent, courts should modify the statute to
coincide with the legislature’s intent. 1006 Here, the court reasoned, the supreme court clearly meant for Rule
216 to apply to peremptory challenges even in the absence of a final judgment. 1007 Reversing the superior
court, the court of appeals accepted the defendant’s appeal for filing, holding that Appellate Rule 216
allows for expedited appeals on a peremptory challenge. 1008
Rockwell v. State
In Rockwell v. State, 1009 the court of appeals held that an individual must be advised of his
Miranda rights when he is taken into custody, and one is in custody after being told he will be taken to the
police station. 1010 Rockwell was in a car accident and was questioned by a police officer at the scene who
noticed that he seemed intoxicated. 1011 The officer also questioned him in the police car and at the
station. 1012 After sobriety tests were performed at the station, Rockwell was arrested for driving while
under the influence and was taken to another station where he was read his Miranda rights. 1013 The officer
continued his questioning after Rockwell requested an attorney. 1014 The superior court admitted all
statements made during the interrogations, and Rockwell was convicted of felony driving while under the
influence and driving with a canceled, suspended, or revoked license. 1015 Rockwell appealed. 1016 The court
of appeals reasoned that while an investigative stop is not “custody” for purposes of Miranda, police
custody occurs when a reasonable person would believe that he was not free to leave and cease questioning
by the police. 1017 The court found that Rockwell was definitely in police custody after he was told the
officer would take him to the station. 1018 The court also found that he may have been in custody during the
interrogation inside the police car prior to being told he would go to the station, but that this was a question
of fact for the superior court. 1019 Affirming the superior court, the court of appeals held that that an
individual must be advised of his Miranda rights when he is taken into custody, and one is in custody after
being told he will be taken to the police station. 1020
Smith v. State
In Smith v. State, 1021 the court of appeals held that the decision whether to file a cross-petition is a
tactical choice for the defense attorney, rather than the client, to make. 1022 Smith was convicted of
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kidnapping and raping a fourteen-year old girl. 1023 His conviction was overturned by the court of
appeals. 1024 In response, the State petitioned for and received a hearing in the supreme court. 1025 The
supreme court ruled in favor of the state and reinstated Smith’s conviction. 1026 Smith subsequently filed an
application for post-conviction relief on the basis that his appellate attorney provided ineffective assistance
of counsel. 1027 Smith claimed that his attorney should have filed a cross-petition with the supreme court on
a legal issue that the court of appeals had decided against him. 1028 In reaching its decision in this case, the
court of appeals reasoned that the decision to petition for review is a complicated strategic and tactical
decision that is usually best left to the attorney. 1029 The attorney was better equipped than the client to make
the decision whether filing a cross-petition would help or hinder the client within the overall framework of
the case, so the decision was one for the attorney to decide. 1030 The court of appeals affirmed the superior
court’s dismissal of Smith’s application for post-conviction relief, holding that the decision whether to file
a cross-petition is a tactical choice for the defense attorney, rather than the client, to make. 1031
Smith v. State
In Smith v. State, 1032 the court of appeals held that § 12.55.127(a) of the Alaska Statutes does not
mandate consecutive sentences for separate judgments, and that a defendant is entitled to appeal
consecutive sentences; 1033 however a composite sentence of twenty years is not excessive when the
defendant has a lengthy history of convictions and is incorrigible. 1034 Smith was convicted of a variety of
felonies and misdemeanors relating to a four-month period in which he: repeatedly stole cars; committed
burglaries, robberies, and assaults; illegally obtained and used firearms; caused extensive property damage;
and attempted to escape custody while on a one-day release for his father’s funeral. 1035 Smith appealed the
imposition of a twenty-year composite sentence for twelve criminal convictions in eight separate
judgments. 1036 Section 12.55.127(a) states that if a defendant is required to serve a term of imprisonment
under a separate judgment, then any term of imprisonment imposed in a later judgment, amended
judgment, or probation revocation shall be consecutive. 1037 Section 12.55.120 also takes away the right of
appeal in certain consecutive sentencing decisions. 1038 Since the statutes were recently enacted, the court
first looked at the legislative history and the interpretation of the prior statute to conclude that the
consecutive sentences requirement applies only when the defendant's new crime was committed after the
entry of judgment for the prior crime. 1039 The court reasoned that the language of the new sentencing
statute was intended to mirror the prior statute so that "later judgment [or] amended judgment" refers to a
judgment based on a crime that was committed after the court entered judgment for the defendant's
"separate" crime. 1040 The court determined that the statute was designed to require sentencing judges to
impose a defendant's mandatory minimum sentences consecutively, but not in all cases where there were
merely separate judgments, thereby maintaining the old rules relating to concurrent sentencing. 1041 Having
determined that Smith could therefore appeal from a decision to run his sentences consecutively, the court
reasoned that nonetheless a twenty-year composite sentence was not excessive because of Smith’s
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history. 1042 Acknowledging that ten years is usually the maximum sentence necessary, the court held that
with “good reason,” a judge may go over that limit, and the judge in this case had abundant “good reason”
because of the defendant’s criminal record and unwillingness to be rehabilitated. 1043 Affirming the superior
court, the court of appeals held that § 12.55.127(a) of the Alaska Statutes does not mandate consecutive
sentences for separate judgments, and that a defendant is entitled to appeal consecutive sentences; 1044
however a composite sentence of twenty years is not excessive when the defendant has a lengthy history of
convictions and is incorrigible. 1045
State v. Batts
In State v. Batts, 1046 the court of appeals held that Alaska Rule of Evidence 412 (“Rule 412”)
permitted the State to impeach a defendant’s testimony using statements obtained after the defendant
invoked his Miranda rights, but resorting to Rule 412 was unconstitutional when the violation of the
defendant’s Miranda rights was intentional or egregious. 1047 Batts was interviewed by police after a
murder, and after each of the first two invocations of his right to silence, the officers clarified that Batts was
only invoking his Miranda rights as to those specific questions. 1048 Subsequently, however, the officers
failed to continue clarifying the extent of his Miranda invocations. 1049 Batts was charged with murder and
tried twice, with both trials ending in hung juries. 1050 In the first trial, the judge held that Rule 412 did not
permit the State to use statements made by Batts after the interviewing officers stopped clarifying his
Miranda assertions, and in the second trial, the judge held that Rule 412 permitted the State to use this
evidence to impeach Batts’s testimony but that the rule itself was unconstitutional. 1051 The court of appeals
partially affirmed the latter interpretation, holding first that the Alaska legislature intended to allow the
State to impeach a defendant’s testimony using statements made after any Miranda violation. 1052 In
determining whether Rule 412 violated the Alaska Constitution, the court weighed the interest in deterring
police misconduct against the importance of protecting the integrity of the judicial system. 1053 The court
reasoned that if officers knew that they would be able to impeach a defendant’s testimony even if it was
obtained after the defendant invoked his Miranda rights, they would have an incentive to continue the
interrogation, thereby decreasing the deterrent effect of Alaska’s exclusionary rule. 1054 The court of appeals
affirmed the superior court, holding that Rule 412 permitted the State to impeach a defendant’s testimony
using statements obtained after the defendant invoked his Miranda rights, but resorting to Rule 412 was
unconstitutional when the violation of the defendant’s Miranda rights was intentional or egregious. 1055
State v. Campbell
In State v. Campbell, 1056 the court of appeals held that the exclusionary rule bars the admission of
evidence of a defendant’s illegal conduct committed in response to an illegal seizure by a police officer. 1057
An officer attempted to stop Campbell for violating an ordinance that prohibits driving without illuminated
headlights more than thirty minutes after sunset. 1058 Campbell attempted to evade the police officer instead
of pulling over. 1059 The state charged Campbell with first-degree eluding a police officer. 1060 Campbell
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moved to suppress the evidence, claiming that the officer illegally stopped him, as he was not violating the
ordinance at the time of the stop. 1061 The superior court granted Campbell’s motion. 1062 But the court of
appeals held that the sun had not set at the time Campbell was initially pulled over (at 11:20 P.M.) and even
if the officer made an honest mistake in initiating the stop, that mistake was unreasonable. 1063 Therefore,
the exclusionary rule excludes any evidence discovered against Campbell as a result of the illegal
seizure. 1064 The court of appeals affirmed the superior court, holding that the exclusionary rule bars the
admission of evidence of a defendant’s illegal conduct committed in response to an illegal seizure by a
police officer. 1065
State, Department of Corrections v. Lundy
In State, Department of Corrections v. Lundy, 1066 the court of appeals held that in a criminal
sentencing proceeding, a court cannot decide the constitutionality of treatment offered to sex offenders, 1067
but a court may assign treatment providers who are suggested by a defendant. 1068 Three individuals were
convicted of criminal offenses related to the sexual abuse of a minor. 1069 The Alaska Department of
Corrections (“DOC”) recently stopped providing treatment for sex offenders while incarcerated, favoring
instead treatment during parole and probation. 1070 The superior court decided that the Alaska Constitution
guarantees defendants the right to treatment while in prison, but the court of appeals held that the
constitutionality of the change must be decided in a civil suit, not in a criminal sentencing.1071 However,
the court of appeals upheld the superior court’s decision to allow one defendant to seek treatment from a
therapist who was not approved by the DOC, reasoning that the broad powers given to a sentencing court
allow for decisions regarding a defendant’s offense and rehabilitation. 1072 In part reversing and in part
affirming the superior court, the court of appeals held that in a criminal sentencing proceeding, a court
cannot decide the constitutionality of treatment offered to sex offenders, 1073 but a court may assign
treatment providers who are suggested by a defendant. 1074
Stock v. State
In Stock v. State, 1075 the court of appeals held that the admissibility of statements obtained after a
suspect exercises his right to silence depends on several non-exclusive factors; there is no bright-line
rule. 1076 The police responded to Stock’s apartment after receiving a report of a disturbance. 1077 The police
took Stock into custody when they arrived at the scene. 1078 Stock responded to some questions without
receiving his Miranda warnings. 1079 The police subsequently Mirandized Stock, and he made some
incriminating statements before invoking his right to remain silent. 1080 Stock was eventually convicted of
assault and appealed on the basis that several of his statements were inadmissible because they were

1060

Id. at 1171–72.
Id. at 1172.
1062
Id.
1063
Id.
1064
Id. at 1173–74.
1065
Id. at 1175.
1066
188 P.3d 692 (Alaska Ct. App. 2008).
1067
Id. at 696.
1068
Id.
1069
Id. at 693.
1070
Id.
1071
Id. at 695.
1072
Id. at 696.
1073
Id.
1074
Id.
1075
191 P.3d 153 (Alaska Ct. App. 2008).
1076
Id. at 161.
1077
Id. at 154.
1078
Id.
1079
Id. at 155.
1080
Id.
1061

61

obtained in violation of his Miranda rights. 1081 The trial court excluded all statements made prior to Stock
hearing his Miranda rights, but Stock contended that even his post-Miranda statements should have been
excluded because they were tainted by the earlier Miranda violations. 1082 The court noted that in deciding
whether additional questions are permissible after a suspect has exercised his right to silence, a court must
examine whether the suspect’s rights were “scrupulously honored,” which includes consideration of: the
time between interrogations, whether the Miranda warnings were given prior to a new round of
questioning, if the subsequent questions relate to the same area that the suspect already declined to speak
about, and the degree of coercion used to break the suspect down. 1083 None of the factors are
dispositive. 1084 The court concluded that although the questions were about the same subject, Stock knew
his rights and was not unduly coerced. 1085 Affirming the trial court, the court of appeals held that the
admissibility of statements obtained after a suspect exercises his right to silence depends on several, nonexclusive factors; there is no bright-line rule. 1086
Tritt v. State
In Tritt v. State, 1087 the court of appeals held that manifest necessity for a mistrial does not exist
when the trial judge could cure the problem with a jury instruction. 1088 During his opening statement,
Tritt’s attorney told the petit jury that prosecutors had presented three inculpatory witnesses to the grand
jury, but had failed to call an exculpatory witness. 1089 The State objected to this comment, claiming that it
had irreparably tainted the petit jury. 1090 Judge Kauvar offered the option of a mistrial to the State; the
prosecutors accepted this offer. 1091 Tritt’s attorney moved to dismiss the second trial on grounds of double
jeopardy. 1092 The motion was denied, after which Tritt appealed. 1093 The court of appeals reasoned that
trials may only be stopped before a verdict under two circumstances: (1) if the defendant consents, or (2) if
manifest necessity for a mistrial arises. 1094 The court believed that Judge Kauvar had granted the mistrial
because the judge felt that jurors would interpret the comments of Tritt’s attorney as an accusation of
prosecutorial misconduct. 1095 In fact, the court of appeals reasoned that those comments had only been a
description of typical grand jury proceedings. 1096 Furthermore, the court reasoned that any jury
misunderstanding could have been cured by an instruction. 1097 Since any misunderstanding was curable, the
court reasoned that there was no manifest necessity for a mistrial. 1098 The court thus held that the double
jeopardy clause barred a second trial. 1099 The court of appeals reversed the superior court, holding that
manifest necessity for a mistrial does not exist when the trial judge could cure the problem with a jury
instruction. 1100
Vizcarra-Medina v. State
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In Vizcarra-Medina v. State, 1101 the court of appeals held that a defendant’s petition for postconviction relief is not frivolous if: (1) the defendant is prepared to offer testimony that he did not
understand key aspects of a plea agreement, and (2) it appears that—despite contrary evidence—the
defendant would be entitled to post-conviction relief if the trial court believed his testimony. 1102 As part of
a plea agreement, Vizcarra-Medina pled no contest to charges of theft. 1103 Later, Vizcarra-Medina filed a
petition for post-conviction relief in which he sought to withdraw his plea; the superior court appointed
Schmitt to represent him in the proceedings. 1104 Vizcarra-Medina told Schmitt that he did not understand
the terms of the plea agreement when he accepted it. 1105 However, Schmitt concluded that his client had no
non-frivolous basis for withdrawing it. 1106 Schmitt filed a certificate to that effect under Alaska Rule of
Criminal Procedure 35.1 (“Rule 35.1”); the superior court then dismissed Vizcarra-Medina’s petition. 1107
The court of appeals stated that Schmitt’s approach misconstrued the meaning of “frivolous” under Rule
35.1. 1108 The court held that an attorney may only declare the claim frivolous if the client would not prevail
even if the court believed him. 1109 The court further held that Vizcarra-Medina was entitled to testify that
he misunderstood the plea agreement. 1110 The court of appeals reversed the superior court’s dismissal of
Vizcarra-Medina’s petition, holding that a defendant’s petition for post-conviction relief is not frivolous if:
(1) the defendant is prepared to offer testimony that he did not understand key aspects of the plea
agreement, and (2) it appears that—despite contrary evidence—the defendant would be entitled to postconviction relief if the trial court believed his testimony. 1111
Vui Gui Tsen v. State
In Vui Gui Tsen v. State, 1112 the court of appeals held that even when a criminal defendant has
difficulty speaking or understanding English, a translator is only constitutionally required if the defendant’s
understanding of the trial is so low as to be “fundamentally unfair.” 1113 Tsen was charged with two counts
of third-degree controlled substance misconduct and one count of third-degree promoting prostitution. 1114
A jury convicted Tsen on all three counts. 1115 On appeal, Tsen argued that his right to due process was
violated when the judge refused to order word-for-word translation of the jury voir dire and the trial
testimony. 1116 Assuming—without deciding—that Alaska law mirrored federal law on the issue of a
criminal defendant’s right to the assistance of an interpreter, the court of appeals stated that a judge should
make an assessment of the defendant’s need for an interpreter based on the level of the defendant’s English
skills and the particular facts of the case. 1117 Recognizing that Tsen had difficulty speaking English, the
court noted that the record contained no indication that Tsen failed to comprehend any of the testimony,
and that the primary question is whether the defendant would otherwise understand so little of the trial
proceedings that the trial would be “fundamentally unfair.” 1118 The court of appeals highlighted the fact
that the defense strategy did not require Tsen to carefully analyze the details of the testimony or to actively
participate in the cross-examinations. 1119 The court of appeals affirmed the superior court, holding that
even when a criminal defendant has difficulty speaking or understanding English, a translator is only
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constitutionally required if the defendant’s understanding of the trial is so low as to be “fundamentally
unfair.” 1120

ELECTION LAW
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
Alaska Independence Party v. State
In Alaska Independence Party v. State, 1121 the Ninth Circuit held that Alaska’s state-run
mandatory primary election system was facially constitutional because it survived strict scrutiny. 1122 The
Alaska Independence Party (“AIP”) and the Alaska Libertarian Party (“ALP”) argued that Alaska’s law
requiring political parties to nominate candidates through a state-run mandatory primary election violated
their First Amendment right to free association because it permitted voters who self-identified as a party
member to run in that party’s primary whether or not the candidate met the party’s internal membership
requirements. 1123 The AIP and ALP claimed that the system forced these groups to be associated with
candidates they may not consider desirable since these candidates’ names could appear on primary ballots
as members of the AIP or ALP. 1124 The Ninth Circuit reasoned that whether an election law is permissible
under the First Amendment depends on the balance between the burden it places on individuals’
constitutional rights and the state’s interests. 1125 Alaska’s primary system did not impose a severe burden
on the constitutional rights of any political parties, and the state interest of protecting against corrupt
electoral practices was compelling. 1126 The Ninth Circuit affirmed the lower court’s decision, holding that
Alaska’s state-run mandatory primary election system was facially constitutional because it survived strict
scrutiny. 1127

Alaska Supreme Court
Anchorage v. Mjos
In Anchorage v. Mjos, 1128 the supreme court held that: (1) there is a presumption in favor of candidate
eligibility for elected office; and (2) when a statute can be reasonably interpreted in two ways, the reading
that favors candidate eligibility should be chosen. 1129 Traini, a member of the Anchorage Assembly, sought
to run for reelection after serving for one year following a special term election and then two subsequent
full, three-year terms. 1130 Anchorage Municipal Charter 4.02 stipulates that an individual may only serve
three consecutive terms. 1131 Traini argued that this meant three full terms, and a local attorney rendered the
same opinion. 1132 Mjos filed for an injunction prohibiting Traini from running again. 1133 The superior court
ruled in favor of Mjos, holding that a partial term counted as a term for purposes of Anchorage Municipal
Charter 4.02. Holding that there is a presumption in favor of candidate eligibility, the supreme court found
that, when reasonable, a statute should be read to authorize eligibility. 1134 The court further reasoned that
although it could be significant that the word “full” is used in one part of the statute, but was not used in the
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section referring to three terms, it is also reasonable to interpret the omission as insignificant. 1135
Overruling the superior court, the supreme court held that: (1) there is a presumption in favor of candidate
eligibility for elected office; and (2) when a statute can be reasonably interpreted in two ways, the reading
that favors candidate eligibility should be chosen. 1136
Braun v. Denali Borough
In Braun v. Denali Borough, 1137 the supreme court held that: (1) attorneys’ fees are appropriate in
a challenge to a reapportionment plan under the catalyst theory, (2) the city’s plan did not violate equal
protection, and (3) a challenge to a voter-approved reapportionment plan is an election challenge. 1138 The
Denali Borough Assembly (“Assembly”) developed a number of reapportionment proposals to present to
the public for a special election, the last of which was voted on and approved. 1139 Braun filed a number of
suits challenging the Assembly’s reapportionment plans, arguing that the approved plan was
unconstitutional and that he was entitled to attorney’s fees for one of his earlier challenges, which resulted
in the Assembly developing a new plan. 1140 The superior court dismissed all the issues except that of
attorneys’ fees and granted summary judgment to the Assembly. 1141 On appeal, the supreme court reasoned
that Braun was entitled to attorneys’ fees because he was the prevailing party under the catalyst theory,
which requires that the litigant achieve his adjudicatory goal and that his lawsuit prompt the defendant to
settle. 1142 The court also held that the plan did not violate the Equal Protection Clause because the dual
standards of “one person, one vote” and “fair and effective representation to voters” were met. 1143 Further,
the plan did not violate Alaska’s equal protection clause because Braun presented no evidence that the plan
was intended to disenfranchise certain voters. 1144 Lastly, the court held that Braun’s challenge to the reapportionment plan was an election challenge and that he failed to plead the elements of such a
challenge. 1145 Reversing the superior court in part and affirming in part, the supreme court held that: (1)
attorneys’ fees are appropriate in a challenge to a reapportionment plan under the catalyst theory, (2) the
city’s plan did not violate equal protection, and (3) a challenge to a voter-approved reapportionment plan is
an election challenge. 1146

EMPLOYMENT LAW
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
Townsend v. University of Alaska
In Townsend v. University of Alaska, 1147 the Ninth Circuit held that: (1) federal courts lack
jurisdiction over a Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act (“USERRA”) action
brought by an individual against a state, and (2) USERRA does not create a cause of action against State
employee-supervisors. 1148 Townsend sued his employer, the University of Alaska, in federal district court
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for violations of USERRA. 1149 The district court dismissed the claim, stating that it did not have
jurisdiction over individual suits against a state under USERRA. 1150 The Ninth Circuit reasoned that prior
to the 1998 amendments to USERRA, the district court would have had jurisdiction, but since the
amendments, federal courts are no longer permitted to hear claims by individuals against a state. 1151 The
court further reasoned that its interpretation of USERRA was supported by its legislative history, which
shows that Congress had passed the amendments in reaction to the Supreme Court’s decision in Seminole
Tribe v. Florida, holding that Congress cannot abrogate state sovereign immunity when it is acting under
its commerce powers. 1152 In light of that decision, Congress specified that USERRA suits by individuals
against a state must be brought in state court, not in federal court. 1153 The court further held that it was not
an error to disallow Townsend to amend his complaint to include the defendants in their individual
capacity, because the statute does not create a private cause of action against the individuals. 1154 Affirming
the decision of the district court, the Ninth Circuit held that: (1) a federal district court lacks jurisdiction
over a USERRA action brought by an individual against a state, and (2) USERRA does not create a cause
of action against State employee-supervisors. 1155

Alaska Supreme Court
Air Logistics of Alaska, Inc. v. Throop
In Air Logistics of Alaska, Inc. v. Throop, 1156 the supreme court held that: (1) under the Alaska
Wage and Hour Act (“AWHA”), all compensable hours should be used in overtime calculations when
employees are on call in a remote location; (2) AWHA claims are always governed by a two-year statute of
limitations; and (3) because the employer reasonably believed that it was complying with the AWHA, it
was not liable for liquidated damages. 1157 Air Logistics, a helicopter company, required its mechanics to
work two-week shifts at remote locations and paid them for ten hours per day even though they typically
worked fewer hours. 1158 In calculating overtime pay, Air Logistics only used the hours actually worked. 1159
A mechanic sued Air Logistics over this method of calculation. 1160 The superior court partially granted Air
Logistics’s motion for summary judgment on hours worked and did not impose liquidated damages, but—
treating the AWHA claim as a contract claim—disagreed with Air Logistics that the statute of limitations
had run. 1161 Both parties appealed. 1162 The supreme court reasoned that the AWHA requires employers to
calculate overtime pay using all compensable hours rather than actual hours worked, because the mechanics
were in a remote location for an extended period of time. 1163 However, it reversed summary judgment on
the statute of limitations issue, holding that an AWHA claim can only be brought as a breach of contract
claim if the employment contract explicitly includes the term in dispute, and otherwise all AWHA claims
are subject to a two-year statute of limitations. 1164 Finally, it affirmed the superior court’s denial of
liquidated damages. 1165 Air Logistics cleared its wage plan with the Department of Labor and never made
any attempts to hide any aspects of the plan, evidencing a good faith attempt to comply with the law.1166
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Reversing in part and affirming in part, the supreme court held that: (1) under the AWHA, all compensable
hours should be used in overtime calculations when employees are on call in a remote location; (2) AWHA
claims are always governed by a two-year statute of limitations; and (3) because the employer reasonably
believed that it was complying with the AWHA, it was not liable for liquidated damages. 1167
Anchorage Police Department Command Officers’ Ass’n v. Municipality of Anchorage
In Anchorage Police Department Command Officers’ Ass’n v. Municipality of Anchorage, 1168 the
supreme court held that police department lieutenants and captains qualify as supervisors under the
Anchorage Municipal Code, and are thus exempt from collective bargaining. 1169 A group of police
lieutenants and captains tried to gain union representation through the Anchorage Police Department
Command Officers Ass’n (“APDCOA”). 1170 The Anchorage Municipal Employee Relations Board
(“Board”) denied the petition for representation because, among other reasons, in the Board’s opinion the
officers fulfilled supervisory roles, and under Anchorage Municipal Code § 3.70.060C(2), supervisory
employees are exempt from collective bargaining. 1171 The supreme court, applying a substantial evidence
test, examined the job descriptions of the police lieutenants and captains and found both to be supervisory
in nature. 1172 However, the supreme court also noted APDCOA’s argument that the statute requires the
supervisory activity to be performed “regularly” or with “independent judgment.” 1173 Looking at the
testimony from the Board’s hearing, the supreme court accepted the Board’s conclusion that testimony in
support of the officers was not credible. 1174 The court also independently found that the balance of the
evidence was against the officers. 1175 Thus, affirming the superior court, the supreme court held that police
department lieutenants and captains qualify as supervisors under the Anchorage Municipal Code and are
thus except from collective bargaining. 1176
Baseden v. State
In Baseden v. State, 1177 the supreme court held that: (1) a State employee may be fired after failing
to report for work subsequent to reinstatement after an earlier termination, and (2) back pay may be limited
to the time prior to an employee’s refusal of an offer of reinstatement. 1178 In April 2000, Baseden was
terminated after thirteen months of employment with the State. 1179 After Baseden filed a grievance in 2001,
the State offered to both reinstate him and provide him with arrears of pay dating to April 2000. 1180
However, Baseden desired arbitration because he wanted attorneys’ fees and compensatory damages in
addition to the terms the State had offered. 1181 When Baseden did not report for work on the first day of his
reinstated job, the State deemed him to have relinquished the position. 1182 Subsequently, Arbitrator Dorsey
determined that the State had reasonable cause to terminate Baseden because of his refusal to return to
work. 1183 In a separate proceeding, Arbitrator Gaunt determined that Baseden was entitled to back pay with
interest for the period from his April 2000 firing until his October 2001 relinquishment. 1184 The superior
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court affirmed the determinations of the arbitrators, and Baseden appealed. 1185 The supreme court reasoned
that although it was not clear whether the arbitrators’ decisions should be reviewed under a gross error
standard or an arbitrary and capricious standard, the decisions survived both levels of review. 1186 The court
reasoned that Dorsey’s decision should be affirmed because, after listening to Baseden’s concerns about the
uncertain terms of his new employment, he had reasonably found that Baseden’s failure to report to work
was unjustified. 1187 The court also reasoned that Gaunt’s award of back pay with interest was not arbitrary
and capricious since Baseden refused to work after the State offered him reinstatement and back pay
without interest. 1188 The supreme court affirmed the superior court, holding that: (1) a State employee may
be fired after failing to report for work subsequent to reinstatement after an earlier termination, and (2)
back pay may be limited to the time prior to an employee’s refusal of an offer of reinstatement.1189
Geneva Woods Pharmacy, Inc. v. Thygeson
In Geneva Woods Pharmacy, Inc. v. Thygeson, 1190 the supreme court held that an employer that
failed to keep adequate employment records provided insufficient evidence to overturn a finding that
overtime wages were due to an employee. 1191 A registered nurse, who had previously been misclassified as
an employee exempt from overtime pay, sued her employer to recover unpaid overtime wages.1192 Since
the employer failed to keep accurate records, the superior court calculated the employee’s overtime award
based on time cards, mileage logs, and other evidence. 1193 The supreme court reasoned that when an
employer does not keep accurate records, an employee may prove her claim by presenting sufficient
evidence from which the court may draw a reasonable inference. 1194 The supreme court held that the
employee met the minimal burden of proof to establish a reasonable inference that the overtime wages were
due. 1195 The supreme court also found that the lack of accurate records kept by the employer forced the
employer to disprove the employee’s claim, and that the employer’s evidence failed to show that the
superior court’s finding constitutes clear error. 1196 The supreme court affirmed the superior court’s award
of overtime pay, holding that an employer that failed to keep adequate employment records provided
insufficient evidence to overturn the trial court’s finding that overtime wages were due to an employee. 1197
Hallam v. Holland America Line, Inc.
In Hallam v. Holland America Line, Inc. 1198 the supreme court held that an ex-employee could not
file a claim under § 23.05.140 of the Alaska Statutes for failure to pay wages in a timely manner unless he
demanded that his employer provide his final paycheck within three working days of the termination of his
employment. 1199 Hallam was employed as a seasonal bus driver for Holland America. 1200 Although his last
day of work was August 20, 1994, he did not receive his final paycheck until September 1, and did not
receive his incentive bonus until October 27. 1201 Hallam filed suit against Holland America for various
claims, including its failure to pay his wages in a timely manner.1202 The superior court granted Holland
America’s motion for summary judgment on the wage claim and Hallam appealed. 1203 The supreme court
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determined that § 23.05.140 afforded Hallam no relief. 1204 It would be unjustified to punish Holland
America based on the company’s established practice of paying bonuses outside of the three working day
window following an employee’s termination absent a demand from the employee for earlier payment. 1205
Because Hallam did not demand early payment, he was not entitled to relief under § 23.05.140. 1206 The
supreme court affirmed the superior court, holding that an ex-employee could not file a claim under §
23.05.140 of the Alaska Statutes for failure to pay wages in a timely manner unless he demanded that his
employer provide his final paycheck within three working days of the termination of his employment. 1207
Kim v. Alyeska Seafoods, Inc.
In Kim v. Alyeska Seafoods, Inc., 1208 the supreme court held that because the language for
requesting a hearing under § 23.30.110(c) of the Alaska Statutes is directory rather than mandatory,
substantial compliance, defined as the timely filing of a request for a hearing, is enough to toll the statute of
limitations while the claimant requests additional time to prepare for the hearing. 1209 Kim suffered a back
injury while working for Alyeska Seafoods. 1210 After Alyeska controverted workers’ compensation
benefits, Kim filed a workers’ compensation claim. 1211 Alyeska controverted Kim’s compensation
claim. 1212 Two days before the second anniversary of Alyeska’s controversion of his compensation claim,
Kim filed a motion for a continuance because he needed more time to prepare for a hearing. 1213 Instead of
granting the motion, the Workers’ Compensation Board (“Board”) found that Kim’s claim was time-barred,
and the appeals commission affirmed. 1214 In determining whether § 23.30.110(c) is directory rather than
mandatory, the supreme court considered three factors: (1) whether the wording was affirmative or
prohibitive, (2) the legislative intent, and (3) the consequences under a mandatory interpretation. 1215 The
court determined that the language in § 23.30.110(c) is affirmative; it does not prohibit action. 1216 Second,
the court found that the legislative history evinced a directory intent. 1217 Finally, the court reasoned that this
case demonstrates the serious consequences of making the statutory language mandatory, thus it ought to
be directory. 1218 Reversing the Commission’s order dismissing Kim’s claim, the supreme court held that
because the language for requesting a hearing under § 23.30.110(c) is directory rather than mandatory,
substantial compliance, defined as the timely filing of a request for a hearing, is enough to toll the statute of
limitations while the claimant requests additional time to prepare for the hearing. 1219
Seybert v. Cominco Alaska Exploration
In Seybert v. Cominco Alaska Exploration, 1220 the supreme court held that: (1) a workers’
compensation insurer does not owe a fiduciary duty to a claimant 1221 and (2) a contract may be avoided for
a non-fraudulent material misrepresentation. 1222 In 1993, Seybert injured his neck while working as a
millwright for Cominco Alaska Exploration. 1223 In 1995, Seybert and Cominco executed a Compromise
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and Release (“C&R”) to settle Seybert’s workers’ compensation claims. 1224 Prior to executing the C&R,
Cominco made statements that led Seybert to believe that he was only eligible for three areas of
benefits. 1225 In 2001, Seybert asked the Alaska Workers’ Compensation Board to set aside the C&R
because he executed it based on Cominco’s misleading statements about which benefits he was eligible to
receive. 1226 The board denied Seybert’s request to set aside the C&R because the misrepresentations were
not fraudulently made. 1227 Reasoning that because the Alaska Workers’ Compensation Act sets up an
adversarial system between the worker’s compensation insurer and the claimant, the supreme court held
that a worker’s compensation insurer does not owe a fiduciary duty to a claimant. 1228 However, contract
principles allow a contract to be avoided for any material misrepresentation that reasonably induced the
formation of the contract. 1229 The supreme court reversed the board’s denial of Seybert’s petition and
remanded the case back to the board to determine if Seybert was induced into the C&R by a material
misrepresentation, holding that: (1) a workers’ compensation insurer does not owe a fiduciary duty to a
claimant, 1230 but that (2) a contract may be avoided for a non-fraudulent material misrepresentation. 1231
State v. Alaska Public Employees Ass’n
In State v. Alaska Public Employees Ass’n, 1232 the supreme court held that: (1) an arbitrator’s
assessment of prejudgment interest on back pay against the State was not gross error where the award of
interest was fair, and (2) the arbitrator could have determined that the State had waived their sovereign
immunity by submitting the claim to binding arbitration. 1233 After Basedan was terminated from state
employment, the Alaska Public Employees Association filed a grievance on his behalf. 1234 The State
eventually conceded that Basedan’s termination was without good cause, and the arbitrator awarded back
pay from the termination date to the date of reinstatement and also required the State to pay interest on the
net award; the State appealed. 1235 The general rule is that prejudgment interest cannot be assessed against
the state unless specifically waived by legislation. 1236 The supreme court reasoned that in the case of
arbitration, however, it is the arbitrator’s duty to determine the scope of the State’s waiver of immunity
from liability for prejudgment interest. 1237 It was reasonable for the arbitrator to conclude that the
legislature’s enactment of an arbitration clause constituted a waiver of the state’s immunity against
prejudgment interest liability. 1238 Reasoning that policy favors effective arbitration, the court concluded
that the arbitrator’s decision did not constitute gross error. 1239 The supreme court affirmed the arbitrator’s
award of prejudgment interest on back pay against the State, holding that: (1) an arbitrator’s assessment of
prejudgment interest on back pay against the State was not gross error where the award of interest was fair,
and (2) the arbitrator could have determined that the State had waived their sovereign immunity by
submitting the claim to binding arbitration. 1240
Villaflores v. State, Commission for Human Rights
In Villaflores v. State, Commission for Human Rights, 1241 the supreme court held that when a
potential employee’s application does not demonstrate the minimum requirements as stated by the
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prospective employer, the applicant is barred from claiming that he or she was denied the position due to
discrimination. 1242 Villaflores applied for a human resources position with ConocoPhillips Alaska, Inc. 1243
In advertising the job, the company sought applicants with at least a bachelor’s degree in human resources
and five to ten years of experience in the human resources field; 1244 Villaflores did not list either of these
requirements on his resume or application. 1245 ConocoPhillips then hired another person, and Villaflores
filed a complaint of employment discrimination on the basis of age and race with the Alaska State
Commission for Human Rights (“Commission”). 1246 The Commission dismissed Villaflores’s complaint as
not supported by substantial evidence, after which Villaflores appealed. 1247 The supreme court reasoned
that without direct evidence of discriminatory intent, a complainant is required to make a prima facie
showing of discrimination by demonstrating that the complainant: (1) belongs to a protected class, (2)
applied for and was qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking applicants, (3) was rejected, and
(4) the employer hired a person not belonging to the protected class. 1248 The supreme court reasoned that
Villaflores was not qualified for the job because he did not have the requisite experience. 1249 The supreme
court affirmed the decision of the superior court, holding that when an potential employee’s application
does not demonstrate the minimum requirements as stated by the prospective employer, the applicant is
barred from claiming that he or she was denied the position due to discrimination. 1250

ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
Bering Strait Citizens for Responsible Resource Development v. United States Army Corps of Engineers
In Bering Strait Citizens for Responsible Resource Development v. United States Army Corps of
Engineers, 1251 the Ninth Circuit held that: (1) the Clean Water Act (“CWA”) permits mitigation strategies
to be developed after a permit is issued, provided that the fully-developed strategies already in existence are
adequate 1252 and (2) under the National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”), an agency preparing an
Environmental Assessment (“EA”) need not always circulate it, but must provide the public with sufficient
environmental information to permit members of the public to participate in the agency’s decision-making
process. 1253 Alaska Gold Company (“AGC”) applied to the Army Corp of Engineers (“Corps”) for a permit
to discharge dredged or fill materials into wetlands at the Rock Creek Mine. 1254 The permit was issued on
the condition that AGC undertake a variety of measures to mitigate environmental damage. 1255 In order to
obtain public comment on the proposed permit, the Corps placed a notice on its website and sent electronic
and hardcopy notices to several federal, state, and local agencies, as well as to individuals in the local
community. 1256 The Corps subsequently issued the permit, along with a Finding of No Significant Impact
(“FONSI”) for the project, meaning that the Corps did not have to issue an Environmental Impact
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Statement. 1257 Bering Strait Citizens for Responsible Resource Development (“BSC”) sought a preliminary
restraining order and temporary injunction against the project. 1258 The Ninth Circuit first determined that
the CWA allowed permits to be issued even when some aspects of a mitigation plan were not yet
finalized. 1259 The court held that issuing a permit while intending to develop mitigation plans in the future
does not violate the CWA unless the mitigation measures that have been fully developed are inadequate;
the court concluded that here, the fully developed measures were adequate. 1260 The court next determined
that although NEPA required agencies to implement its procedures with public involvement, the law did
not require circulation of a draft EA in all cases. 1261 When preparing an EA, an agency must provide the
public with sufficient environmental information, considered in the totality of circumstances, to permit
members of the public to weigh in with their views and thus inform agency decision-making.1262 The court
concluded that this requirement had been satisfied by the efforts of the Corps and AGC to keep the Nome
community informed about the project. 1263 Thus, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court, holding that:
(1) the CWA permits mitigation strategies to be developed after a permit is issued, provided that the fully
developed strategies already in existence are adequate, 1264 and (2) under NEPA, an agency preparing an EA
need not always circulate it, but must provide the public with sufficient environmental information to
permit members of the public to participate in the agency’s decision-making process. 1265

ETHICS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
Alaska Supreme Court
Froines v. Valdez Fisheries Development Ass’n
In Froines v. Valdez Fisheries Development Ass’n, 1266 the supreme court held that the mere
presence of certain factors delineated in Alaska Rule of Professional Conduct 1.5 (“Conduct Rule 1.5”)
does not necessarily support limiting an award of attorneys’ fees. 1267 In a breach of contract action, Froines
made a settlement offer to Valdez Fisheries Development Association (“Valdez”), which rejected the offer,
and the case went to trial. 1268 After trial, the jury found in favor of Froines and Froines moved to recover
attorneys’ fees. 1269 The superior court awarded attorneys’ fees to Froines, but limited his award to $10,000,
and Froines appealed. 1270 Conduct Rule 1.5 enumerates factors to consider when determining if attorneys’
fees are reasonable. 1271 The supreme court reasoned that three of these factors, when considered in the
context of Alaska Civil Rule 68, are probative as to whether Froines litigated unreasonably at trial and
whether the case was a good one for settlement: (1) the lack of novelty of the legal issues involved, (2) the
probability of only a modest recovery, and (3) minimal award. 1272 Since these factors cut both ways in
terms of their probative value, the mere presence of these factors did not support the superior court’s
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limiting of the attorneys’ fees award. 1273 Reversing the superior court, the supreme court held that the mere
presence of certain factors delineated in Conduct Rule 1.5 does not necessarily support limiting an award of
attorneys’ fees. 1274

FAMILY LAW
Alaska Supreme Court
Audrey H. v. State, Office of Children’s Services
In Audrey H. v. State, Office of Children’s Services, 1275 the supreme court held that: (1) under §
47.10.011(9) of the Alaska Statutes, a child may be at risk of emotional harm when regularly confronted by
parental abuse of alcohol or drugs, and (2) the State makes reasonable efforts to reunite children with a
parent who suffers from organic brain damage when the State takes “affirmative steps” to do so. 1276 On
June 8, 2005, two of Audrey H.’s daughters were removed from their home because Audrey H. failed to
provide a safe and clean living environment and exposed them to alcohol abuse, drug abuse, and
prostitution in their home. 1277 The State made efforts to reunite Audrey H. with her daughters by providing
access to services and taking steps to ensure Audrey H.’s compliance. 1278 When Audrey H. failed to utilize
the required services, the State moved for termination of parental rights, which the superior court
granted. 1279 On appeal, the supreme court first reasoned that § 47.10.011(9) permitted termination of
parental rights when a child was at risk of emotional harm. 1280 Furthermore, the specific mention of alcohol
and drug abuse in §§ 47.10.011(10) and 47.10.011(11) did not preclude the consideration of how those
facts affect the risk of emotional harm to the child under § 47.10.011(9). 1281 Second, the supreme court
reasoned that, when a parent suffers from organic brain damage, the State is obligated to take affirmative
steps to ensure the parent’s compliance with any required services. 1282 Since the State took affirmative
steps, the supreme court concluded that the State had met the reasonable-efforts standard. 1283 Affirming the
superior court, the supreme court held that: (1) under § 47.10.011(9) of the Alaska Statutes, a child may be
at risk of emotional harm when regularly confronted by parental abuse of alcohol or drugs, and (2) the State
makes reasonable efforts to reunite children with a parent who suffers from organic brain damage when the
State takes “affirmative steps” to do so. 1284
Barile v. Barile
In Barile v. Barile, 1285 the supreme court held that when a parent makes a motion to modify
custody, a court must hold an evidentiary hearing when the allegations, if proved, could warrant a change
in custody. 1286 When Tammy and Primo divorced, the superior court ordered that Primo receive sole
custody of their child, Chance. 1287 Tammy later filed a motion for sole custody of Chance. 1288 Tammy
argued that this modification was supported by several changed circumstances, including the parents’ new
marriages, the abuse and neglect of Chance, the abuse of Primo’s new stepson, and Chance’s preference for
living with Tammy. 1289 The superior court determined that these allegations did not rise to the level of a
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substantial change in circumstances and dismissed the motion without an evidentiary hearing. 1290 On
appeal, the supreme court reasoned that a motion to modify custody may only be dismissed without an
evidentiary hearing under two circumstances: (1) when the allegations, if proved, would not warrant a
custody modification; or (2) if the allegations created no genuine issue of fact requiring a hearing. 1291 The
court noted that although the superior court had addressed several of Tammy’s allegations in its decision, it
did not address her allegations that Chance and his stepbrother were abused. 1292 The court reasoned that
because a finding of domestic abuse would establish changed circumstances, it was error to deny Tammy a
hearing in which she could attempt to prove the allegations. 1293 Additionally, the court found that Chance’s
safety and access to medical care may have been at risk. 1294 Since Tammy’s allegations, if proved, could
warrant a custody modification, a factual hearing was required before her motion could be dismissed. 1295
The supreme court reversed the superior court, holding that when a parent makes a motion to modify
custody, a court must hold an evidentiary hearing when the allegations, if proved, could warrant a change
in custody. 1296
Chesser v. Chesser-Witmer
In Chesser v. Chesser-Witmer, 1297 the supreme court held that an interim custody order with a fixed
date of termination may be modified at a continuation hearing following the date of the order’s termination
and that a court does not need to make express findings on all statutory factors. 1298 Following a divorce, the
superior court ordered a temporary custody arrangement such that the child would spend the school year
with her father on a military base in New York and summer vacations with her mother in Alaska. 1299 This
temporary order expired after one year and the arrangement was permanently changed to give custody to
the mother during the school year. 1300 The father appealed, arguing that the court needed to consider each
of the statutory factors and that the mother needed to show a change of circumstances to modify the
custody order. 1301 The supreme court held that the superior court’s decision was not clearly erroneous
because the superior court was not obligated to make express findings on all nine of the statutorily
mandated factors. 1302 Additionally, it reasoned that since the one-year arrangement was temporary, the
mother did not need to show a change in circumstances or request a modification and that the new custody
hearing should merely be viewed as a continuation of the previous hearing. 1303 Affirming the decision of
the superior court, the Supreme Court of Alaska held that an interim custody order with a fixed date of
termination may be modified at a continuation hearing following the date of the order’s termination and
that the trial court does not need to make express findings on all of the statutory factors. 1304
Eniero v. Brekke
In Eniero v. Brekke, 1305 the supreme court held that in determining the best interests of the child, a
trial court may consider whether an out-of-state move by one parent was partially, and not primarily,
illegitimate in determining the best interests of the child. 1306 Eniero and Brekke had cohabitated for four
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years and had a daughter, Miranda, together. 1307 After the couple separated, the parents agreed to share
custody of Miranda on an alternating-weeks basis. 1308 Desiring to move to Oregon, Eniero filed a motion to
modify the terms of the custody arrangement to allow Miranda to move with her. 1309 Brekke opposed the
motion, arguing that Eniero’s principal motivation was to prevent him from playing an active role in
Miranda’s life. 1310 The superior court applied a two-step approach to determine whether the custody
arrangement allowed the move. 1311 First, the court found that Eniero primarily had legitimate reasons for
the move. 1312 Second, the court found that preventing Brekke’s involvement in Miranda’s life was a
secondary motivation for the move, and on the whole, that the move was not in the best interests of the
child. 1313 Therefore, the court held that if Eniero moved, Miranda would remain with Brekke. 1314 Affirming
the superior court’s decision, the supreme court held that in determining the best interests of the child, a
trial court may consider whether an out-of-state move by one parent was partially, and not primarily,
illegitimate in determining the best interests of the child. 1315
Ferguson v. Ferguson
In Ferguson v. Ferguson, 1316 the supreme court held that a divorce settlement could not be
modified, even if it used a lump sum in lieu of future child support payments, if the circumstances had not
changed and the settlement was more than the statutory cap. 1317 James and Victoria divorced in 2001 and
settled on a $233,000 lump sum payment instead of future child support payments. 1318 Counsel for both
parties pushed for the unconventional approach and convinced the superior judge they understood the
ramifications. 1319 In 2006, Victoria filed a motion to modify the settlement because unemployment forced
her to liquidate most of the $233,000 and pay the tax penalties associated with the early withdrawals on
401ks and pension funds which were part of the lump sum. 1320 The supreme court held that the lump sum
settlement was already based on Victoria’s unemployment and both parties considered the tax penalties for
liquidating the assets. 1321 The settlement was also based on James earning $100,000, but the maximum
adjusted income that can be considered is $84,000, which further showed the settlement was fair and
should not be modified in Victoria’s favor. 1322 The supreme court affirmed the decision of the superior
court, holding that a divorce settlement could not be modified, even if it used a lump sum in lieu of future
child support payments, if the circumstances had not changed and the settlement was more than the
statutory cap. 1323
Haines v. Cox
In Haines v. Cox, 1324 the supreme court held that: (1) in valuing property for equitable distribution
purposes in a divorce trial, courts may use an older tax assessment if a more current tax assessment is not
available until after divorce trial; and (2) when determining the value of the marital property, courts must
consider the fair rental value of the home and the cost of insurance premiums paid by one spouse. 1325
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Haines and Cox separated in May 2003, and their divorce trial was held in October 2005. 1326 After the
couple separated, Haines left the marital home but continued to pay property insurance premiums and
property taxes while Cox remained in the house. 1327 The superior court used a 2005 tax assessment when
determining the value of the marital home. 1328 On appeal, Haines argued the court should have used the
2006 assessment for valuation purposes despite it being unavailable until three months after the trial
ended. 1329 The supreme court found that the lower court was required to use the best assessment of value
available during the trial. 1330 However, the supreme court found that the superior court erred when it failed
to consider Cox’s continued use of the home. 1331 Cox’s occupancy was “as though he received rent from
the marital estate.” 1332 Additionally, the insurance premiums paid by Haines continued to benefit Cox, and
the lower court should have considered the payments in valuing the marital property. 1333 Affirming the
superior court in part and reversing in part, the supreme court held that: (1) in valuing property for
equitable distribution purposes in a divorce trial, courts may use an older tax assessment if a more current
tax assessment is not available until after divorce trial; and (2) when determining the value of the marital
property, courts must consider the fair rental value of the home and the cost of insurance premiums paid by
one spouse. 1334
Hooper v. Hooper
In Hooper v. Hooper, 1335 the supreme court held that an award of greater than half of a marital
estate to one spouse during a divorce was acceptable when it was supported by sufficient findings of
fact. 1336 In divorce proceedings for Sabra and Taggart Hooper, the superior court decided that Sabra was
entitled to 67% of the estate based on factors such as her time spent raising the children and each party’s
relative earning capacities and economic needs. 1337 Taggart appealed and argued that the superior court did
not apply the appropriate legal standards. 1338 The supreme court acknowledged that an equal division of
property is presumed to be the most equitable, but also recognized that the trial court has broad discretion
to deviate from absolute equality. 1339 The supreme court decided that the superior court did not abuse its
discretion because it entered thoughtful and detailed findings of fact discussing all of the relevant factors
set out in the law. 1340 The supreme court affirmed the superior court and held that an award of greater than
half of a marital estate to one spouse during a divorce was acceptable when it was supported by sufficient
findings of fact. 1341
Iverson v. Griffith
In Iverson v. Griffith, 1342 the supreme court held that: (1) a mother was entitled to an evidentiary
hearing to determine if recent changes in the father’s employment circumstances required modification of
an existing custody arrangement, and (2) a court must explain its decision to deny a motion to appoint a
guardian ad litem. 1343 In a custody dispute, Iverson, the mother, sought an evidentiary hearing to determine
if Griffith’s new job, which required him to leave their daughter with another family for two weeks a
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month, affected his ability to care for the child. 1344 The superior court denied Iverson’s hearing request. 1345
On appeal, the supreme court held Griffith’s new job constituted a change in circumstances that could
impact his ability to care for their daughter; therefore, Iverson was entitled to a hearing to determine if the
custody arrangement should be modified. 1346 The supreme court also stated that § 25.24.310(c) of the
Alaska Statutes requires a court to explain its denial of a motion to appoint a guardian ad litem. 1347 The
supreme court vacated and remanded the superior court’s decision, holding that: (1) a mother was entitled
to an evidentiary hearing to determine if recent changes in the father’s employment circumstances required
modification of an existing custody arrangement, and (2) a court must explain its decision to deny a motion
to appoint a guardian ad litem. 1348
Jacob v. State, Department of Health and Social Services
In Jacob v. State, Department of Health and Social Services, 1349 the supreme court held that the
State violated the rights of grandparents seeking custody of their grandchildren in State care when they
were not informed of proceedings involving the children. 1350 The Jacobs had joint custody of their
grandchildren with the children’s mother, who had moved the children from Washington, where the Jacobs
lived, to Alaska. 1351 After the mother began abusing drugs, the Office of Children’s Services (“OCS”) took
the children into State custody. 1352 For the next three years, the grandparents contacted OCS dozens of
times to seek information about the children and to attempt to place the grandchildren in their home. 1353
During this time, OCS never gave the Jacobs notice of proceedings involving the children, even when the
law required such notice. 1354 The Jacobs filed for declaratory and injunctive relief in superior court. 1355
OCS filed a motion to dismiss, which the superior court granted, while also giving the Jacobs the
opportunity to intervene in the children’s Child in Need of Aid (“CINA”) hearings. 1356 The Jacobs
subsequently intervened and appealed. 1357 The supreme court reasoned that the CINA statutes prefer to
place children with actual family members rather than foster families, and grandparents must have notice of
CINA hearings. 1358 The supreme court found that because the Jacobs were not given custody or notice of
proceedings involving the children, the Jacobs were entitled to declaratory judgment. 1359 However, the
Jacobs’ injunctive request was moot, because after the superior court decision, they received: (1) notice of
the hearings involving their grandchildren; (2) an opportunity to be heard; and (3) custody of two of the
children while proceedings were ongoing over the custody of the third. 1360 Reversing the superior court, the
supreme court held that the State violates the rights of grandparents seeking custody of their grandchildren
in state care when they were not informed of proceedings involving the children. 1361
Karrie B. v. Catherine J.
In Karrie B. v. Catherine J., 1362 the supreme court held that in a determination of a child’s best
interest during a hearing on the termination of parental rights, a court may consider the lack of adoptive
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placement options, the parent’s determination to change, and the parent/child bond. 1363 Karrie and Crystal
were born to Catherine in 1998 and 2001 respectively. 1364 From birth until 2005, both children witnessed
alcohol abuse by their mother and father, witnessed domestic violence between their mother and father, and
suffered from domestic violence. 1365 At the time of the first altercation in 1998, the Office of Children’s
Services (“OCS”) became involved in the family’s affairs, setting requirements the parents had to meet. 1366
Between 1998 and 2005, both parents periodically failed to meet the requirements set forth by the OCS. 1367
The children’s guardian ad litem moved for termination of Catherine’s parental rights; 1368 the superior
court denied the motion based on the best interests of the children as evidenced by: (1) the lack of
alternative options for permanent placement of the children, (2) Catherine’s determination to change, and
(3) the strong mother/child bond between Catherine and her daughters. 1369 First, the court stated that
because favorable current placements could be considered in determining that the best interests of a child
supported termination of parental rights, the lack of permanent placement options could weigh against
termination of parental rights. 1370 Second, the court stated that under Alaska law, a parent’s determination
to change may be considered in determining the best interests of the child. 1371 Third, the court stated that
the bond between a parent and child may receive consideration in proceedings for the termination of
parental rights, because that bond can imply that the child’s best interests may be served by continued
contact with the parent. 1372 Affirming the superior court, the supreme court held that in a determination of a
child’s best interest during a hearing on the termination of parental rights, a court may consider the lack of
adoptive placement options, the parent’s determination to change, and the parent/child bond. 1373
Kestner v. Clark
In Kestner v. Clark, 1374 the supreme court held that: (1) in determining the amount of child support
due, a court may impute income to a parent who is voluntarily unemployed; 1375 and (2) it is appropriate to
permit discovery of the non-custodial parent’s new spouse’s finances when that parent seeks a variance
from the payment schedule, or when that parent does not work because of the new spouse’s income. 1376
After Clark and Kestner divorced, the latter remarried and voluntarily left the workforce in order to be a
stay-at-home mom for her children from the new marriage. 1377 During a subsequent hearing to modify child
support payments, Clark filed a motion to impute income to Kestner based on her earning potential. 1378
Kestner opposed the motion, arguing that it was reasonable for her to be voluntarily unemployed because of
her relatively low potential income and the high cost of child care. 1379 Clark then filed a discovery motion
requesting production of documents relating to the finances of Kestner’s new spouse. 1380 The supreme
court reasoned that because public policy prioritizes the fulfillment of paying child support over most all
other obligations, the superior court correctly imputed Kestner’s earning potential to her, and correctly
accounted for her spouse’s finances when determining the appropriate amount of child support due. 1381 The
supreme court affirmed the superior court, holding that: (1) to determine the amount of child support due,
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the superior court may impute income to a parent who is voluntarily unemployed, 1382 and (2) it is
appropriate to permit discovery of the non-custodial parent’s new spouse’s finances when that parent seeks
a variance from the payment schedule, or that parent does not work because of the new spouse’s
income. 1383
Krushensky v. Farinas
In Krushensky v. Farinas, 1384 the supreme court held that a court may not enter a qualified
domestic relations order (“QDRO”) containing a qualified pre-retirement survivor annuity (“QPSA”), if
doing so contradicts a memorializing final property order and violates the parties’ prior agreement. 1385
Krushensky filed for divorce from Farinas in 2004 and the parties reached a settlement involving all
property, including Krushensky’s two defined-benefit retirement accounts. 1386 The superior court
memorialized the settlement with a property order directing the entry of a QDRO providing that Farinas
would receive fifty-five percent of the retirement benefits Krushensky had accumulated during their
marriage. 1387 Eventually, Farinas filed a proposed QDRO that would grant her a QPSA containing separate
interests in Krushensky’s retirement accounts. 1388 Under a shared interest, Farinas’s interest in an account
would terminate if Krushensky died before retiring; under a separate interest, her interest would continue
regardless of Krushensky’s death. 1389 The QPSA would provide Farinas with an annuity in the event of
Krushensky’s pre-retirement death. 1390 Krushensky agreed to the separate interests, but argued that the
QPSA violated the property order and was unnecessary because of the separate interests. 1391 Nevertheless,
the superior court granted Farinas’s proposed QDRO. 1392 On appeal, the supreme court ruled that the
inclusion of a QPSA contradicted the parties’ settlement intent by changing Farinas’s entitlements in the
event of Krushensky’s death. 1393 Because of the QPSA, if Krushensky died before retiring, Farinas would
actually receive a total of 67.4% of his retirement benefits, and prejudicing future beneficiaries of
Krushensky. 1394 Additionally, the court stated that the QPSA was unnecessary because the separate interest
agreed upon protected Farinas in case of Krushensky’s death. 1395 Since the QDRO contradicted both the
parties’ expectations and the property order, the supreme court held that it could not be enforced. 1396 The
supreme court reversed the superior court, holding that a court may not enter a qualified domestic relations
order (“QDRO”) containing a qualified pre-retirement survivor annuity (“QPSA”), if doing so contradicts a
memorializing final property order and violates the parties’ prior agreement.1397
Littleton v. Banks
In Littleton v. Banks, 1398 the supreme court held that Alaska Rule of Civil Procedure 90.6(c)
requires a child custody investigator to disclose the existence of a personal association with an attorney in a
case on which she is working. 1399 Littleton challenged the superior court’s decision to grant Banks sole
custody of their daughter because the court admitted into evidence a report by a custody investigator who
failed to disclose that she had recently visited Peru with Banks’ attorney. 1400 The supreme court determined
that the investigator’s potential bias made it improper for the superior court to consider any of her
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findings. 1401 The court reasoned that the personal association between the custody investigator and Banks’
attorney could directly affect the investigator’s recommendations and therefore could have a direct effect
on the parties. 1402 However, the supreme court found that the record amply demonstrated that it was in the
child’s best interest for Banks to have sole custody and that the superior court did not abuse its discretion in
so deciding. 1403 Thus, the supreme court affirmed the superior court, holding that Rule 90.6(c) requires a
child custody investigator to disclose the existence of a personal association with an attorney in a case on
which she is working. 1404
Maisy W. v. State, Department of Health and Social Services
In Maisy W. v. State, Department of Health and Social Services, 1405 the supreme court held that
termination of parental custody was warranted when a parent with a history of neglect for her children
repeatedly failed to follow case plans developed by the Office of Children’s Services (“OCS”). 1406 A
mother appealed the judgment of the superior court that terminated her parental rights because she had
mentally injured and neglected her children and had a history of substance abuse. 1407 The superior court
also found termination was warranted because OCS had created and updated at least ten case plans for the
family, none of which the mother followed. 1408 The supreme court reasoned that the children needed aid
because their mother failed to follow any of the numerous case plans developed by OCS. 1409 The State
demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence that social workers made active efforts to provide
rehabilitation services and programs to the mother to try to prevent the breakup of the family. 1410 Because
the State had tried to assist the mother for several years, and she had refused to comply with case plans or
other rehabilitative services, the court found that the mother’s parental rights should be terminated. 1411 The
supreme court affirmed the superior court, holding that termination of parental custody was warranted
when a parent with a history of neglect for her children repeatedly failed to follow case plans developed by
OCS. 1412
McLane v. Paul
In McLane v. Paul, 1413 the supreme held that a court may not modify a child custody arrangement
when there had been no substantial change in circumstances. 1414 When Paul and McLane divorced, they
signed a custody agreement for their daughter Alexis. 1415 Under the plan, McLane would have custody
during the school year, while Paul would have custody during the summer. 1416 In 2007, Alexis spent time at
Paul’s residence in Illinois, and her parents eventually made arrangements for her to enroll in a local
school. 1417 Shortly after Alexis matriculated, McLane demanded her return to Alaska. 1418 On the basis of
the schooling arrangements, Paul filed a motion to modify custody. 1419 The superior court granted the
motion, which McLane appealed. 1420 The supreme court reasoned that in order to avoid disturbing a child
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with changes, a movant seeking to modify custody must prove that a substantial change in circumstances
has occurred. 1421 The court concluded that the plan for Alexis to attend school in Illinois had been an
experimental arrangement, not a substantial change in circumstances, 1422 and reasoned that if experimental
custody arrangements constituted substantial changes, it would discourage parents from granting each other
generous custody terms. 1423 The supreme court reversed the superior court, holding that a court may not
modify a child custody arrangement when there had been no substantial change in circumstances. 1424
Michele M. v. Richard R.
In Michele M. v. Richard R., 1425 the supreme court held that when making a child custody
determination, a court may: (1) emphasize a child’s educational needs so long as it also considers all other
relevant best interests factors, and (2) disregard the child’s stated preference to live with a particular parent,
but (3) must explicitly determine if a parent’s previous instance of domestic abuse triggers the statutory
presumption against awarding custody. 1426 Richard moved to gain full custody of his son Charles after
learning that he was doing poorly in school. 1427 The superior court awarded Richard full custody after
weighing the required statutory best interest factors. 1428 Michele, the child’s mother, appealed the decision,
claiming that the court: (1) placed too much weight on the child’s educational needs, (2) should have
allowed the child to live with whichever parent he preferred to live with, and (3) failed to properly consider
past allegations of domestic abuse against Richard. 1429 The supreme court determined that because Charles
was chronically absent from school and behind in his studies, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by
emphasizing his educational needs in making a custody determination. 1430 In addition, there was evidence
that Charles was immature and preferred living with his mother because she allowed him to skip school and
play hockey. 1431 Thus, the trial court need not give much weight to the child’s preference. 1432 Finally, the
court found that because § 25.24.150 of the Alaska Statutes creates a rebuttable presumption against
placing a child in the custody of a parent with a history of “perpetrating domestic violence,” the trial court
erred when it did not explicitly determine if the previous allegations against Richard constituted a history of
perpetrating domestic violence. 1433 The supreme court vacated and remanded to determine if the father had
a history of “perpetrating domestic violence,” holding that when making a child custody determination, a
court may: (1) emphasize a child’s educational needs so long as it also considers all other relevant best
interests factors, and (2) disregard the child’s stated preference to live with a particular parent, but (3) must
explicitly determine if a parent’s previous instance of domestic abuse triggers the statutory presumption
against awarding custody. 1434
Mikesell v. Waterman
In Mikesell v. Waterman, 1435 the supreme court held that a superior court may properly decline to
exercise jurisdiction in a child custody proceeding, even though Alaska was the child’s “home state,” for
purposes of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (“UCCJEA”). 1436 When
Mikesell and Waterman separated they agreed to alternate custody of their child on a yearly basis. 1437 Four
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years later, Mikesell, the father, began a custody hearing in Alaska, asking for sole custody of the child. 1438
Waterman, the mother, filed a separate custody action in New Mexico, and asked the Alaska court to
decline jurisdiction on Mikesell’s custody hearing on the grounds that it was an inconvenient forum. 1439
The superior court, despite finding that Alaska was the child’s “home state” under the UCCJEA, granted
Waterman’s motion without a hearing. 1440 Although Alaska courts generally give preference to home-state
jurisdiction in custody matters, a court may properly decline to exercise jurisdiction if other factors are
present. 1441 Since substantial evidence was available in New Mexico, and since the child and her mother
both had a significant connection to that state, 1442 the supreme court reasoned that the superior court had
adequate evidence to support its finding that declining to exercise jurisdiction in Alaska was proper. 1443
Thus, affirming the superior court, the supreme court held that a superior court may properly decline to
exercise jurisdiction in a child custody proceeding, even though Alaska was the child’s “home state,” for
purposes of the UCCJEA. 1444
Millette v. Millette
In Millette v. Millette 1445 the supreme court held that a modification of child support without a
valid motion would be retroactive and thus prohibited, even where circumstances have materially changed
and a modification would likely be permitted with a proper motion. 1446 Carol Jean and Matthew Millette
separated in June 2003. 1447 The couple had a son, Jesse. 1448 In August 2004, the superior court gave Carol
Jean interim sole legal and primary physical custody of Jessie. 1449 Following the order, Child Support
Services Division ordered that Matthew pay ninety dollars per month in child support. 1450 In October 2005,
the superior court entered a permanent custody award, and ordered Matthew to pay $348 in child support
retroactive to August 2004. 1451 Matthew appealed the child support award on the basis that it was
impermissibly retroactive. 1452 Citing precedent, the supreme court determined that the superior court erred
in ordering Matthew to pay a higher child support retroactive to August 2004.1453 The court determined that
modification of child support must be made pursuant to a valid motion, and that absent such motion a trial
court cannot modify child support payments even where circumstances have materially changed.1454 Since
Carol Jean did not file a motion for modification of child support until November 24, 2004, that was the
earliest possible date that the superior court could have ordered higher child support payments. 1455 Because
of this, the superior court erred in making the higher payments retroactive to August 2004. 1456 Thus, the
supreme court reversed the superior court’s child support award, holding that a modification of child
support without a valid motion would be retroactive and thus prohibited, even where circumstances have
materially changed and a modification would likely be permitted with a proper motion. 1457
Pam R. v. State, Department of Health and Social Services
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In Pam R. v. State, Department of Health and Social Services, 1458 the supreme court held that the
grandmother of two young children and an infant was not their “Indian custodian” under the Indian Child
Welfare Act (“ICWA”) when: (1) neither parent had transferred physical custody of the two older children
to the grandmother, and (2) the Office of Children’s Services (“OCS”) had assumed emergency custody of
the infant before the mother designated custody to the grandmother. 1459 Mark and Sally had three children,
each of whom was an “Indian child” within the meaning of the ICWA. 1460 The older two sons lived with
their maternal grandmother, an Alaska Native. 1461 After Sally gave birth to her third son, 1462 she obtained a
document indicating that the maternal grandmother was to be the infant’s “Indian custodian.” 1463 However,
OCS had already taken the infant into protective custody after he tested positive for cocaine. 1464 Sally
advocated for the maternal grandmother to be designated as the children’s “Indian custodian,” but both
Mark and the children’s guardian ad litem objected. 1465 The supreme court reasoned that since no state or
tribal court had placed legal custody of the children with the maternal grandmother, the grandmother could
only be an “Indian custodian” if the parents had transferred physical custody of the children to her. 1466 The
children had not been consistently or exclusively in the grandmother’s care, and the parents had maintained
both legal and physical custody over their children; 1467 as a result, the trial court’s finding that neither
parent had transferred physical control of the children to the grandmother was not clearly erroneous. 1468
The court also determined that OCS had assumed emergency custody of the infant before temporary
physical custody had been transferred to the grandmother. 1469 The supreme court affirmed the trial court’s
determination that the grandmother of two young children and an infant is not their “Indian custodian”
under the ICWA when: (1) neither parent had transferred physical custody of the two older children to the
grandmother, and (2) the OCS had assumed emergency custody of the infant before the mother designated
custody to the grandmother. 1470
Richardson v. Kohlin
In Richardson v. Kohlin, 1471 the supreme court held that a father’s unemployment and decreased
income constituted a material change in circumstances, which supported recalculation of his required child
support payments. 1472 After being laid off from his job, a father, Kohlin, moved to the Pacific Northwest
and was only able to find employment that paid about half of his previous salary. Kohlin sought to change a
child support order to reflect his lower income. 1473 Since Kohlin was unemployed at the time of the original
child support calculation, the mother, Richardson, argued his continued unemployment could not constitute
a material change of circumstances, and that Kohlin was voluntarily and unreasonably unemployed. 1474 In
finding for Kohlin, the superior court held the father’s significant reduction in income constituted a
material change of circumstances.1475 Because a material change of circumstances is defined as a difference
of at least fifteen percent between the support order amount and an amount calculated according to the
relevant formula, and because here that difference was forty percent, the supreme court held that the
standard for modification of child support payments was met. 1476 Further, the supreme court rejected the
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mother’s argument that the father’s unemployment was involuntary or unreasonable, because the father
actively sought high-paying work. 1477 The supreme court affirmed the superior court, holding that a father’s
unemployment and decreased income constituted a material change in circumstances, which supported
recalculation of his required child support payments. 1478
Robertson v. Riplett
In Robertson v. Riplett, 1479 the supreme court held that in a child custody case decided by a foreign
court, an Alaska court could not modify the foreign court’s decision since it lacks subject matter
jurisdiction, but it could enforce the decision and require the defendant to disclose his tax information. 1480
Robertson is a resident of Ohio, but his previous wife and their two children, of whom she had custody,
moved to Alaska. 1481 Prior to the move, an Ohio court issued a decision suspending Robertson’s visitation
rights until he took a psychological assessment and completed an anger management program. 1482 The
supreme court refused Robertson’s request to modify this decision because it lacked subject matter
jurisdiction; the Ohio court had not declined jurisdiction or determined that Alaska is a more convenient
forum. 1483 However, the supreme court held that Robertson must disclose his tax return to aid in enforcing
his child support obligation determined by the Ohio court. 1484 The supreme court affirmed the finding of
the superior court, holding that in a child custody case decided by a foreign court, a superior could not
modify the foreign court’s decision because it lacked subject matter jurisdiction, but it could enforce the
decision and require the defendant to disclose his tax information. 1485
Samuel H. v. State, Office of Children’s Services
In Samuel H. v. State, Office of Children’s Services, 1486 the supreme court held that termination of
a father’s parental rights was not warranted when his testimony indicated he had made efforts to secure his
daughter’s safety and care by making arrangements with the mother and both maternal grandparents. 1487
The Office of Children’s Services began a Child in Need of Aid (“CINA”) proceeding shortly after
Samuel’s daughter was born cocaine-positive. 1488 The child was placed in the maternal grandmother’s care
because Samuel was in prison at the time. 1489 The superior court terminated Samuel’s parental rights
because it found that he had not made adequate arrangements for his child’s care. 1490 Samuel appealed. 1491
The supreme court reasoned that adequate arrangements did not necessarily mean following a formal
procedure to begin legal proceedings for the placement of the child. 1492 The court concluded that the
father’s testimony that he had made efforts to make arrangements with the mother and the child’s maternal
grandparents demonstrated that Samuel had made adequate arrangements for his daughter. 1493 Reversing
the superior court, the supreme court held that termination of a father’s parental rights was not warranted
when his testimony indicated he had made efforts to secure his daughters safety and care by making
arrangements with the mother and both maternal grandparents. 1494
Sawicki v. Haxby
1477

Id. at 49.
Id. at 45, 49–50.
1479
194 P.3d 382 (Alaska 2008).
1480
Id. at 383.
1481
Id. at 383–84.
1482
Id. at 384.
1483
Id. at 385–86.
1484
Id. at 387.
1485
Id. at 383.
1486
175 P.3d 1269 (Alaska 2008).
1487
Id. at 1275.
1488
Id. at 1270.
1489
Id.
1490
Id. at 1271–72.
1491
Id. at 1272.
1492
Id. at 1275.
1493
Id.
1494
Id.
1478

84

In Sawicki v. Haxby, 1495 the supreme court held that in an action for reduction of child support, once
the custodial parent produced prima facie evidence that the supporting parent was underemployed, then the
burden of proof shifted to the supporting parent to contradict that evidence. 1496 Sawicki filed a motion for
reduction of child support after she quit a well-paying job for one that paid significantly less. 1497 She
switched jobs because the previous job had required too much travel. 1498 The court reasoned that prima
facie evidence from the custodial parent could consist of showing the change in jobs was
“unreasonable.” 1499 In determining whether someone is unreasonably employed, the court considered the
totality of the circumstances, including work history, prior income, qualifications, education and reasons
for leaving the job. 1500 The supreme court noted that in this case, Sawicki did not provide any evidence
supporting her assertion that her prior job required significant amounts of travel, and she contradicted
herself in her testimony. 1501 The supreme court affirmed the decision of the superior court and held that in
an action for reduction of child support, once the custodial parent produced prima facie evidence that the
supporting parent was underemployed, the burden of proof shifts to the supporting parent to contradict that
evidence. 1502
Seth D. v. State, Department of Health and Social Services
In Seth D. v. State, Department of Health and Social Services, 1503 the supreme court held that an
incarcerated father’s due process rights were not violated when his request for transport to a hearing on the
state’s petition to end his parental rights was denied. 1504 Seth had a history of drug use and incarceration for
drug possession and violation of probation. 1505 While in prison, the Office of Children’s Services filed a
petition to terminate Seth’s parental rights. 1506 Seth asked to be transferred so that he could attend the
hearing in person; his request was denied and he participated by phone until his sentence ended four days
into the trial, at which point he attended and testified in person. 1507 The supreme court ruled that there was
no violation of Seth’s due process rights because there is no procedural due process right for incarcerated
parents to be transported to their parental rights termination trials, and Seth testified in person after his
sentence ended. 1508 On the more general question of due process claims for Seth as a parent at termination
hearings, the court applied the Mathews v. Eldridge 1509 balancing test and again concluded that the denial
of the transport request did not violate Seth’s due process rights. 1510 However, the court warned that in the
future, opposition to transport motions must contain a specific showing about the burden of such
transport. 1511 Finally, the supreme court held that the lack of evidence supporting Seth’s argument
concerning his ability to participate via phone and in person sufficiently supported the lower court’s
decision to deny Seth’s transport request. 1512 The supreme court affirmed the superior court, holding that an
incarcerated father’s due process rights were not violated when his request for transport to a hearing on the
state’s petition to end his parental rights was denied. 1513
Skinner v. Hagberg
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In Skinner v. Hagberg, 1514 the supreme court held that: (1) a biological parent’s duty to pay child
support begins on his child’s date of birth, not when paternity is adjudicated; and (2) any deductions in
child support payments which are used to pay for visitation expenses must be on an actual dollar-for-dollar
basis. 1515 Skinner gave birth to a son in January 2002. 1516 Genetic testing conducted in May 2004
confirmed that Hagberg was the child’s biological father. 1517 During proceedings to determine legal and
physical custody arrangements for the child, the superior court ruled that Hagberg’s child support
obligation began when genetic testing confirmed that he fathered Skinner’s child. 1518 The superior court
also ordered that Skinner and Hagberg split visitation expenses equally. 1519 On appeal, the supreme court
noted that while paternity adjudication may be a prerequisite to enforcing a child support duty, Hagberg’s
duty to pay child support arose on his child’s date of birth. 1520 The court also reasoned that because
children are entitled to receive the full ordered amount of child support, any excess credit against
Hagberg’s payments that resulted in underpayment violated his son’s right to support. 1521 Thus, the only
way to ensure that the child receives all of the support to which he is entitled is to deduct visitation
expenses on an actual dollar-for-dollar, rather than estimated, basis.1522 Thus, the supreme court reversed
the superior court, holding that: (1) a biological parent’s duty to pay child support begins on his child’s date
of birth, not when paternity is adjudicated; and (2) any deductions in child support payments which are
used to pay for visitation expenses must be on an actual dollar-for-dollar basis. 1523
Smith v. Groleske
In Smith v. Groleske, 1524 the supreme court held that due process requires an evidentiary hearing
before a court may assess sanctions in a custody case when there are disputed issues of material fact in the
parties’ affidavits. 1525 After Groelske and Smith divorced, they established a custody agreement where the
children would live primarily with Smith, their mother, and would spend seven consecutive weeks of the
year with their father, Groelske. 1526 The children were scheduled to visit Groelske, and Smith became
concerned about who would be watching her children while they were with their father and advised
Groelske that she was preventing the children from visiting him. 1527 Without a hearing, the superior court
ordered a motion to enforce visitation, and awarded visitation damages of $5,502. 1528 The supreme court
determined there was a high risk that Smith’s important interest in not being assessed unwarranted and
chilling monetary sanctions could be compromised if the court was permitted to assess sanctions based
solely on conflicting affidavits. 1529 Since the fiscal and administrative burden of holding the evidentiary
hearing did not outweigh the benefits of possibly avoiding unwarranted sanctions, due process required that
Smith be afforded an evidentiary hearing. 1530 The supreme court overturned the superior court, holding that
due process requires an evidentiary hearing before the court may assess sanctions in a custody case when
there are disputed issues of material fact in the parties’ affidavits. 1531
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Smith v. Stafford
In Smith v. Stafford, 1532 the supreme court held that: (1) no cause of action existed for violation of
Child in Need of Aid (“CINA”) procedures when there was no relevant duty of care, (2) child social
workers were entitled to qualified but not absolute immunity from state law claims, and (3) a 42 U.S.C. §
1983 claim may be blocked by qualified immunity under federal law. 1533 Smith was the father of A.B., a
minor. 1534 After her birth, A.B. was taken from her parents’ custody and placed in the custody of the Office
of Child Services (“OCS”). 1535 OCS placed social worker Cox and supervisor Stafford in charge of the
claim. 1536 Cox required that Smith complete numerous detailed counseling requirements. 1537 The
relationship between the two gradually deteriorated to the point where Cox was removed from the case. 1538
Smith was eventually granted custody of A.B. and sued Stafford and Cox, alleging numerous violations of
CINA procedures, defamation and privacy torts, and violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 1539 The district court
dismissed the claims on defendants’ motion for summary judgment based on three alternative grounds. 1540
First, the court held that collateral estoppel barred all of Smith's claims. 1541 Second, at least qualified
immunity applied under federal law and barred Smith's § 1983 claim. 1542 Third, either absolute or qualified
official immunity applied and barred all of Smith's state law claims. 1543 On appeal, the supreme court
grouped Smith’s claims into three categories and evaluated the lower court’s grant of summary judgment
with regard to each. 1544 The supreme court found that the grant of summary judgment was appropriate
regarding Smith’s CINA claims because no duty of care had been violated. 1545 The court also found that
Stafford and Cox were entitled to official immunity for all actions taken within the scope of their duties, but
were not entitled to absolute immunity from Smith’s tort claims; absolute immunity was unnecessary to
protect social workers from lawsuits and denying all claims would prevent victims the opportunity to seek
redress. 1546 Therefore, the court found while most of Smith’s tort claims were barred by official immunity,
an issue of fact existed with regard to Smith’s invasion of privacy and defamation claims. 1547 Lastly,
summary judgment was appropriate for the § 1983 claim because it was barred by qualified immunity
under federal law. 1548 The supreme court vacated and remanded the superior court in part, holding that: (1)
no cause of action existed for violation of CINA procedures when there is no relevant duty of care, (2)
child social workers are entitled to qualified but not absolute immunity from state law claims, and (3) a 42
U.S.C. § 1983 claim may be blocked by qualified immunity under federal law. 1549
Tessa v. State, Department of Health and Social Services
In Tessa v. State, Department of Health and Social Services, 1550 the supreme court held that a
mother’s failure to remedy her conduct within a reasonable period of time, after having been given ample
opportunity to work on parenting skills, was grounds for the termination of custodial rights. 1551 Tessa’s
parental custody rights were terminated after an extensive and prolonged process during which child
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services attempted to reunite her and her daughter, who had been systematically abused. 1552 The trial court
separated Tessa from her daughter after determining that Tessa did not show any interest in improving her
parenting skills and did not recognize that she had emotional and mental problems that contributed to her
daughter’s physical and mental condition. 1553 After months of counseling, Tessa still would not
acknowledge that her daughter had been abused, and the court found this evinced a lack of concern for her
daughter’s welfare. 1554 The supreme court affirmed the decision of the superior court, holding that a
mother’s failure to remedy her conduct within a reasonable period of time, after having been given ample
opportunity to work on parenting skills, was grounds for the termination of custodial rights. 1555
Thomas v. State, Department of Health and Social Services
In Thomas v. State, Department of Health and Social Services, 1556 the supreme court held that the
parental rights of a father with a long history of substance abuse and incarceration should be terminated. 1557
Thomas H. was the father of two small children. 1558 At birth, the girls had traces of controlled substances in
their blood and the Office of Child Services (“OCS”) began its involvement with the children. 1559 Thomas
had been arrested twelve times since 2001and had a long history of substance abuse and incarceration,
although at the time of the trial he had been sober for two years. 1560 Thomas’s conduct before the trial led
the court to determine that he had failed to address the problems in a reasonable time as required in the
statute. 1561 Additionally, OCS had made active efforts to keep the family together, but Thomas’s actions,
especially his incarcerations, had frustrated OCS’s efforts. 1562 Lastly, the court held that allowing Thomas
back into the children’s life would likely result in physical or emotional harm to the children. 1563 The
supreme court affirmed the judgment of the superior court, holding that the parental rights of a father with a
long history of substance abuse and incarceration should be terminated. 1564
Tillmon v. Tillmon
In Tillmon v. Tillmon, 1565 the supreme court held that: (1) an individual is entitled to deduct certain
expenses from his income for child support calculations, and (2) a modified child support order can only be
retroactive back to the date of service. 1566 Clifton and Susan Tillmon filed for divorce after thirteen years of
marriage. 1567 Clifton objected to the court’s calculation of his child support obligation, arguing that it did
not include deductions for work-related daycare payments or involuntary retirement contributions, and that
it should be modified because the Tillmon’s oldest daughter had begun living with him. 1568 The supreme
court held that Clifton could deduct the daycare and retirement payments when calculating his child
support; since it could not determine whether the support award had included these deductions, the supreme
court remanded the issue of award size to the superior court. 1569 The supreme court also held that the
modified support order could be effective no earlier than the date when Clifton’s modification motion was
served, although it could begin later with good cause. 1570 In part affirming and in part remanding the
superior court, the supreme court held that: (1) an individual is entitled to deduct certain expenses from his
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income for child support calculations, and (2) a modified child support order can only be retroactive back
to the date of service. 1571
Worland v. Worland
In Worland v. Worland, 1572 the supreme court held that when a litigant unreasonably prolongs
litigation, a grant of attorney’s fees to the adverse party may be acceptable even if the motion for attorneys’
fees is not timely. 1573 After four hours of off-the-record settlement negotiations, the parties agreed on the
record to the terms of a divorce settlement. 1574 Weeks later, the husband, Charles, had a change of heart
regarding some of the terms previously agreed to. 1575 Charles argued that the original agreement omitted
material terms and thus was invalid. 1576 The superior court enforced the property settlement agreement and
awarded attorneys’ fees to Charles’s ex-wife, and Charles appealed. 1577 After reviewing Charles’s claims
about omitted terms, the supreme court found that the original agreement incorporated all material terms
and thus was valid. 1578 Moreover, the court held that because Charles unreasonably prolonged the litigation
with frivolous arguments, his ex-wife’s motion for attorneys’ fees was valid even though it was not timely
filed, because trial courts have some discretion over such filing deadlines. 1579 Affirming the superior court,
the supreme court held that when a litigant unreasonably prolongs litigation, a grant of attorney’s fees to
the adverse party may be acceptable even if the motion for attorneys’ fees is not timely. 1580

INSURANCE LAW
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
Certain Underwriters at Lloyds v. Inlet Fisheries, Inc.
In Certain Underwriters at Lloyds v. Inlet Fisheries, Inc., 1581 the Ninth Circuit held that: (1) the
federal maritime doctrine of uberrimae fidei applies to marine insurance contracts, (2) vessel pollution
insurance is a type of marine insurance for the purposes of uberrimae fidei, and (3) a vessel pollution policy
may be voided under uberrimae fidei for failure to disclose information material to the insurer’s risks. 1582
Inlet Fisheries, Inc. and Inlet Fish Producers, Inc. (“Inlet”) insured four vessels with a vessel pollution
policy from Lloyd’s of London (“Lloyd’s”). 1583 Inlet omitted several facts from its insurance application:
its then-current policy was at risk of cancellation for Inlet’s failure to survey its vessels and pay premiums,
its vessels had questionable seaworthiness, and a fifth Inlet vessel had been involved in two recent
environmental incidents. 1584 When Inlet filed a claim under its pollution policy, Lloyd’s launched an
investigation that uncovered the omissions. Lloyd’s then sought a declaratory judgment allowing it to void
the policy under uberrimae fidei. 1585 This doctrine obliges the insured to voluntarily disclose to the insurer
all information that is material in calculating an insurance risk. 1586 The district court held that uberrimae
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fidei applied and permitted Lloyd’s to void the contract. 1587 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that
Lloyd’s could void the policy if uberrimae fidei was an established federal admiralty rule that governed
Inlet’s policy. 1588 Since uberrimae fidei had existed in American law for two centuries and was still valid in
several Circuit Courts of Appeal, the Ninth Circuit found that it was an established rule and applied to
marine insurance contracts. 1589 Because vessel pollution policies share their general terms with typical
marine insurance policies, the court held that the similarities in these types of insurance meant that Inlet’s
policy could be characterized as marine insurance for the purposes of uberrimae fidei. 1590 Finally, the Ninth
Circuit reasoned that uberrimae fidei permitted an insurer to rescind a contract upon a showing that the
insured intentionally misrepresented facts or failed to disclose any material fact, regardless of intent. 1591
The court also reasoned that Lloyd’s had shown that information about Inlet’s previous insurers and vessel
conditions was material and because Inlet omitted this information on its application, Lloyd’s was entitled
to void its policy. 1592 The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court, holding that: (1) the federal maritime
doctrine of uberrimae fidei applies to marine insurance contracts, (2) vessel pollution insurance is a type of
marine insurance for the purposes of uberrimae fidei, and (3) a vessel pollution policy may be voided under
uberrimae fidei for failure to disclose information material to the insurer’s risks. 1593

Alaska Supreme Court
Amos v. Allstate Insurance Co
In Amos v. Allstate Insurance Co., 1594 the supreme court held that an insurance company may accept
late payment of an insurance premium to reinstate coverage for any future accidents without retroactively
reinstating coverage for the period of the lapsed payment. 1595 Tatum, a boat owner, was in an accident on
August 9, 2000, but his insurer, Allstate, contended that he did not have coverage since he was delinquent
in his payments. 1596 Allstate had previously sent Tatum notice that his policy would be cancelled as of July
15 if the full monthly payment was not paid. 1597 Tatum did not make the payment until August 14, five
days after the accident occurred. 1598 Allstate then notified Tatum that the policy had been canceled as of
July 15 and would be reinstated as of August 15—the date the payment was received. 1599 Tatum filed a
complaint against Allstate alleging breach of contract, negligence and bad faith. 1600 Allstate counterclaimed
for material misrepresentation and fraud because of backdated checks that Tatum attempted to introduce as
evidence. 1601 The trial court found that an insurance company cannot accept payment conditioned upon a
lapse in coverage unless that condition is in the policy, and that since Allstate had accepted the payment,
they are estopped from arguing that the policy lapsed. 1602 On appeal, the supreme court reversed the
decision of the trial court, holding that Tatum’s coverage had lapsed between July 15 and August 15. 1603
The court reasoned that under § 21.36.220(a)(1) of the Alaska Statutes, Allstate is allowed to cancel a
policy for nonpayment of premiums by written notice, which they provided in this case. 1604 The court
further reasoned that, although Allstate accepted payments subsequent to the accident, they made it clear
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that it would not afford retroactive coverage and was only to be effective from that day forward. 1605
Reversing the decision of the lower court, the supreme court held that an insurance company may accept
late payment of an insurance premium to reinstate coverage for any future accidents without retroactively
reinstating coverage for the period of the lapsed payment. 1606
Progressive Corp. v. Peter
In Progressive Corp. v. Peter, 1607 the supreme court held that: (1) Alaska Civil Rule 68 and §
09.30.065 of the Alaska Statutes require that an offer of judgment include every claim, (2) an underinsured
motorist (“UIM”) recovery may be considered in denying a request for Rule 68 fees, (3) a party may be
treated as a prevailing party if the recovery was not incidental and was related to the main focus of the
litigation, and, (4) awarding Alaska Civil Rule 82 (“Rule 82”) attorneys’ fees based on a UIM already
including attorneys’ fees is not necessarily duplicative. 1608 Peter was hit by a car and refused both offers of
his insurer, Progressive. 1609 The superior court held that the two offers were invalid; Progressive
appealed. 1610 Progressive argued that: (1) its offer of judgment satisfied Alaska Civil Rule 68 because it
satisfied the purposes and texts of Rule 68 and § 09.30.065, (2) its second offer was greater than the
judgments finally rendered, and (3) the Peters were not entitled to attorneys’ fees. 1611 The court found that
Rule 68 and § 09.30.065 required an offer to include every claim, 1612 and because Progressive’s first offer
did not include every claim and would not have ended the entire litigation, the first offer was invalid. 1613
The court next found that Progressive’s argument that the second offer was greater than the judgments—
because voluntary payments and partial settlements should not be the standard for evaluating offers of
judgment—would encourage abusive offer-of-judgment tactics. 1614 The court also determined that because
trial courts have broad discretion in determining which party “prevails,” and because the Peters needed
counsel in order to enforce the UIM payment, the trial court properly awarded attorneys’ fees both under
the terms of the UIM and Rule 82. 1615 Affirming the superior court, the supreme court held that: (1) Rule
68 and § 09.30.065 require that an offer of judgment include every claim, (2) a UIM recovery may be
considered in denying a request for Rule 68 fees, (3) a party may be treated as a prevailing party if the
recovery was not incidental and was related to the main focus of the litigation, and (4) awarding Rule 82
attorneys’ fees based on a UIM already including attorneys’ fees is not necessarily duplicative. 1616
Sidney v. Allstate Insurance Co.
In Sidney v. Allstate Insurance Co., 1617 the supreme court held that: (1) the provider of
underinsured motorist (“UIM”) coverage was liable only for the portion of damages in excess of available
liability insurance, (2) the provider was not liable for prejudgment interest and attorneys’ fees when the
insured party elected to forgo those add-ons on the initial settlement with the liability insurer, and (3) the
insured party was entitled to a pro rata share of attorneys’ fees. 1618 Sidney was injured when a car driven by
Kanteh struck her vehicle. 1619 Sidney received $25,000 from Allstate for medical payments, 1620 and Safeco,
Kanteh’s insurance company, paid Sidney $25,000 and assumed responsibility for the $25,000 medical
payments lien asserted by Allstate against Kanteh, resulting in a $50,000 net settlement to Sidney. 1621 An
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arbitrator awarded Sidney total damages of $118,432. 1622 The superior court reduced many of these
amounts, and both parties appealed, Sidney arguing for the original amounts and Allstate challenging the
superior court’s award of attorneys’ fees and interest. 1623 Under Alaska law, an injured party may
supplement available liability coverage by purchasing UIM insurance, though an injured person must
exhaust all available underlying policy limits before pursuing UIM benefits. 1624 Here, the supreme court
reduced Allstate’s liability by $50,000, reasoning that Allstate was only liable for the amount above the
$50,000 Sidney had already collected. 1625 The supreme court reasoned that since Sidney elected not to
pursue prejudgment interest and attorneys’ fees from Safeco in the initial settlement, she was not
underinsured for those amounts, and was thus not entitled to UIM recovery. 1626 Sidney, however, was
entitled to recover from Allstate a pro rata share of attorneys’ fees from pursuing the settlement, as the
settlement procured a direct benefit for Allstate. 1627 The supreme court affirmed in part and reversed in
part, holding that: (1) the provider of UIM coverage was liable only for the portion of damages in excess of
available liability insurance, (2) the provider was not liable for prejudgment interest and attorneys’ fees
when the insured party elected to forgo those add-ons on the initial settlement with the liability insurer, and
(3) the insured party was entitled to a pro rata share of attorneys’ fees. 1628
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Dowdy
In State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Dowdy, 1629 the supreme court held that
insurance policies that extend coverage to persons who are injured “in the same accident” cannot be
reasonably construed to refer to emotional injuries that result from viewing a dead or injured person away
from an accident scene. 1630 Asa and Barbara Dowdy suffered severe emotional distress as a result of their
daughter’s death in a traffic accident. 1631 The Dowdys were not at the scene of the accident. 1632 Their
personal insurance policy included underinsured motorist coverage with additional per-person policy limits
for individuals who are injured “in the same accident” as another person. 1633 The superior court found that
the Dowdys were injured in the same accident as their daughter and awarded them compensatory
damages. 1634 State Farm appealed. 1635 The supreme court reasoned that under the facts and circumstances
at issue, it was clear that “in the same accident” could not reasonably be construed to cover their emotional
distress claims. 1636 The Dowdys were not injured in, nor did they witness, the accident. 1637 Rather, the
Dowdys were injured as a result of the death of their daughter in an accident. 1638 The conclusion that either
Asa or Barbara Dowdy were injured “in the same accident” would stretch the meaning of the phrase
beyond any generally accepted usage. 1639 The supreme court reversed the superior court, holding that
insurance policies that extend coverage to persons who are injured “in the same accident” cannot be
reasonably construed to refer to emotional injuries that result from viewing a dead or injured person away
from an accident scene. 1640
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Whittier Properties, Inc. v. Alaska National Insurance. Co.
In Whittier Properties, Inc. v. Alaska National Insurance Co., 1641 the supreme court held that: (1)
gasoline leaking from a broken pipe constitutes a “pollutant” within the meaning of an insurance policy’s
language, and (2) it was therefore unreasonable to believe that damages from the leaked gasoline would be
covered by the insurance policies. 1642 The insured, owner of a gas station, had installed a 20,000 gallon
underground gasoline storage tank. 1643 The insurer issued the insured five liability insurance policies over
the course of the insured’s ownership of the station, each of which contained an absolute pollution
exclusion clause that explicitly excluded damages from pollutants. 1644 A year after the gas station closed,
local environmental authorities investigated the land and found almost a foot of free-standing gasoline as a
result of a broken pipe in the storage unit. 1645 A number of lawsuits were brought by the state and
neighbors who claimed property damage from the leak. 1646 The insured sought indemnity from the insurer,
who denied coverage, claiming the leaked gasoline was a pollutant that fell within the absolute pollution
exclusion clauses of the policies. 1647 The insured sued the insurer for various contract claims, after which
both parties moved for summary judgment, and the superior court granted the insurer’s motions. 1648 The
supreme court reasoned that contract exclusions should be construed narrowly in favor of the insured and
that most jurisdictions have found these clauses unambiguous; the clause here was unambiguous because
once the gasoline had leaked from the storage unit, it was useless and is therefore properly characterized as
a pollutant. 1649 Under Alaska’s doctrine of reasonable expectations, courts should construe insurance
policies to give effect to the insured’s reasonable expectations, but as determined by an objective
standard. 1650 Here, the insured’s expectations of coverage were not reasonable. 1651 The supreme court
affirmed the superior court, holding that: (1) gasoline leaking from a broken pipe constitutes a “pollutant”
within the meaning of an insurance policy’s language, and (2) it was therefore unreasonable to believe that
damages from the leaked gasoline would be covered by the insurance policies. 1652

NATIVE LAW
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
Stratman v. Leisnoi, Inc.
In Stratman v. Leisnoi, Inc., 1653 the Ninth Circuit held that a corporation can qualify as a
deficiency village corporation under the Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act (“ANILCA”)
even if the corporation does not meet the requirements established under the Alaska Native Claims
Settlement Act (“ANCSA”). 1654 In 1976, Stratman filed suit to enjoin the Department of the Interior from
issuing land to Leisnoi, Inc. on Kodiak Island because the village did not satisfy the ANCSA
requirements. 1655 ANILCA was passed by Congress in 1980 to settle any land disputes that remained after
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ANCSA. 1656 Stratman argued that the language of ANILCA incorporates the eligibility requirements of the
older ANCSA. 1657 The supreme court did not agree; the purpose of ANILCA was to facilitate the exchange
of deficiency lands as soon as possible, and therefore Leisnoi qualified as an eligible village regardless of
whether it met the ANCSA requirements. 1658 The court further held that Leisnoi’s eligibility under ANCSA
was irrelevant because courts must follow valid legislation even if Congress acted under a misapprehension
of fact or law. 1659 Thus, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal because a corporation can
qualify as a deficiency village corporation under ANILCA even if the corporation does not meet the
requirements established under ANCSA.

Alaska Supreme Court
Bodkin v. Cook Inlet Region, Inc.
In Bodkin v. Cook Inlet Region, Inc., 1660 the supreme court held that: (1) the Alaska Native Claims
Settlement Act (“ANCSA”) authorizes elder benefit programs that limit beneficiaries to elders who owned
original shares of stock, 1661 and (2) constitutional challenges to an act of Congress must first be made in a
federal court before a state court can exercise jurisdiction. 1662 Pursuant to ANCSA, Cook Inlet Region, Inc.
(“CIRI”) created an Elders Benefit Program that provided quarterly monetary payments to any shareholder
older than sixty-five years who received CIRI shares as an original enrollee. 1663 Several CIRI shareholders
who did not benefit from this arrangement challenged the plan, claiming: (1) ANCSA did not authorize
CIRI’s benefit plan, and (2) if ANCSA did authorize such a plan it would violate the Fifth Amendment’s
takings clause. 1664 The supreme court held that both the plain language and the legislative history of
ANCSA expressly permit such benefit plans. 1665 Also, the court found that because the federal Tucker Act
vests federal courts with jurisdiction over claims based upon an act of Congress, the State supreme court
did not have jurisdiction to hear the constitutional challenges. 1666 The supreme court affirmed the superior
court, holding that: (1) the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (“ANCSA”) authorizes elder benefit
programs that limit beneficiaries to elders who owned original shares of stock, 1667 and (2) constitutional
challenges to an act of Congress must first be made in a federal court before a state court can exercise
jurisdiction. 1668
Starr v. George
In Starr v. George, 1669 the supreme court held that an adoption proceeding in a tribal council was
not enforceable in state court on the basis of full faith and credit when an interested party to the proceeding
did not receive proper notice of the tribal council’s hearings. 1670 The Starrs adopted two of their
grandchildren through proceedings in their local tribal council. 1671 When the tribal adoptions took place,
the Starrs and the children’s other grandparents, the Georges, were fighting in state court over custody and
guardianship of the children. 1672 The Starrs attempted to use the tribal adoption to dismiss the state court
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proceedings, but the trial court refused and granted custody to the Georges. 1673 The Starrs appealed,
claiming that the tribal council’s decision was entitled to full faith and credit in state courts.1674 Citing
precedent, the supreme court first determined that the Indian Child Welfare Act’s divorce exception does
not extend to custody disputes between grandparents or other members of a child’s extended family. 1675
The court then found that the Georges’ involvement in state custody proceedings entitled them to notice of
the tribal council’s adoption proceedings. 1676 Since the Georges never received notice, their due process
rights were violated. 1677 The court reasoned that just as Alaska is not required to give full faith and credit to
procedurally deficient decisions in other states, it is also not required to do so for procedurally deficient
tribal council proceedings. 1678 Thus, the supreme court affirmed the superior court’s order denying the
Starrs’ motion to dismiss their child custody case, holding that an adoption proceeding in a tribal council
was not enforceable in state court on the basis of full faith and credit when an interested party to the
proceeding did not receive proper notice of the tribal council’s hearings. 1679
Wilson v. State
In Wilson v. State, 1680 the supreme court held that the Office of Child Services (“OCS”) complied
with the Indian Child Welfare Act (“ICWA”) by making active efforts to keep a family together before
filing to retain custody of four children. 1681 OCS learned that four Alaska Native children were living in a
physically abusive home, and OCS removed them from their parents’ custody. 1682 After obtaining
temporary custody over the children, OCS devised and attempted to implement a rehabilitation plan for the
parents—an ICWA requirement before OCS can file for permanent custody. 1683 The parents would not
comply with the OCS plan, refusing to attend classes and failing to comply with the terms of the OCSsupervised visits with the children. 1684 The superior court granted the OCS request for full custody, finding
that the efforts made by OCS constituted “active efforts” under the ICWA. 1685 The supreme court agreed
and rejected the father’s argument that OCS had not complied with ICWA; the court emphasized that OCS
continued working with the parents despite the father’s repeated violent threats against OCS social
workers. 1686 Moreover, OCS attempted to give the parents financial assistance so that they could afford to
drive to parenting classes and visitations, and OCS workers went beyond their normal operating procedures
to organize OCS-supervised visitations for the mother. 1687 Therefore, these sincere actions constituted
“active efforts” under the ICWA, even though they were unsuccessful. 1688 The supreme court affirmed the
superior court, holding that OCS complied with the ICWA by making active efforts to keep a family
together before filing to retain custody of four children. 1689

PROPERTY LAW
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Alaska Supreme Court
Black v. Municipality of Anchorage, Board of Equalization
In Black v. Municipality of Anchorage, Board of Equalization, 1690 the supreme court held that land
under and around an owner’s condominium was a limited common element associated with the
condominium unit and was therefore subject to taxation. 1691 Anchorage assessed taxes for the land around a
condominium unit, 1692 and Black appealed, claiming that he did not own the land and should not have to
pay taxes on it. 1693 The supreme court reasoned that under Alaska law, limited common elements attached
to condominiums. 1694 Since the owners’ treatment of the land indicated it was reserved for the use of one or
more (but less than all) owners, 1695 the land was thus a limited common element attributable to the owner
of the condominium unit attached to the land. 1696 Anchorage was therefore permitted to tax Black for both
the condominium unit and the limited common element. 1697 Further, Anchorage was taxing Black for the
limited common element, just as it did for any other condominium owner, so the tax did not violate his
equal protection rights. 1698 The supreme court affirmed the superior court’s ruling that the land under and
around the owner’s condominium was a limited common element associated with the condominium unit,
and was therefore subject to taxation. 1699
Griswold v. City of Homer
In Griswold v. City of Homer, 1700 the supreme court held that an initiative amending the city’s
zoning code was invalid because the City Council did not have the authority to pass zoning amendments
without involving the Advisory Planning Commission. 1701 The residents of Homer approved an initiative
increasing the floor area limitations for retail and wholesale stores in the Commercial District to 66,000
square feet. 1702 Griswold, a Homer resident, filed suit, claiming that the initiative was invalid. 1703 The
supreme court reasoned that the Alaska Statutes required that the city’s Advisory Planning Commission
have an active role in developing a comprehensive plan for reviewing zoning recommendations, to
reinforce their role in implementing organized social development. 1704 Since the initiatives approved by the
City Council bypassed the Planning Commission entirely, the zoning by initiative was invalid. 1705 The
supreme court reversed the superior court, holding that an initiative amending the zoning code was invalid
because the City Council did not have the authority to pass zoning amendments without involving the
Advisory Planning Committee. 1706
Vanek v. State, Board of Fisheries
In Vanek v. State, Board of Fisheries, 1707 the supreme court held that fishing permits issued by the
Alaska Commercial Fishing Entry Commission (“CFEC”) were not property interests under the Takings
Clauses of the Federal and Alaska Constitutions. 1708 After commercial fishery regulations were repeatedly
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changed between 1996 and 2005 to limit the salmon harvest and shorten the commercial fishing season,
commercial salmon fishers sued the State for the unconstitutional taking of private property for public use
without just compensation. 1709 The superior court granted the State’s motion to dismiss, and the fishers
appealed. 1710 The supreme court reasoned that the CFEC permits were not private property under the
takings clauses because: (1) § 16.43.150(e) of the Alaska Statutes defined an entry permit as a “use
privilege,” 1711 (2) characterizing CFEC permits as private property would violate §§ 3 and 5 of Article VIII
of the Alaska Constitution, 1712 and (3) past case law did not support characterizing CFEC permits as
property for purposes of the Takings Clauses. 1713 With regard to the prior case law, the court had
previously characterized CFEC permits as property for purposes of Inheritance and the Due Process
Clauses of the Alaska Constitution, but distinguished the same permits for purposes of the Takings
Clauses. 1714 Affirming the superior court, the supreme court held that fishing permits issued by CFEC were
not property interests under the Takings Clauses of the Federal and Alaska Constitutions. 1715

TORT LAW
United States Supreme Court
Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker
In Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 1716 the United States Supreme Court held that: (1) the Clean
Water Act’s (“CWA”) water pollution penalties did not preempt punitive damage awards in maritime spill
cases, 1717 and (2) punitive damages cannot exceed compensatory damages in maritime cases. 1718 The
Exxon Valdez ran aground on a reef and spilled eleven million gallons of crude oil into Prince William
Sound. 1719 In the aftermath of the disaster, a group of commercial fishermen, Native Alaskans, and
landowners brought a class action suit to recover for their economic losses stemming from the oil spill. 1720
A jury ultimately awarded the plaintiffs $287 million in compensatory damages and $5 billion in punitive
damages. 1721 Exxon appealed the punitive damages award, claiming that the CWA foreclosed the award of
punitive damages and that the punitive damages award was excessive as a matter of maritime common
law. 1722 In determining whether the CWA foreclosed the award of punitive damages, the Supreme Court
noted that the statute allowed compensatory damages for injuries resulting from oil spills and other water
pollution. 1723 The Court decided that it would be untenable to claim that the CWA preempted punitive
damages but not compensatory damages. 1724 Since nothing in the statute pointed to that result, the Court
rejected Exxon’s attempt to sever the punitive damage remedy from the causes of action under the
CWA. 1725 Further, the Court observed that the CWA did not contain a clear indication of congressional
intent to preempt punitive damages, nor was it likely that the CWA’s remedial scheme would be frustrated
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by allowing punitive damages for private harms. 1726 Thus, punitive damages were allowed against
Exxon. 1727 The Court also addressed the issue of whether the punitive damages leveled against Exxon were
excessive. The Court reviewed three different approaches to arrive at a standard for assessing maritime
punitive damages before ultimately deciding that punitive damages awards should be pegged to
compensatory damages in a fixed ratio. 1728 In determining what would constitute a proper ratio, the Court
relied on studies of punitive damages awards in thousands of cases. 1729 Because the median ratio of
punitive damages to compensatory damages in those studies was 0.65:1, the Court determined that punitive
damages should not exceed compensatory damages in maritime cases. 1730 The United States Supreme
Court reversed the punitive damages award against Exxon, holding that: (1) the CWA water pollution
penalties did not preempt punitive damage awards in maritime spill cases, 1731 and (2) punitive damages
cannot exceed compensatory damages in maritime cases. 1732

Alaska Supreme Court
Burnett v. Covell
In Burnett v. Covell, 1733 the supreme court held that: (1) the doctrine of strict products liability
does not extend to business owners who have furniture that clients may use, and (2) a plaintiff in a
negligence claim must show that evidence can be produced that would enable a jury to decide whether the
defendant has breached his duty of care. 1734 Burnett visited Covell, his lawyer, for a meeting in Covell’s
office. 1735 Burnett sat on one of Covell’s chairs and it broke, prompting Burnett to sue Covell under the
doctrines of strict products liability and negligence. 1736 The superior court granted Covell summary
judgment on the strict products liability claim and partial summary judgment on the negligence claim. 1737
The supreme court affirmed on both counts. 1738 First, strict products liability only extends to parties who
have placed a product in the stream of commerce. 1739 Offering a chair for clients to use while in a business
owner’s office does not place the chair in the stream of commerce, and therefore Covell could not be liable
under strict products liability. 1740 Second, a plaintiff in a negligence action must have evidence that the
defendant had actual or constructive knowledge of the alleged danger. 1741 Burnett did not have any
evidence that the chair had shown signs of deterioration or that it was common practice to replace chairs
once they have reached a particular age, and therefore there was no evidence to suggest that Covell had
actual or constructive knowledge of the chair’s dangerous condition. 1742 Thus, the supreme court affirmed
the decision of the superior court, holding that: (1) the doctrine of strict products liability does not extend to
business owners who have furniture that clients may use, and (2) a plaintiff in a negligence claim must
show that evidence can be produced that would enable a jury to decide whether the defendant has breached
his duty of care. 1743
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Capolicchio v. Levy
In Capolicchio v. Levy, 1744 the supreme court held that the superior court was not obliged to
instruct a pro se litigant on his right to file a response to a motion for summary judgment. 1745 Capolicchio, a
short-term resident of a homeless shelter, was denied entrance and evicted after violating the shelter’s
policies against alcohol consumption and misconduct. 1746 Capolicchio, acting pro se, filed suit for
discrimination and harassment. 1747 The superior court did not inform Capolicchio of his right to respond to
a motion for summary judgment, and granted summary judgment and attorneys’ fees to the defendants. 1748
The supreme court found that the superior court was not required, under Bauman, to notify a pro se litigant
of his right to file when he has filed nothing. 1749 The court found that the lower court properly found no
prima facie case for discrimination because Capolicchio failed to deny Levy’s allegations that his eviction
occurred for violating shelter rules. 1750 Therefore, the lower court’s decision did not violate Capolicchio’s
constitutional rights. 1751 Affirming the superior court, the supreme court held that the superior court was
not obliged to instruct a pro se litigant on his right to file a response to a motion for summary judgment. 1752
Edenshaw v. Safeway, Inc.
In Edenshaw v. Safeway, Inc, 1753 the supreme court held that actual or constructive notice of a
hazardous condition is not an element of a prima facie case in a slip-and-fall action against a grocery store
owner. 1754 Edenshaw slipped and fell at a grocery store owned by Safeway, Inc. 1755 Safeway removed the
case to federal court and moved for summary judgment on the grounds that: (1) it fulfilled its duty of care
with a “regularized method of finding hazards,” and (2) it had no notice of the hazard in the location of the
fall. 1756 After denial of the motion for summary judgment and motion for reconsideration, Safeway moved,
under Alaska Rule of Appellate Procedure 407, to certify the question of whether or not notice of an unsafe
condition is an element of a prima facie case in slip-and-fall actions. 1757 The supreme court rejected the
argument that the rule from road hazard cases—that actual or constructive notice to the state of a dangerous
condition was a necessary element for proving the negligent maintenance of a road—should be extended to
injuries in grocery stores. 1758 Rather, noting the differences between a highway and a grocery store, the
supreme court applied the previously established general rule of negligence, requiring reasonableness in the
maintenance of property in light of all circumstances. 1759 The supreme court held that actual or constructive
notice of a hazardous condition is not an element of a prima facie case in a slip-and-fall action against a
grocery store owner. 1760
Estate of Logusak ex rel. Logusak v. City of Togiak
In Estate of Logusak ex rel. Logusak v. City of Togiak, 1761 the supreme court held that: (1) police
officers did not breach their duty to protect a girl when they acted reasonably in releasing her to her
parents, and (2) the officers were immune from suit for their discretionary acts. 1762 Sixteen-year-old
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Logusak killed herself shortly after being released to her parents from police custody. 1763 Her parents sued
the city, alleging the police officers were negligent in failing to keep their daughter in protective
custody. 1764 The supreme court reasoned that because the officers acted reasonably in releasing Logusak to
her parents and because her parents failed to show that there was a lawful reason to keep her in custody, the
officers did not breach their duty. 1765 Additionally, because Logusak’s parents failed to show the officers’
decision was capricious or malicious, the decision was an exercise of discretion and thus immune under
discretionary function official immunity. 1766 The supreme court affirmed the superior court’s grant of
summary, holding that: (1) police officers did not breach their duty to protect a girl when they acted
reasonably in releasing her to her parents, and (2) the officers were immune from suit for their discretionary
acts. 1767
Jarvill v. Porky's Equipment, Inc.
In Jarvill v. Porky’s Equipment, Inc., 1768 the supreme court held that in products liability cases, the
statute of limitations begins to run when the injury or damage is suffered. 1769 Jarvill contracted with Haag,
an employee of Porky’s, to construct a boat for $90,000. 1770 In order to secure financing, Jarvill hired an
inspector who noted that the hull needed external support. 1771 Less than three years after purchase, the boat
sank while at the dock. 1772 Jarvill sued, claiming product defect, breach of warranty, and negligence. 1773
The superior court found that the two-year statute of limitations had expired because it had started running
when Jarvill’s agent, the inspector, knew that no external support for the hull had been provided. 1774 The
supreme court noted that short statutes of limitations should be construed narrowly, and that the statute of
limitations begins to run when the damage is suffered, rather than at the time of sale, since the right of
action begins only when the damages actually occur. 1775 Since the damages began accruing with the
sinking of the ship, so too did the statute of limitations. 1776 The fact that Jarvill’s agent knew of problems
did not begin the statute of limitations because no damage had been suffered at that point. 1777 Reversing the
superior court in relevant part, the supreme court held that in products liability cases, the statute of
limitations begins to run when the injury or damage is suffered. 1778
Maddox v. Hardy
In Maddox v. Hardy, 1779 the supreme court held that a bill of sale was sufficient to constitute
transfer of title, preventing the transferor from joint and several liability resulting from use of the property
after the transfer. 1780 Lorenz, Maddox’s neighbor, started a large fire to remove debris and garbage from
her property, causing embers, smoke, and pieces of metal from the fire to land on Maddox’s property,
covering it with ash. 1781 Maddox asserted multiple tort claims against Lorenz, including nuisance,
negligence, and offensive contact, and asked for compensatory and punitive damages. 1782 Maddox also
attempted to impose joint and several liability on Hardy, because Hardy had sold the property to Lorenz
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prior to the fire but had not yet executed and recorded the quitclaim deed.1783 The jury found Lorenz and
another co-defendant partially liable in nuisance, but declined to allocate any fault to Hardy.1784 The
supreme court refused to impose joint and several liability on Hardy, holding that execution of the bill of
sale was sufficient to transfer title to Lorenz. 1785 Affirming the superior court in relevant part, the supreme
court held that a bill of sale was sufficient to constitute transfer of title, preventing the transferor from joint
and several liability resulting from use of the property after the transfer. 1786
Moore v. Peak Oilfield Service Co.
In Moore v. Peak Oilfield Service Co., 1787 the supreme court held that: (1) a driving while
intoxicated conviction (“DWI”) establishes that the driver was reckless and negligent as a matter of law,
and (2) whether the driver’s recklessness and negligence legally caused the accident is a genuine issue of
material fact that precludes summary judgment. 1788 Moore’s car overturned and his passenger was seriously
injured when he hit a dead moose in the road, which had been struck and killed by a truck owned by Peak
Oilfield Service (“Peak”). 1789 Moore’s passenger sued Peak, who filed a third-party claim against Moore
for comparative fault because the appellant was convicted of driving while intoxicated during the
accident. 1790 A jury found Peak not liable, but did not reach the question of Moore’s comparative fault in
causing the accident. 1791 After an appeal and remand, the jury found Peak liable and Peak appealed, arguing
that Moore’s DWI established that he was reckless and negligent as a matter of law. 1792 The supreme court
reasoned that if a defendant pleaded no contest to a serious crime and had a fair trial leading to a
conviction, he is precluded from denying an element of a civil action that the conviction establishes. 1793
Because a DWI is a serious crime, and the appellant did not contest it after a fair trial, the DWI established
that Moore was reckless and negligent. 1794 Moore may still argue that his recklessness and negligence was
not the legal cause of the accident, but he cannot contest that he was reckless and negligent. 1795 The
supreme court reversed the superior court’s denial of partial summary judgment and remanded the case to
the superior court, holding that: (1) a DWI establishes that the driver was reckless and negligent as a matter
of law; and (2) whether the driver’s recklessness and negligence legally caused the accident is a genuine
issue of material fact that precludes summary judgment. 1796
Noffke v. Perez
In Noffke v. Perez, 1797 the supreme court held that: (1) a court may not exclude medical records as
hearsay when the records meet the business exception to the hearsay rule and exclusion prejudices the party
trying to enter the evidence, (2) a court may require an expert witness to produce tax returns for himself
and his employer when their probative value outweighs privacy concerns, and (3) compliance with the
posted speed limit does not ipso facto rule out negligence. 1798 Jose Perez, the injured driver of a car, and his
passenger, Neyda Perez, sued Dora Noffke, the driver of a car that struck Perez’s vehicle in May 2003. 1799
Noffke conceded negligence but the jury determined the legal cause of injury and damages. 1800 The jury
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awarded $102,000 to the Perezes and the trial court entered final judgment in January 2006. 1801 Noffke
appealed, arguing that: (1) certain exhibits should have been admitted as evidence and not treated as
hearsay, and (2) his expert witness and the witness’s employer should not have to submit their tax
returns. 1802 The supreme court held that the medical records met the foundational requirements for the
business exception to the hearsay rule and that Perez waived any authenticity or foundation objections
during the pretrial conference. 1803 The supreme court also held that the lower court’s error prejudiced
Noffke because her defense focused on the Perezes’ preexisting medical conditions, which could not be
fully demonstrated without the records. 1804 Additionally, the supreme court held that the risk of bias
outweighed privacy concerns regarding disclosure of the expert witness’s tax returns, and thus the tax
returns were discoverable. 1805 Lastly, the supreme court held that the trial court erred when it granted a
directed verdict in favor of Perez on the issue of comparative negligence. 1806 The question to be evaluated
was whether a jury could have found Jose Perez breached his duty to drive safely in light of the road
conditions, road work, and speed at which other nearby cars were traveling. 1807 The mere fact of
compliance with the speed limit did not mean Perez was not a negligent driver. 1808 In part affirming and in
part reversing the superior court, the supreme court held that: (1) a court may not exclude medical records
as hearsay when the records meet the business exception to the hearsay rule and exclusion prejudices the
party trying to enter the evidence, (2) a court may require an expert witness to produce tax returns for
himself and his employer when their probative value outweighs privacy concerns, and (3) compliance with
the posted speed limit does not ipso facto rule out negligence. 1809
Rhodes v. Erion
In Rhodes v. Erion, 1810 the supreme court held that an award of attorneys’ fees under Alaska Civil
Rule 82 (“Rule 82”) may be proper when the grant of attorneys’ fees will not impair access to the courts,
even when the fees are greater than the amount in controversy. 1811 Rhodes sued Erion after a car accident,
and Erion made three offers of judgment under Alaska Civil Rule 68 (“Rule 68”), which Rhodes failed to
accept. 1812 The jury ultimately awarded Rhodes $18,281.85 in past damages and no future losses. 1813 With
prejudgment interest, attorneys’ fees and court costs, Rhode’s verdict totaled $27,016.12, which was at
least five percent less favorable than an earlier offer of $30,000. 1814 Erion moved for attorney’s fees under
Rule 68 and Rhodes requested that the superior court apply Civil Rule 82 to reduce the award. 1815 The trial
judge held that Rule 82 did not require the court to deny Erion attorneys’ fees and the court later denied
Rhodes’s motion for reconsideration, finding Erion’s award reasonable because of Rhodes’ vigorous
prosecution. 1816 On appeal, Rhodes argued that the court should reduce Erion’s award because Erion spent
more on her defense than the amount in controversy. 1817 The supreme court held a reduction was not
warranted because the attorneys’ fees accumulated by Erion were largely due to Rhodes’ continued
prosecution and pursuit of a large verdict. 1818 The supreme court considered the award under Civil Rule
82(b)(3)(I)–(J) and determined the award would not deter similarly situated litigants from future, voluntary
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use of the courts. 1819 Affirming the superior court, the supreme court held that an award of attorneys’ fees
under Rule 82 may be proper when the grant of attorneys’ fees will not impair access to the courts, even
when the fees are greater than the amount in controversy. 1820
Sheldon v. City of Ambler
In Sheldon v. City of Ambler, 1821 the supreme court held that a police officer had qualified
immunity in an excessive force claim when the officer reasonably believed that his use of force during an
arrest was lawful. 1822 Sheldon was found intoxicated in public, beating his girlfriend, and refusing to let her
to go home. Officer Jones told Sheldon to let the woman leave. 1823 When Sheldon refused, Jones secured
Sheldon in a “bear hug” and threw him to the ground to arrest him. 1824 Sheldon’s head struck the ground,
and he later died from his injuries. 1825 Sheldon’s family sued Jones for excessive force, but the superior
court held that Jones had qualified immunity because he reasonably believed that his use of force was
lawful. 1826 The supreme court affirmed this decision, modifying its earlier decision in Samaniego v. City of
Kodiak 1827 to remove ambiguity. 1828 The Samaniego decision could have been read to require an officer’s
use of force be objectively reasonable. 1829 The supreme court held that qualified immunity only requires a
police officer to have a reasonable belief that his actions are lawful, even if they are not objectively
reasonable. 1830 Because there was no indication that Jones should have been aware that placing Sheldon in
a bear hug and throwing him to the ground constituted excessive force, it was reasonable for him to believe
that his actions were lawful. 1831 Thus, the supreme court affirmed the superior court, holding that a police
officer had qualified immunity in an excessive force claim when the officer reasonably believed that his use
of force during an arrest was lawful. 1832
Southern Alaska Carpenters Health and Security Trust Fund v. Jones
In Southern Alaska Carpenters Health and Security Trust Fund v. Jones, 1833 the supreme court
held that a state law claim for negligent misrepresentation is not preempted by the Federal Employee
Retirement Income Security Act (“ERISA”). 1834 Jones was told by his employer and a union-sponsored
trust that he was covered by health insurance when in fact he was not. 1835 Jones sued the employer and the
trust for negligent misrepresentation; the superior court found in favor of Jones and awarded compensatory
damages, including damages for emotional distress. 1836 On appeal, the employer and trust argued that
Jones’s claim was barred by § 412 of ERISA and that damages for emotional distress should not have been
granted because there was no physical injury and neither the employer nor the trust owed a duty of care to
Jones. 1837 The supreme court reasoned that Jones was not a participant or beneficiary of an ERISA plan,
preemption would deny Jones recovery for his injuries, and negligent misrepresentation is an area
traditionally of state concern. 1838 Thus, affirming the superior court, the supreme court held that a state law
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claim for negligent misrepresentation is not preempted by the Federal Employee Retirement Income
Security Act (“ERISA”). 1839

Sowinski v. Walker
In Sowinski v. Walker, 1840 the supreme court held that: (1) a dram shop is liable only for its share
of fault in actions involving minors’ use of alcohol they illegally purchased from the shop; (2) a tort
defendant may not receive a reduction in damages based on a pre-trial settlement by another defendant; (3)
the estate of a decedent without a spouse, children, or dependents may not recover damages for loss of
enjoyment of life; and (4) the non-dependent sibling of a wrongful death victim may not assert a wrongful
death claim for non-pecuniary harm. 1841 Minors Vaughn and Walker died when their ATV struck a cable
stretched across an access road. 1842 The families of Vaughn and Walker sued DelRois Liquor Store, which
had sold alcohol to the boys and, the jury concluded, was 35% at fault for the accident. 1843 The trial judge,
reasoning that comparative negligence was not a defense under Alaska Statutes and case law, combined the
jury’s finding of 35% liability for DelRois with the 27% liability the jury placed on Vaughn and Walker
and held DelRois responsible for 62% of the verdict. 1844 The supreme court held that the enactment of pure
several liability in § 09.65.210 of the Alaska Statutes meant that a dram shop owner who sold alcohol to
minors would be liable for only its own share of fault, so DelRois should only pay for its own 35% of the
fault. 1845 Turning to the pre-trial settlements, the court ruled that the statute implementing several liability
mandated an award corresponding to each defendant’s share of fault and reasoned that denying a reduction
of the award would encourage settlements while denying a windfall to non-settling plaintiffs. 1846 Thus, the
court held that the superior court correctly denied DelRois a reduction for the other defendants’ pre-trial
settlements. 1847 Regarding the jury’s award for loss of enjoyment of life, the supreme court noted that
Alaska’s wrongful death claim statute limited an estate’s recovery to pecuniary losses where the decedent
has no spouse, children, or dependents. 1848 Because these decedents had no spouses, children, or
dependents, and, according to the court, the intangible loss of enjoyment of life is non-pecuniary harm, the
court held that the families could not recover damages for loss of enjoyment of life. 1849 The supreme court
also vacated the jury’s award to Walker’s sister for emotional harm resulting from Walker’s death because
the wrongful death claim statute unambiguously barred non-pecuniary claims by non-dependent
siblings. 1850 Thus, vacating the judgment of the superior court and remanding the case for modifications,
the supreme court held that: (1) a dram shop is liable only for its share of fault in actions involving minors’
use of alcohol they illegally purchased from the shop; (2) a tort defendant may not receive a reduction in
damages based on a pre-trial settlement by another defendant; (3) the estate of a decedent without a spouse,
children or dependents may not recover damages for loss of enjoyment of life; and (4) the non-dependent
sibling of a wrongful death victim may not assert a wrongful death claim for non-pecuniary harm. 1851
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Wilson
In State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Wilson, 1852 the supreme court held that when
determining excess damages for underinsured motorist (“UIM”) claims, the insured’s damages should be
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considered in the aggregate unless there are compelling reasons to do otherwise. 1853 During the course of
his employment, Wilson suffered injuries in a car accident while riding as a passenger. 1854 An arbitration
panel determined that Wilson’s co-worker, the driver, was 40% at fault, while the driver of the other
vehicle was 60% at fault. 1855 The panel also determined the amount of damages Wilson suffered, consisting
of general damages and lost wages. 1856 Wilson received worker’s compensation as a result of his
employer’s immunity and received the maximum amount of liability insurance the other driver had in
coverage. 1857 However, the total amount received was less than the total amount of damages determined by
the arbitration panel. 1858 Wilson was also eligible for UIM coverage through his co-worker’s insurance
policy. 1859 But the insurer disputed the amount to be paid under the UIM statute. 1860 The insurer argued on
appeal that the lost wages and general damages should be considered separately when determining excess
damages under the statute. 1861 The supreme court rejected this argument, reasoning that the policy rationale
for the UIM statute was to fully compensate the injured after all available liability coverage had been
exhausted, while preventing the injured from receiving double recovery. 1862 Affirming the superior court,
the supreme court held that when determining excess damages for UIM claims, the insured’s damages
should be considered in the aggregate unless there are compelling reasons to do otherwise. 1863

Alaska Court of Appeals
Savely v. State
In Savely v. State, 1864 the court of appeals held that in order to form a reasonable estimate of future
expenses in a restitution case, courts should look to evidence regarding the victim’s current condition and
likely cost and duration of possible future treatments. 1865 Savely was convicted of contributing to the
delinquency of a minor for having sexual intercourse with a fourteen-year old girl. 1866 As part of his plea
bargain with the State, Savely agreed to pay restitution in an amount determined by the court for past and
future expenses such as medical treatment and counseling. 1867 The superior court found that Savely had
infected the minor with herpes and ordered him to pay approximately $40,000 in restitution. 1868 Despite
Savely’s claim that he was not the source of the herpes, the court of appeals found sufficient evidence to
support the conclusion that Savely had infected the minor with herpes. 1869 However, the court also held that
the restitution charges were invalid. 1870 According to the court, the psychologist who made the
recommendation about the cost of future counseling testified well before the restitution hearing and by the
date of the hearing it was unclear what treatment the minor would need and how much it would cost. 1871
The court remanded the case so that the lower court could develop a more “reasonable estimate” based on
the victim’s prognosis. 1872 Thus, affirming the lower court’s decision but vacating the lower court’s award
of damages, the court of appeals held that in order to form a reasonable estimate of future expenses in a
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restitution case, courts should look to evidence regarding the victim’s current condition and likely cost and
duration of possible future treatments. 1873

TRUSTS & ESTATES LAW
Alaska Supreme Court
Dieringer v. Martin
In Dieringer v. Martin, 1874 the supreme court held that: (1) a probate master may not make new
factual findings on the merits when a case is remanded to the probate master for reconsideration of fees
only, 1875 and (2) a trustee is not entitled to compensation for an attempted defense of bad-faith conduct
when he was found guilty of that misconduct. 1876 The supreme court had previously vacated the superior
court’s award of fees to a trustee, and remanded the case for reconsideration of the amount of fees
owed. 1877 On remand, the probate master deemed the case completely open, and recommended that the
superior court uphold its prior award of fees to the trustee. 1878 The superior court rejected the master’s
recommendation, and reduced the fee award to the trustee. 1879 The trustee appealed the superior court’s
rejection of the master’s new factual findings. 1880 The supreme court reasoned that because the case was
remanded only for consideration of the fee amount, the case was not completely open, and the superior
court properly excluded the probate master’s new factual findings. 1881 The supreme court also found that
the trustee had committed intentional bad-faith acts, precluding reimbursement for his defense of that
misconduct. 1882 The supreme court affirmed the superior court, holding that: (1) a probate master may not
make new factual findings on the merits when a case is remanded to the probate master for reconsideration
of fees only, 1883 and (2) a trustee is not entitled to compensation for an attempted defense of bad-faith
conduct when he was found guilty of that misconduct. 1884
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